Daily Report

East Europe

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FBIS-EEU-94-188 *28 September 1994*

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NOTICE TO READERS: Effective 1 October, the processing indicators appearing in brackets at the start of each item in this publication will be changed. All new indicators will begin with "FBIS" to make the material more easily identifiable in databases. Some will also indicate whether the item has been translated from the vernacular or transcribed from English.

All material in this volume previously disseminated in electronic form.

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Article Criticizes Prime Minister's Role

AU2709170594 Lezhe KOHA JONE in Albanian 24 Sep 94 p 2

[Article by T. Cela: "Who Really Directs the Albanian Government"]

[Text] "I think that the transformation of the Albanian economy and Albanian life in the last two and one-half years has been radical," Prime Minister Aleksander Meksi announced in reply to a Socialist motion demanding his dismissal. Sali Berisha did not lag behind in expressing his own support for the government. "Prime Minister Meksi and his cabinet enjoy my total confidence and that of all Albanians who have supported the reform and who realistically judge its major achievements in Albania," Berisha declared. Without going into the question of who these people are who support the reform and how many they are, it is worth asking why the president of the republic persists in his "weakness" for the prime minister, in the teeth of all the demands of the opposition and the other political forces and in spite of the continual accusations laid at the door of the Meksi cabinet.

The media have often criticized the present prime minister not only for virtually nonexistent relations with the mass media, but also for his almost notional responsibilities, and has claimed, possibly humorously, that Meksi hears of cabinet changes four days late.

There has been no lack of criticism from the opposition: paralyzed industry, increasing corruption and smuggling, illegal privatization, incessant strikes, the Libofsh incident, and finally cholera would be enough to unseat any prime minister. However, perhaps because he is convinced that "in a very short period, no more could be done than what has been done," or because he believes in the old refrain of Albanian statesmen, "the dogs may bark but the caravan moves on," the prime minister blithely continues in the post he has occupied for two and one-half years.

Moreover, he has maintained for two and one-half years the support of President Berisha, whom the current law allows to chair meetings of the government, displacing Meksi to the seat normally occupied by Kopliku.

Let us set to one side for a moment all these things, which after all are results of the policies pursued by the government, and look at what the Albanian prime minister has actually done. Nobody can say specifically what this is, because we have rarely heard Meksi speak or issue proposals or produce his alternatives, and still less represent the policies of his state in the international arena. After the "meeting" with Amato two years ago, it seems that Meksi has decided not to become mixed up in foreign policy, a decision that no other prime minister in the world has made. In fact, he becomes mixed up with everything and nothing, because as far as one knows he has very little in his hands.

The role of the prime minister in Albanian political life is so pallid that he acquiesces in chairing the discussion of a draft constitution according to which nothing will be left of the parliamentary republic except its name, if the prerogatives of the president are to be those anticipated by Meksi. What would Meksi do in such a situation?

Perhaps nothing more or less than today, claims Social-Democratic Party Chairman Skender Gjinushi, speaking about the decline of the prime minister's role in Albania, a decline that has been imposed on the prime minister as a result of pressures of various kinds. However, there are many cases in which he has voluntarily acceded to this. At bottom, this might be one of the main reasons why Berisha supports Meksi and also the reason why he has not been replaced.

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Zhelev Returns From Germany Via Vienna

AU2809083394 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 0500 GMT 28 Sep 94

[Text] On 27 September, President Zhelyu Zhelev returned from his brief, unofficial visit to Germany. Prior to his return to Bulgaria he made a brief stopover in Vienna, where he met Federal President Thomas Klestil.

Issues related to bilateral relations and Bulgaria's integration in the European Union were discussed during the talks in Germany and Austria.

The German politicians showed understanding and sympathy for the Bulgarian demand to have indirect compensation for the losses caused by the Yugoslav embargo with the construction of a stable transportation infrastructure in the Balkans.

Both in Vienna and Bonn the hosts showed considerable interest in Bulgaria's political situation.

Minister Rescinds Decision Retiring Some Officers

AU2709122594 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 16 Sep 94 p 2

[Report by Elin Rakhnev: "Ministry Postponed Retirement for Some of 'Those Colonels'"]

[Text] Sofia—It was announced yesterday that Defense Minister Valentin Aleksandrov has decided to permit colonels who do not satisfy the requirements of Article 71 of the General Military Service Act to remain in the Bulgarian Army for a further year, but his decision only applies to officers serving in operational units. The colonels serving in the General Staff and at the headquarters of the different armed services will remain in regular army service.

The decision was finally announced at a meeting between the minister and the commanders of the Armed Services. According to information from the Defense Ministry Press Center, the Supreme Military Council is to meet on 21 September, when, in addition to the Army's budget and financial provisions, it is expected to discuss cadre issues.

The deferral of the retirement of certain officers is reportedly aimed at gradually correcting the existing imbalances in the age profile of the officers corps and ensuring "the normal functioning of operational units that are important for combat readiness."

After arguing for three months with General Lyuben Petrov, the former chief of General Staff, Defense Minister Valentin Aleksandrov had intended to transfer 275 colonels to the reserve at the beginning of September.

At the start of April Aleksandrov announced that 2,886 officers were to be retired, including 330 colonels, and this marked the start of the conflict between him and the former chief of the General Staff. On 18 August, however, Gen. Petrov officially rejected any dismissals whatsoever.

On 1 September the government declared its support for the defense minister and refused to examine Gen. Petrov's objections. The cabinet resigned the next day. In the opinion of observers, the war between the defense minister and chief of the General Staff was one of the main reasons for the fall of the Berov administration.

At a news conference in Sofia yesterday, it was announced that the Officers Patriotic Union "Honor and Merit" will be officially founded on 8 October 1994. According to the union's initiative committee, immense corruption is allegedly spreading in the Bulgarian Army, especially among the senior military, and mafia-like connections have developed between civilian and military bigwigs.

Lieutenant General Lyutskan Lyutskanov of the Reserve, leader of the "Honor and Merit" Union, accused the new political and military "elite" of shameful behavior, lack of professionalism, and moral turpitude, and promised to fight corruption and the mafia in the Bulgarian Army by lawful means.

[Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian on 19 September on page 2 reports that the Defense Ministry Press Center issued a fax late on 16 September, confirming that "81 of the 275 colonels retired by Defense Minister Valentin Aleksandrov will remain in army service for a further year"]

New Choice Chooses Ludzhev as Candidate

AU2809093494 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 0900 GMT 28 Sep 94

[Text] On 28 September at a news conference that took place on the SOFIA PRESS premises, it was officially confirmed that the New Choice Political Council had proposed Dimitur Ludzhev for the post of prime minister. Ivan Pushkarov announced the decision at the news conference.

According to Pushkarov, New Choice has a firm idea about the formula of the cabinet that it will be proposing. This cabinet will have to outline its tasks clearly and categorically, because against the background of the current situation in the country there is no room for political maneuvers.

Further Comment on New Choice Cabinet Mandate

AU2809103594 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 26 Sep 94 p 4

[Text] Today the New Choice faction will officially receive the mandate to form a new cabinet. Within one week this last turn of the parliamentary roulette will reduce the incredible amount of questions that surround the cabinet crisis.

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It will become clear whether the hysteria that engulfed the political elite, will be channeled toward new elections or toward forming a new cabinet. The strenuous consultations, most of which were conducted at the middle and even lower level, and were of the "conversations at the National Assembly canteen" kind, confirmed the strength of the tradition established by the current National Assembly—to form a new cabinet rather than hold new elections.

The chance to catch the last train—meaning a post in the new cabinet or at least preserving the seat in the National Assembly—is solely based on the hope of holding a secret vote on the new cabinet in the parliament. The evils of this variant are obvious: The cabinet will not be backed by the openly acknowledged responsibility of the deputies who voted for it in a secret vote. This fact would deprive the cabinet of the public confidence and thus of the opportunity to implement its executive power ideas. This fact turns the activities of the political formation that is at present trying to draw lists with names of ministers into a rather senseless enterprise.

The only justification of those who support the new cabinet variant is that by forming a new cabinet the institutions, legislature, and the so-called political forces will be provided with the opportunity to put their affairs in order, something that would at least partially facilitate the conduct of new elections. Thus the choice at the National Assembly will be between the lesser of two evils.

Dimitrov Indicates Possible Allies in Campaign

AU2809090294 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 27 Sep 94

[By reporter Antoaneta Puncheva]

[Text] Today, Filip Dimitrov, chairman of the National Coordinating Council of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS], clearly indicated who the future allies of the SDS will be. They will come from the ranks of the public organizations, Agrarians, monarchists, and representatives of various ethnic groups in the country that, according to Dimitrov, should also be represented in the next parliament. Filip Dimitrov believes that the chances of Ahmed Dogan [leader of Rights and Freedoms Movement] has negligible chances of success in the next elections. In Dimitrov's view, Mehmed Hodja [leader of Party for Democratic Changes] may be able to win over part of the disillusioned DPS electorate.

The SDS also confirmed its positions regarding the government crisis. The SDS supports an open vote against the formation of a new government in the present parliament, and opposes amendments to the Electoral Law at the moment, because they constitute an attempt to put off the elections.

Talks With BPDP

AU2809105194 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1000 GMT 28 Sep 94

[Text] On 28 September Filip Dimitrov, chairman of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] National Coordinating Council, and Stefan Sofiyanski, deputy chairman of the SDS National Coordinating Council, received representatives of the leadership of the Bulgarian People's Democratic Party [BPDP] at the latter's request.

Issues related to forms of pre-election cooperation were discussed at the meeting. Both sides oppose forming a new cabinet in the existing parliament, because this would exacerbate the crisis in Bulgaria even further.

The SDS Press Center announced that the dialogue between the two political forces will continue.

BSP Restates Stand on Elections, Bill, Cabinet

AU2709173594 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1400 GMT 27 Sep 94

[Text] The New Choice parliamentary faction could successfully implement its mandate to form a new cabinet because everything is possible in our parliament. That is what Aleksandur Marinov, deputy chairman of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] parliamentary faction, said today at the BSP's regular weekly news conference.

BSP Deputy Chairman Doncho Konakchiev said that the BSP is continuing to act for early parliamentary elections and that it will continue its contacts with all other political forces that want early elections.

The BSP parliamentary faction thinks that there could be insufficient time and political will for the adoption of a new election bill at the National Assembly. Therefore, the BSP faction will agree to amend the existing Election Bill. The Socialists, however, will insist on the adoption of several important amendments, such as adopting a mixed election system.

The BSP parliamentary faction will adhere to its decision not to support a new cabinet in this parliament and it will not review its position on the necessity of holding early parliamentary elections.

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Prime Minister on Talks With French Leaders

LD2809090794 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 0700 GMT 28 Sep 94

[Text] Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus returned during the night from a visit to France, which culminated on 27 September in meetings with three important French leaders: Prime Minister Edouard Balladur, Paris Mayor Jacques Chirac, and Interior Minister Charles Pasqua. This is how Vaclav Klaus summarized his talks for Czech Radio:

[Begin Klaus recording] Our talks were mostly concerned with the subject of Europe and less with the subject of bilateral Czech-French relations because the latter are in order or, should I say, if they are not quite as intense [hutne] as we would wish them to be, it is the task of each of us to take a look at them rather than its being a matter for the state.

The [word indistinct] about Europe were thus very interesting for me. It is clear that it is worth having these tete-a-tetes because sometimes one gets impressions rather different from those that are dominant in the media. I think a pragmatic view on this matter prevails in French politics and among the current French political leadership. It is nonideological, there is no a prioriism [neaprioristicky], it is nonfundamentalist. Everyone simply accepts the fact that Europe will have an eternal problem as to how to integrate, that the path of integration cannot be precisely marked out once and for all, and that certain ideas will win over others and then be implemented.

That is precisely how I feel and what I believe is right. A few years ago the trend was significantly different. [end recording]

Radio-Television Council Elects New Chairman

AU2709125794 Prague LIDOVÉ NOVINY in Czech 23 Sep 94 p 3

[Article by "ljd": "Bohuslav Hanus New Chairman of the Council for Czech Radio and Television Broadcasting"]

[Excerpts] Prague—The Czech Council for Czech Radio and Television Broadcasting can find no reason to revoke any decision it made in its former composition. The council presented itself by this definite statement on the floor of the Parliamentary Commission for Media for the first time after its election.

The Council was recalled in its original composition by the Chamber of Deputies on 2 July, and the mandate of three of its members was renewed. Similarly to the previous council, they have not reached an agreement regarding the ninth seat on the council.

The parliamentary commission heard the main problems of the council, among which is the decision on utilizing 38 local radio frequencies that are used until the end of 1995 by holders of licenses issued by interdepartmental commissions. [passage omitted]

Following its transfer from the Chamber of Deputies to its basis in Prague-Strasnice, the council elected Bohuslav Hanus, former deputy chairman of the council, member of the recalled council, and former high-ranking employee of the Radiocommunications Administration, new chairman to replace Jindrich Kabat, who resigned. The council also prepared an appeal to all monitors of the broadcast to contribute to the fairness of the election campaign.

Problems Facing Uranium Mining Industry Examined

AU2709133794 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 12 Sep 94 p 14

[Article by "(pek)": "Diamo Has Suspended Uranium Mining for Three Months but Expects To Resume Full Production Later"]

[Text] Straz pod Ralskem—The Diamo State Enterprise Straz pod Ralskem has suspended uranium-ore mining in two of its branches. The Czechoslovak Uranium Industry Enterprise Pribram, the former giant, is going through a considerable reduction process as a result of the winding down in the production of this strategic raw material.

Individual production units such as construction plants, machine shops, electrical-engineering plants, laboratories, and design establishments are being transferred from the state's ownership in several privatization measures. At the beginning of August, the government approved another 20 entities that it is offering for privatization. The state will keep under its administration only those operations that are related directly to mining, in which a winding down or liquidation program is under way or that are associated with eradicating the influence of mining on the environment.

According to Jan Kafka, the head of the director's secretariat, at the moment, Diamo is supplying uranium concentrate exclusively for the requirements of the nuclear power plants in the Czech Republic. Its only customer is the Czech Power-Generating Works [CEZ]. "We have to orient ourselves toward domestic customers because the price of uranium on world markets has declined considerably during the past 10 years, and we are unable to compete. Moreover, we never presented ourselves abroad previously because that was impossible before 1989." However, CEZ has announced that it is not considering a delivery this year for the first fuel for the Temelin nuclear power plant, and an agreement had still not been reached on a delivery for Dukovany before the beginning of the summer. So, as of 1 July, the enterprise management acquiesced to a regular suspension of work, which, however, will be extended to three months from the normal three to four weeks. The suspension of production concerns the Chemicka Tezba

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[Chemical Mining] branch in Straz pod Ralskem and the GEAM branch in Dolni Rozince in the Bohemian-Moravian highlands. It will affect some 70 percent of the employees. Work not associated with mining (for example, liquidation and clean-up operations) will continue as normal. "We extended people's regular vacations by 14 days. In the time remaining, they receive 60 percent of their average salary in harmony with the labor code. At the same time, they have an opportunity to earnextra money elsewhere. Following the break, production in the two branches will be resumed to the extent planned," explains Jan Kafka.

An agreement was eventually reached with CEZ on covering the Dukovany power plant's energy requirements. Diamo's representatives do not want to divulge more about the agreement.

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President on Economy, Visegrad, EU Integration

WS2709145094 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 27 Sep 94 p 9

[Interview with President Michal Kovac by Andrzej Jagodzinski; date and place not given: "Pluralism Is Not a Brawl"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Jagodzinski] Everything seems to suggest that, after the election, power in the country will be once again wielded by a coalition government. Which coalition would be best, do you think?

[Kovac] Opinion polls indeed indicate that a strong government will have to be formed by a coalition of at least three, and perhaps even four, five, or six parties. The most important matter is that the government should be able to lead to a social and political reconciliation. The parties that will form the cabinet should be able to cooperate as partners not only among themselves but also with the opposition and extragovernmental establishments.

It should be a government that will not shake the confidence that the international community has placed in Slovakia; the government should be able to guarantee economic growth and convince everyone that it wants to carry the process of economic transformation through to the end—especially privatization. It should be a government that will give all guarantees to foreign capital.

As far as the confidence of our foreign partners is concerned, I can say with satisfaction that the government and I have achieved pretty good results in recent months. The new cabinet cannot let this go down the drain.

[Jagodzinski] What economic priorities can you see for the new government?

[Kovac] First, the budget deficit must be kept within limits acceptable to the IMF. Moreover, privatization, which was slowed down a little in the preelection period, should be increased. Apart from that, along with the Visegrad Group states and other countries, we should deal with the development of the infrastructure: extension of the network of railway and road connections, telecommunications, ports, and so forth. In other words, we should do everything that today can be done not in isolation but in broad cooperation.

An important effect of this might be a recovery in several areas of production as well as a decrease in unemployment, which is rather high. Moreover, reform of the social-care system must be completed because the present system is still characterized by the socialist way of thinking, is not efficient, and does not provide strong motivation for people to work—even in regions where jobs can be found.

Past Disputes—For Historians

[Jagodzinski] What is the most urgent task of foreign policy?

[Kovac] It is undoubtedly the task of regulating relations with Hungary. Once we achieve this, our chances of becoming a member of the European Union [EU] will increase. The new Hungarian Government and the Slovak Government have expressed a desire to sign a treaty on mutual cooperation as soon as possible. I hope this is really possible to accomplish.

We must reach an agreement with Hungary in a number of specific areas: the water economy on the Danube, the water power plant in Gabcikovo, the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, and others. It is of secondary importance whether a treaty will be followed by these specifics or vice versa. What is really important is that we should remove our mutual prejudices and create an atmosphere of trust. The past should be left to historians.

[Jagodzinski] You launched the initiative of the so-called minority tables.

[Kovac] Last year in Medzilaborce, eastern Slovakia, I met with representatives of the Ruthenian and Ukrainian minorities. I presented them with my plan for holding roundtable talks at least twice a year. However, the purpose of such meetings would no longer be, as has been to date, a dialogue between minorities and representatives of the state authorities because I hope that such institutions will not be indispensable for holding a dialogue with the government. I also hope that the government itself will create permanent and effective mechanisms for communicating with minorities.

As I see it, the new purpose of the "tables" should be the exchange of experiences between the various minorities or even coordination of the activities they engage in.

[Jagodzinski] You have mentioned the Visegrad Group. Do you mean only a loose exchange of views?

[Kovac] In my opinion, coordination of activities would be much more effective. Something like this exists already in the economy: the free trade zone. I believe it has proved itself, even though some dates for lifting tariffs could be less remote. Now, in the area of politics, it would be good to coordinate our activities aimed at speeding up our integration with EU, NATO, or other international organizations.

If we had managed to arrive at one common stand, our position would be better. I think steps taken on one's own, not in a group, are nearsighted: Even if I am safe and my neighbor is not, my own safety becomes relative as well. I believe that this is a universal truth, and it is not important that now it is being repeated by a representative of a small country.

Let me add that I have never been suspected by any Western politician of wanting to establish some alternative structures through such cooperation. On the contrary; I heard only words of encouragement. [passage omitted]

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Meciar Discusses Topical Preelection Issues

AU2709122694 Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 22 Sep 94 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Vladimir Meciar, chairman of Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, by Pavol Minarik; place and date not given: "We Do Not Intend To Give Up Our Alternatives"]

[Text] [Minarik] Slovakia has once again found itself at a crossroads. In your view, in what direction will it proceed after the election?

[Meciar] Slovakia's foreign policy coordinates have been set and are unalterable. However, it finds itself in a domestic dilemma. First and foremost, the country needs to confirm, apply, and accept its statehood. Then, it must do the same with regard to its domestic political stability, steadying its constitutional bodies and settling the minorities' relations with Slovaks. It should be given a clear concept for its economic orientation, something it has not had so far. There is a situation of permanent renewal in our country. Finally, instability in the government and parliament—after the election, this will be the sixth government since 1989—prevents the formulation of any kind of conceptual policy, and this is the dilemma Slovakia is facing today. The dilemma derives from the fact that, although the country has the potential for development, its policy prevents it from making progress. If this situation does not improve, it will not be possible to utilize this potential for development, and there may be a deterioration.

[Minarik] You are getting ready to return to power for the third time. You no longer talk about the victory of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] in the coming election—just the number of votes it will win. Will your predictions come true?

[Meciar] It is hard to say. The HZDS represents an alternative, and we are asking for support for it. We are not Slovakia's keeper, and everything now depends on the extent to which citizens accept this alternative. We pledge to execute our responsibility to the extent to which it is assigned to us. We do not intend to give up our alternatives because other parties have no alternatives and are not even offering them. As a matter of fact, our opponents are mostly an assortment of personally dissatisfied, ambitious people who, admittedly, know where they want to sit but do not know what they will do there.

[Minarik] You have said several times that it would be better if you yourselves formed the government after the election. If this were not possible, however, with whom would you endeavor to do so?

[Meciar] The first option is an electoral one: If, in casting their ballots, the citizens were to express such confidence in us that we could form the government ourselves, this would be a considerable stabilizing element for Slovakia. The second option, a postelection one, may mean instability, an attempt to form a government in opposition to the HZDS. Work is already under way on this. It may even embrace an attempt to entrust the formation of the government three times to someone parliament will not accept, which would trigger a new crisis and a fresh election within six months. The citizen is faced with these options. If he gives us enough support and strength to maintain political stability, we can guarantee him successful development.

However, if he were not to give us this, we do not see stability in an unstable political partnership. After all, it is known that the political entities in Slovakia are more than at sixes and sevens and more than unstable internally.

[Minarik] A political opponent in Slovakia is often turned into an enemy. Do you think the situation will remain like this for long?

[Meciar] Excuse me, I look upon them not as enemies but as guys playing at politics.

[Minarik] In your opinion, what does Slovakia most lack?

[Meciar] Domestic calm and stability in its constitutional bodies. Everything else can resolve itself. A change of strategy has to be tried. What I mean by this is a change from the strategy of macroeconomic restriction to the strategy of recovery and development. The Slovak Republic has all of the potential to be able to do this. I just do not know if it will manage to unite itself in order to achieve this goal.

[Minarik] Many politicians—and not just they—are calling for reconciliation in Slovakia before the election.

[Meciar] The problems in this sphere derive from systemic flaws. For example, the position of the president of the Republic is a little unusual in our country. This was brought about by the compromise demanded by the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] before the vote on the Slovak Constitution. It is apparent, however, that this was a mistake. In our country, the president is the supreme commander of the armed forces and is its only representative abroad. He may—but does not have to—appoint government members at his own discretion; at the same time, however, he does not exercise control over the cabinet. The president submits a report on the state of the Republic, but there is no supervision over him in the execution of his function. He is not subject to control by the public because he was not elected by a nationwide ballot; parliament may exercise control over him, however. Nevertheless, it can only do so if he commits treason or if he endangers the constitutional system of the Slovak Republic. It is obvious that this constitutional loophole impairs the continuity and stability of the country's constitutional system and something has to be done about this. This does not mean, however, that the issue involves Michal Kovac. It involves the systemic flaw in the Constitution, the flaw that appeared when it was adopted.

[Minarik] You see no possibility of resolving relations with President Kovac?

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[Meciar] The president himself has made it clear before the election that he is opposed to the HZDS, although he is the impartial head of state. His public statements are directed against the movement from which he came, which is unethical, and also against its chairman—that is, me. If, in the meantime, he has altered his ideological values and ideas, this may, perhaps, be as a consequence of the development of his personality, but, perhaps, it is also a deformation. In no way can he be regarded as a person who has the right to stand above the parties in such a biased manner.

[Minarik] On the basis of a speech made by M. Zeman [Czech Social Democratic Party chairman] in Kosice, you drew the conclusion that the Slovak model may be used against Prime Minister Klaus in recalling him from the government. Do you really think this could happen?

[Meciar] Zeman said literally in Kosice that negotiations on repeating what has happened in Slovakia have already begun in the Czech lands. Likewise, he said that the situation is possible, and I believe he used the word "realistic." There is a recording of his speech in Kosice. It would be interesting for the Czechs to know what he thinks about them and how he intends to destabilize the political scene. Zeman is infiltrating Slovakia in a similar manner. He is offering us some kind of unionist arrangement. He is consulting mainly the Party of the Democratic Left, the postcommunists, and also the Slovak social democrats. Apparently, Mr. Zeman announced in Kosice—and publicly—that the time has come for a change of government in the Czech Republic.

[Minarik] The Hungarian parties are increasing their efforts to establish autonomy in the ethnically mixed area of Southern Slovakia. You have said that, if this were to happen on an ethnic basis, it would be a tragedy. Even your opponents from the current governing coalition disagree with the establishment of autonomy. You sharply criticize them, however.

[Meciar] I think that what the Hungarian parties are doing is the penultimate step before partition. And, as far as the coalition is concerned? You cannot latch onto what, for example, SDL Chairman Weiss says; it is necessary to look at what he does. His talks in Budapest have not been made public. If you look at developments since the beginning of the year, the Komarno appeal for autonomy issued in January shocked Slovaks. However, Moravcik's government is quietly fulfilling all of the eight points that came out of this Komarno appeal. The way is being paved for the drive toward attaining autonomy. All of this will now lead to the polarization of Slovak political entities into two unbalanced [sentence incomplete as published]. And the Hungarian political parties are becoming the decisive balance on the scales. Given the current mode of government, they are the ones determining Slovak policy. During the six months Moravcik's government has been in office, his cabinet has faced collapse twice—and twice it has depended on the Hungarian political parties. So, his government must obey. These issues are not discussed in public, but they are, in fact, being implemented quietly.

[Minarik] How do you view the Czech Republic?

[Meciar] As an important and significant partner. In our program, we ascribe special importance to relations with the Czech Republic.

[Minarik] What is it like to be in opposition? I do not think it can be so bad. You have lost weight, you take part in sports, and you are relaxed. You were rather worn out in the government.

[Meciar] Sport is the only means of relaxation. Otherwise, I do not rest at all. We drafted the HZDS's comprehensive program during the course of several weeks. We have reconstructed the movement and prepared completely new people for parliament as well as a whole new structure for the electoral team. So, work for me was, and is, hectic. As far as our position in the opposition is concerned, I do not consider it to be a disgrace because it is a structure for executing power. However, we behave constructively in the opposition. We do not go the Council of Europe to complain or to other countries to rail against the government. We consider our relations with it to be Slovakia's internal affair. We are not carrying out destruction in the social sphere. We do not want to call strikes or cause social unrest. We are only proceeding in the manner in which an opposition party has the right and duty to proceed. We are merely giving lessons in political culture to those who were in opposition before us, lessons in how to behave for when the situation is reversed.

[Minarik] What did you want to say to Slovak voters in the campaign song "Vivat Slovakia"?

[Meciar] It is not only a campaign song; it is also an expression of something we feel. We were regarded as a confrontational movement, but we produced a good word and a song. That is not confrontation. It is human affinity.

Addresses TV Viewers

LD2709232394 Bratislava STV 1 Television Network in Slovak 2145 GMT 27 Sep 94

[Speech to television viewers by former Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar in Bratislava on 27 September—recorded]

[Excerpts] Dear fellow citizens, the election of 1994 goes far beyond the framework of the four-year election period. We are at the crossroads of a possibility to choose between two alternatives. You will decide how Slovakia will develop further. It is a young state. [passage omitted]

The contradictions that riddle Slovakia are not only personality contradictions but also conceptual contradictions. That is why it is important for us to seek stability, a stable path, and stable representations.

If in October we have in Slovakia the sixth government and the fourth parliament, it would be bad if, after a certain short period of time, we have to do it all over

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again. A new election would be very expensive. That is why we should try to pass our exams the first time.

Slovakia is facing the alternative of creating its political system. Eighteen political parties are competing for your attention; the majority of them are very small parties. We are to choose how Slovakia is to develop. [passage omitted]

For Slovakia, this election also mean a lot because it is to decide definitively about the path and the strategy of its economic reform. If the results of the economic reform until now have excluded the strategy of tightening belts, one has to embark on the path of development, on the path of growth and economic revival. The social situation and employment must be improved by increasing the gross national product. [passage omitted]

We must go and vote for ourselves, for our state. Slovakia needs a new alternative, a new perspective, and a new certainty. Good luck, Slovakia, on your way. I hope we succeed with our program: Slovakia, Get on With It.

Daily Carries HZDS Election Manifesto

AU2709134294 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA (Special supplement) in Slovak 21 Sep 94 pp 1-28

["Election Program of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia—Go Slovakia, Go!"]

[Excerpts] Esteemed Fellow Citizens: Elections are a direct, free, and democratic choice, in which the citizen decides on the development he and society will take and on the selection of his representatives. Elections are both a right and a responsibility.

The 1990 election decided on the fall of totalitarianism and the 1992 election on the sovereignty and freedom of the Slovak Republic. The 1994 election can decide on the internal stability of the state, on transition toward economic recovery and new prosperity. As doubts have been cast on this state, the election will also supersede a referendum [on Slovakia's independence]. They will also determine whether the citizen will leave the state in the hands of those who did not want it, or whether he lets those complete their work who had founded and started to build it.

The Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] wants to complete the tasks arising from the state's founding. It subscribes to the Christian scale of values. It wants to achieve recovery and renewal of society's growth. It wants to give everyone work, prosperity, peace, order, and opportunity. We see the basic sources of our development primarily within our society. This also presupposes the continuation of foreign policy cooperation in a way that we started implementing after 1 January 1993. We are looking in the proposed program for guarantees of social security. We are also looking for guarantees of stability for the state. Unstable and weak parties will not create a stable state.

We are submitting to you a program of what we want to achieve and how we see our path for Slovakia. We stand by this program, which we understand as a public promise given to you, citizens, for your future. We will be able to implement it to the degree to which you bestow trust upon us in the election and, along with it, responsibility for our further life.

We introduce to you people who have come to identify with this program, who want to implement it, and who know how to go about it. They also want to right the mistakes of those who failed.

The condition for our work is your vote in the election. Under the present electoral system, there are no people who do not vote. There are only those who choose their alternative directly and those who do not care about the future and agree with their vote being statistically distributed to all parties in the second count.

The HZDS is a civic movement. We look for, and find, the purpose of our activity in serving you. With your support, we will achieve anything. We have started a grand project. Allow us to complete it for our common benefit, joy, and use.

We have a historic chance. Let us not waste it!

[signed] Vladimir Meciar [passage omitted]

Economic Strategy

What Slovakia Needs:

1. The formulation of a long-term economic strategy for the Slovak Republic

What the HZDS will do:

In the 18 months of its independent existence, the Slovak economy demonstrated its viability and prerequisites of effective development. This is evidenced by the economic results thus far, which bear witness to economic recovery.

The long-term target of the HZDS economic strategy, which we suppose will be attained at the turn of the century, is the building of a prosperous socially and ecologically oriented market economy, based on economic growth and, thereby, on the prosperity of citizens, communities, regions, the nation, ethnic minorities, and the state. The aim is to approach the advanced European market economies from the viewpoint of economic potential and the standard of living and to establish prerequisites for society's adaptation to the civilization changes of the third millennium and for full-fledged integration into European structures.

We will set up an agency for the formulation of long-term economic strategy of the Slovak Republic.

What Slovakia needs:

2. The implementation of economic transformation with a view to creating a new type of democratic society, one that takes into consideration the conditions of the Slovak Republic.

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What the HZDS will do:

We will orient the transformation process toward giving the finishing touches to the building of a pluralistic, participatory, and cooperative democratic society that respects human rights, social tolerance, and ethical norms of mutual cooperation and understanding.

The economic system of the Slovak Republic will be based on market relations, plurality of proprietary forms with a preponderance of private ownership, universal human values, creative self-realization, and the individual's participation and share in the implementation of society's targets and economic recovery.

We consider a harmonious relationship between the operation of the market and the economic and social authority of the state to be the foundation of a socially and ecologically oriented market economy. We will keep state intervention in the economy to a minimum and gear its influence toward the establishment of an adequate entrepreneurial environment, restrict the operation of economic and information monopolies, establish conditions for freedom of enterprise and equality of opportunities, and support honest acquisition of property, well-deserved growth of prosperity, and social progress.

We will secure, furthermore, social partnership in the economy, a cooperative relationship between labor and capital. We want to secure participation by management and by employees in the creation of economic results by interlinking in a systemic way performance and competition with solidarity and social responsibility, in the interest of the development of civic activities and social peace.

What Slovakia needs:

3. The creation of prerequisites for economic recovery and long-term growth of the economy of the Slovak Republic.

What the HZDS will do:

It is necessary to move away from restrictive monetary and budget policy toward developmental economic policy, and, in the interest thereof, we will provide for:

—gradually increasing the rate of GDP growth from the present level to 7 percent in 1998,

—maintaining the annual rate of inflation, calculated on the basis of growth of consumer prices, at a level under 12 percent and gradually reducing it,

—gradually reducing the present rate of unemployment to under 10 percent by means of the creation of development centers, support for small and medium-sized businesses, and development of job-creating services and entrepreneurial activities,

—gradually reducing the state budget deficit to under 3 percent of the GDP,

—not exceeding a sustainable level of internal and external indebtedness of the Slovak Republic,

—monetary stability and the gradual attainment of full convertibility of the Slovak koruna [Sk], primarily by means of effective proexport policy,

—providing incentives for investment activities on the basis of changes in proprietary relations so that the share of the private sector in overall investments becomes decisive and regional aspects are taken into account in the development of capital investment,

—more pronounced support for science, research, development, information technology, and education (quaternary sector) with a view to putting dynamism into the economy as the basic prerequisite of securing sufficient resources and improving health, the development of education, and the culture of national and ethnic minorities.

What Slovakia needs:

4. Achieving a fundamental solution to structural changes in the economy and growth of employment.

What the HZDS will do:

The development of public and private investments will be used as a point of departure in securing the essential restructuring of the economy and growth of employment. This makes it necessary:

—to take steps toward the implementation of public investments aimed at the completion of the transportation, energy, telecommunications, and transit infrastructure, water economy projects, and ecological systems,

—to reduce the tax burden of investing entrepreneurs and enterprises, for example, by writing off a part of investment expenditures from taxable income,

—in justified cases, when there are sufficient domestic material and technical prerequisites and enough manpower, to support public investment projects by means of a strictly purpose-linked credit issue or to finance them by means of a budget deficit while at the same time applying regulatory anti-inflationary measures in the sphere of prices and wages and strict tender proceedings,

—to use foreign loans or direct foreign capital involvement in the sphere of public investments exclusively to secure state-of-the-art technology and know-how,

—to support by means of tax and customs instruments imports of state-of-the-art technology and know-how as a condition for the successful restructuring of the economy and the effective utilization of foreign capital.

What Slovakia needs:

5. Defining ways and means of achieving long-term and short-term economic targets.

What the HZDS will do:

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It is necessary to build functional market relations in all spheres of economic activity, based on the prevailing share of private ownership.

In the interest thereof, we will support:

—the purposeful restructuring of the economy in order to raise the ability of products and services to compete,

—purposeful privatization, which will enable the effective utilization of the natural, human, material, and capital resources of our economy,

—Slovakia's prospective full-fledged involvement in European integrative groupings, the establishment or reinforcement of a network of the Slovak Republic's foreign economic representations in the world, and the reinforcement of foreign economic activities of the Slovak Republic's representative missions abroad,

—the grooming and professional preparation of a new generation of entrepreneurs and managers capable of performing the most demanding domestic and foreign economic activities,

—the building of a quality control system on a par with the European standard and the expeditious introduction of the "Made in Slovakia" system as a prestigious trademark. [passage omitted]

Privatization

What Slovakia needs:

1. To achieve by means of privatization the restructuring of the economy and the restoration of companies' health.

What the HZDS will do:

The privatization concept will be implemented so that it establishes a competitive environment and eliminates the monopoly status of privatized companies, and so the privatization process helps solve the problems of their restructuring, financial recovery, and development, while taking into account specific features of individual sectors of the economy.

What Slovakia needs:

2. To achieve by means of privatization the emergence of a strong domestic entrepreneurial class that will become a guarantee of Slovakia's economic development.

What the HZDS will do:

In the interest of supporting the domestic entrepreneurial class, we will permit payment by installments and the writing off of investments from the purchase price. This means that, when selecting buyers of privatized property, the main emphasis will be placed on a precisely formulated and well-founded entrepreneurial plan. In special and well-founded cases, we will also accept sale for a so-called symbolic price, but always linked to employee stock ownership and with provisions for strict penalties in the event of nonfulfillment of the agreed conditions by the buyer.

What Slovakia needs:

3. The enforcing of employees' participation in privatization.

What the HZDS will do:

In the interest of reinforcing the social acceptability of the privatization process, we will enforce employees' participation in the privatization of companies. By means of employees' wide-ranging participation in the privatization of companies, we will motivate all employees in the long-term development of the privatized company and provide incentives for employees to support the investment strategy of their company. We will not limit participation to current employees but will extend it also to former retired employees who spent a great number of years in the company and thereby significantly contributed to the creation of values that are now subject to privatization. We will push for this principle as an element of justice in the privatization process, paying heed to the interests of the population of the relevant regions. A firm foundation for a participatory economy will be built in this way.

What Slovakia needs:

4. Support for, and effective regulation of, foreign capital entering the economy.

What the HZDS will do:

We will direct foreign capital entry primarily toward investments in new technology and in the modernization and reconstruction of enterprises, while retaining Slovak entities' significant stakes in the privatized property of joint ventures, particularly in strategic branches.

What Slovakia needs:

5. Reassessment of the use of coupon privatization.

What the HZDS will do:

Coupon privatization will be applied only in the case of larger enterprises, while respecting the principle that only a minority part of equity will be offered for sale for investment coupons. Emphasis will be placed on the sale of companies by standard methods. In this way, we will generate [vygenerujeme] new owners of privatized enterprises not on the basis of the arbitrary process of share allocation but on that of purposeful selection, in which heed will be paid to the buyer's entrepreneurial plan and in which the company's specific features and its requirements for restructuring, recovery, development, and increased employment will be respected. In this way, we will allow citizens to acquire in coupon privatization shares in the property of shareholding companies that offer a realistic chance of the shares' appreciation.

What Slovakia needs:

6. The equalizing of conditions for the acquisition of state property in the first and second privatization waves and the reinforcing of justice in privatization.

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What the HZDS will do:

We will adopt principles and specific measures to equalize conditions for the acquisition of property in the first and second privatization waves. This will involve a reassessment of the specific contractual terms under which buyers acquired privatized property in the first privatization wave. In justified cases, we will extend the period for the repayment of the purchase price to 10 years, as is the case in the second privatization wave. Likewise, we will make it possible for the buyers to write off pledged investments from the purchase price. In the interest of reinforcing the element of justice in the privatization process and preferring inventive entrepreneurs to individuals whose entrepreneurial prerequisites dwell solely in their having financial resources at their disposal, we will take measures making it obligatory to prove the origin of money used in privatization.

What Slovakia needs:

7. To prevent speculative privatization, for instance, by not honoring obligations toward the National Property Fund [FNM] and not paying it for privatized companies.

What the HZDS will do:

We will amend the legal framework and the courts' functioning so that enterprises that have been acquired for speculative reasons and whose buyers do not honor their commitments be expeditiously returned to the FNM of the Slovak Republic. It is necessary to preventively privatize by a majority shares in the property of shareholding companies in which the return to the FNM is much easier than in the case of the sale of state enterprises' property. [sentence as published]

What Slovakia needs:

8. To activate the FNM's possibilities in promoting economic growth and the restructuring of the economy.

What the HZDS will do:

We will ensure legal amendments that will allow the FNM to take an active part in financing developmental programs of the Slovak Republic. We will accelerate the sale of the FNM's portfolio from the first privatization wave, while giving consideration to domestic entrepreneurs and employees' participation in privatization. We will make possible advantageous terms of purchase, in return for guarantees of the privatized entities' development. Revenue from such sales will be used predominantly to support developmental programs. A part of the FNM's assets will be transferred to pension funds.

What Slovakia needs:

9. To define the state's interest in the privatized enterprises of sectors of the economy that are of strategic importance for a stable and balanced development of society.

What the HZDS will do:

From the viewpoint of the practical aspect of the privatization process and for the benefit of a balanced and stable development of society, we will clearly define the state's interest in privatized enterprises. We will determine which sectors of the economy and which enterprises within those sectors are of strategic importance to the economy. We will determine which enterprises will be temporarily regulated directly and which by means of indirect regulatory instruments. We will work out a timetable, the extent, and a method for the privatization of these enterprises. This will concern, in particular, enterprises of the energy sector, the gas industry, and arms production. State interest in strategic enterprises will be secured by the state's stake in their ownership.

What Slovakia needs:

10. To secure the economic and social stability of enterprises before their privatization.

What the HZDS will do:

We will set a privatization timetable in which we will divide enterprises into individual groups depending on the urgency of privatization. We will then set realistic time frames for their transition toward a new proprietary arrangement so that enterprises are motivated to achieve short-term and medium-term targets. Special approach will be taken toward privatization and the entry of foreign capital, in stabilized branches that have a convertible [konvertibilna] production and are of strategic importance, such as the energy sector and the gas industry.

By means of consistent control on the part of ministries, we will prevent the deliberate distortion and deterioration of economic results of enterprises in the preprivatization stage. [passage omitted]

Ethnic Minorities

What Slovakia needs:

1. To guarantee the development of ethnic minorities.

What the HZDS will do:

At international forums, we will work toward the establishment of Pan-European standards regarding the rights of members of ethnic minorities and toward a solution corresponding to both the legitimate demands of international organizations and the vital needs of society.

What Slovakia needs:

2. To create state commitments toward minorities that will not be at variance with the territorial integrity of the state.

What the HZDS will do:

The territorial integrity of the Slovak Republic is the supreme requirement of Slovak statehood. We reject any attempts to call into question existing borders. We use as our point of departure resolutions of the highest international institutions, which rule out any linkage between minorities' legitimate rights and demands for border

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changes. We will do everything within our power so that the borders and integrity of our territory remain inviolable.

What Slovakia needs:

3. To continue to protect the individual rights of members of ethnic minorities on the civic principle. To pass a law on ethnic minorities and ethnic communities.

What the HZDS will do:

Individual rights of members of ethnic minorities are guaranteed by the Constitution of the Slovak Republic. Collective rights of ethnic minorities go beyond standard rights, and such above-standard rights are unacceptable not only to Slovakia but to Europe as a whole. We will initiate the organization of a symposium to draft a charter of ethnic minority rights and will ask the Council of Europe and the CSCE to hold this symposium in Slovakia in 1995.

We will draft a law on ethnic minorities, which will guarantee all standard international rights of members of ethnic minorities and ethnic groups, as well as all civil rights arising from the Constitution of the Slovak Republic.

What Slovakia needs:

4. To maintain equality between the rights and duties of members of ethnic minorities and members of the state-forming nation.

Being a member of an ethnic minority implies not only rights but also duties toward the state and its interests. We will strive to fulfill both aspects of this relationship. We will establish conditions for the involvement of members of ethnic minorities in the economic, social, and cultural life of the Slovak Republic. A natural prerequisite for members of ethnic minorities who want to take an active part in the economic, cultural, and social life on the entire state territory is knowledge of the state language.

What Slovakia needs:

5. To continue to guarantee conditions for the ethnic, cultural, and religious identity of members of ethnic minorities.

What the HZDS will do:

We will continue to support the preservation and development of the identity of ethnic minorities, on the basis of reciprocity with neighboring states in which there are ethnic Slovaks. We will continue to guarantee this right, which will also be reflected in the law on ethnic minorities and ethnic groups.

Any attempts at assimilation [odnarodnovanie] will remain inadmissible in the Slovak Republic.

What Slovakia needs:

6. To guarantee the teaching of the mother tongue of members of ethnic minorities.

What the HZDS will do:

We will continue to guarantee the teaching of the mother tongue and will proceed from the principle of reciprocity.

What Slovakia needs:

7. To ensure greater care of Slovaks abroad.

What the HZDS will do:

We will increase support for members of the Slovak ethnic community, particularly in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Croatia, and Ukraine. Assistance will focus on the preservation of the Slovak language, on support for culture and the development of education, and on enabling ethnic Slovaks to attend Slovak-language religious services. Support will also extend to the publication of books and periodicals in Slovak and to the development of literature and local arts and crafts. [passage omitted]

Care of Slovaks in Ethnically Mixed Areas

What Slovakia needs:

1. To pass a law on proportional electoral representation in elections to representative bodies at the community level.

What the HZDS will do:

We will work toward the passage of a law on proportional electoral representation even before this year's local election.

What Slovakia needs:

2. To ensure religious services in the state language in communities with an ethnically mixed population.

What the HZDS will do:

In dialogue with church representatives, we will demand that clergymen provide religious services in the state language in all communities in which there are members of the Slovak nation.

What Slovakia needs:

3. To ensure the establishment of preschool facilities and schools with Slovak as the language of instruction in communities in which there are citizens of Slovak nationality.

What the HZDS will do:

There are more than 300 communities in the south of Slovakia, in which there are no Slovak preschool facilities or schools. We will see to it that the Ministry of Education and Science charges district school administrations with completing the network of Slovak preschool facilities and schools. The state must have the right to impose sanctions on communities that refuse to comply with this requirement.

What Slovakia needs:

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4. To ensure that, at schools of all types, Slovak be taught by teachers with a perfect command of the state language, in accordance with the legal regulations of the Slovak Republic.

What the HZDS will do:

We proceed from the right and obligation of members of ethnic minorities to master the state language. The consistent implementation of this self-evident right, which is respected by international institutions without exception, has not been possible to date. We will enforce this principle as of the 1995-96 school year and, in graduation classes, as of the 1994-95 school year.

What Slovakia needs:

5. To make it mandatory for students of schools with a minority language as the language of instruction to take an exam in Slovak as part of the final exams required for graduation.

What the HZDS will do:

The development of economic, social, and cultural life makes it incumbent upon secondary school graduates to take an end-of-school exam in Slovak. The school system did not ensure this requirement thus far. This measure will go into force as of the 1995-96 school year.

What Slovakia needs:

6. That the teaching of history respect the fact that the students are citizens of the Slovak Republic. That sufficient teaching of the ethnic minority's history be guaranteed.

What the HZDS will do:

History is one of the most important subjects when it comes to nurturing in students loyalty toward the state. Because different views can exist on the same events in distant or recent history, as reflected in the history textbooks of different states, we will ensure at all schools of the Slovak Republic uniform instruction according to textbooks published and approved by the Ministry of Education and Science of the Slovak Republic.

Members of ethnic minorities have the right to get to know the history of their community within the framework of the given state. The Ministry of Education and Science of the Slovak Republic will expeditiously organize a competition for historians to prepare a textbook on the history of ethnic minorities and ethnic groups on the territory of the Slovak Republic. The teaching of this subject matter can become a supplementary part of history lessons at schools with a minority language as the language of instruction.

What Slovakia needs:

7. To ensure that public announcements and local radio broadcasts in ethnically mixed areas also be in the state language.

What the HZDS will do:

We will attend to the assertion of the constitutional right of members of the Slovak nation to obtain information in their mother tongue. This implies an obligation for mayors, community leaders, and organizers of events to permit access to information in the state language in public announcements and in local radio and television broadcasts.

What Slovakia needs:

8. To ensure that members of ethnic minorities are informed objectively about the domestic political situation through the press, radio, and television.

What the HZDS will do:

We will support the publication of a daily in Hungarian and other minority languages, whose contents will consist of businesslike and unbiased information on developments—in particular, on the domestic political scene. The daily will strive to contribute to mutual understanding and friendship among citizens of Slovak nationality and members of ethnic minorities and ethnic groups. We will also support objective radio and television broadcasts in the languages of ethnic minorities.

Information Systems

What Slovakia needs:

1. The establishment of a government body for information systems.

What the HZDS will do:

We will enforce legislative measures that will eliminate unsubstantiated and tendentious challenging of Slovak statehood and constitutional officials. We will secure freedom of information and will eliminate the possibility of any political entity having a monopoly position in the sphere of information.

What Slovakia needs:

2. To ensure that human dignity, personal honor, good reputation, and a citizen's privacy and name are protected.

What the HZDS will do:

We will proceed strictly from the Constitution of the Slovak Republic and international agreements (such as the Rome convention) that confirm and guarantee freedom of speech but do not permit tendentious, fabricated, and defamatory insults from people in public information media. Legislative and other provisions will define financial and other penalties for the violation of citizens' integrity.

What Slovakia needs:

3. To emphasize the sovereignty and identity of the information system of the Slovak Republic and its dominant position in the dissemination of information about Slovakia at home and abroad.

What the HZDS will do:

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We will complete the building of the TA SR [Slovak news agency] and will promote its equal position on the world media market. We will demand that the TA SR spread truthful and complete news.

What Slovakia needs:

4. To build a nongovernmental information agency.

What the HZDS will do:

Besides completing the building of the TA SR, we will support the establishment of a nongovernmental information agency to convey information about Slovakia abroad, in parallel with the TA SR but independently of it, to paralyze the effect of anti-Slovak campaigns seeking the destabilization of the situation in our country.

What Slovakia needs:

5. To prevent the spreading of immorality, hatred, and racial and religious intolerance in the media.

What the HZDS will do:

On the basis of the Christian traditions of Slovak society, we will be active so that a calm and nonconfrontational atmosphere necessary for Slovakia's advancement becomes established in the sphere of media and morally destructive tendencies and antidemocratic attacks against holders of different views are not promoted by the media.

What Slovakia needs:

6. To apply in our conditions Council of Europe resolution No. 1,003 of 1993.

What the HZDS will do:

We will support the efforts of the journalistic community in applying, through self-regulation, the principles of ethics in journalism, in the interest of creating a calm and creative atmosphere in society.

What Slovakia needs:

7. To demand that the TA SR, Slovak Television, and Slovak Radio proceed from the national and state cultural and public interests of the Slovak Republic.

What the HZDS will do:

The Slovak Republic is a young democratic state. Slovak statehood is a value that must be supported by the state TA SR agency and by public broadcasters. We will guarantee by legislative means the inadmissibility of attacks on the founding and existence of the state, its territorial integrity, and constitutional democratic system. Naturally, this definitely does not mean that specific criticism of any personality from the executive, judicial, or legislative branches of power should be eliminated.

What Slovakia needs:

8. To give support to domestic entities on the mass media market.

What the HZDS will do:

By initiating legislative norms, it will prevent the uncalled-for creation of mass media monopolies.

What Slovakia needs:

9. Respect for the professional mission, social status, and independence of journalists.

What the HZDS will do:

We fully respect the professional mission, social status, and independence of journalists. We will push for a more effective legal protection of journalists and a marked improvement of their working and social conditions and will facilitate their access to information.

Defense

What Slovakia needs:

1. To reliably ensure the territorial integrity and inviolability of the state border of the Slovak Republic and its airspace. To lay the foundations for Slovak military science.

What the HZDS will do:

We will address the process of the Army's transformation and modernization without reducing its combat ability and readiness to be deployed.

We will ensure that the main combat units and formations are permanently in full strength and avail themselves of a high level of equipment and supplies.

When modernizing the Army, preference will be given to domestic manufacturers of special equipment and material of all kinds.

We will lay the foundations for a modern military strategy and operational arts under Slovakia's conditions.

What Slovakia needs:

2. To achieve gradual compatibility of armed forces and defense methods with those of the armies of advanced democratic states.

What the HZDS will do:

By means of gradual legislative steps, our legal system in the sphere of defense will move closer to that in the European Union member states.

We will establish conditions and better opportunities for the training of professional soldiers abroad. We will expand officers' ability to work in international staffs (United Nations, NATO, Western European Union).

With a view to achieving compatibility with NATO, we consider as priorities the orientation of special production in Slovak industry and the provision of flight-operation systems and systems for commanding troops.

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We will make sure that all professional soldiers of the Army of the Slovak Republic fully master the methodology of training and the methods of work of NATO commanders and staffs.

What Slovakia needs:

3. To gradually improve conditions for the performance of military service.

What the HZDS will do:

We will erect barriers against hazing and the degradation of human dignity in the Army. We will introduce religious services in the armed forces.

We will ensure better housing, catering, and clothing for soldiers and noncommissioned officers performing basic military service. We will ensure better conditions for the transition from military service to civilian life. We will work out and introduce a more effective system of motivating lower-ranking officers. On the basis of the gradual expansion of the measure of the Army's professionalization, we will work out principles for shortening basic military service.

For professional soldiers (career soldiers as well as those on extended service), we will establish more attractive and appealing conditions for practicing their profession. With this in mind, we will ensure the timely construction of apartments and Army houses. We will improve the system of evaluating the work of officers during training outside the barracks. We will push for the establishment of a military building and loan association. We will improve the health care of soldiers, retired soldiers, and their families and thus make the military profession more attractive.

What Slovakia needs:

4. To build the defense of the Slovak Republic on patriotism and pride in Slovakia and its traditions. To participate in an objective historical assessment of the struggle for national liberation.

What the HZDS will do:

In conjunction with civilian and military scientific and historical institutions and drawing on the archives and scientific capacity of the Slovak Heritage Foundation, we will revise the course of lectures and the methodology and system of patriotic upbringing for active duty and reserve soldiers. [passage omitted]

Legislature

What Slovakia needs:

1. To reassess the current constitution and its effectiveness.

What the HZDS will do:

We will push for the adoption of sufficiently effective systems and checks and balances for legislative, executive, and judicial power.

What Slovakia needs:

2. To ensure the stability of democratic elections results for the National Council of the Slovak Republic and thereby stabilize our political system.

What the HZDS will do:

We will submit the draft of a law on internal regulations in the National Council of the Slovak Republic. It should guarantee the political legitimacy of elections (right to rule) as an act of direct democracy and immediate execution of state power by the people. [passage omitted]

Foreign Relations

What Slovakia needs:

1. To confirm the continuity of the Slovak Republic's foreign policy orientation, drafted by the HZDS after the June 1992 election, the aim of which is full integration into European and transatlantic political, security, and economic structures in a way that will allow the Slovak Republic to preserve national independence, territorial integrity, and sovereignty.

What the HZDS will do:

We will pursue any positive foreign policy developments. We will establish favorable foreign economic and foreign political conditions for the successful completion of the political and economic transformation of the Slovak Republic. We will continue to pursue assertive diplomatic activity that should help further stabilize the Central European region.

What Slovakia needs:

2. To intensify efforts toward the Slovak Republic's European Union [EU] membership. To seek the reinforcement of security and stability in Europe by achieving full NATO membership, a realistic path toward which is active and systematic participation in the Partnership for Peace program, which the Slovak Republic was one of the first to join. In conjunction with this, to seek the development of close cooperation with the Western European Union.

What the HZDS will do:

We will consider the Slovak Republic's EU membership its long-term priority. We will strive to reach this target by establishing all necessary systemic measures, including the harmonization of the Slovak Republic's legislation with EU laws, regulations, and norms. We will seek full NATO membership by means of active participation in the Partnership for Peace program and exert maximum efforts toward the Slovak Republic's integration into the EU.

What Slovakia needs:

3. To place emphasis on developing constructive, nonconfrontational, and mutually advantageous relations, cooperation, and friendship with neighboring states—the Czech Republic, Austria, Hungary, Poland, and Ukraine.

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What the HZDS will do:

We will seek the establishment of a mechanism of regular interstate consultations with neighboring states and conduct a dialogue with the aim of gradually drafting and signing the appropriate contractual documents providing a stable contractual framework for mutually advantageous and good-neighborly relations, cooperation, and friendship. In relations with the Czech Republic, which is of extraordinary importance for Slovakia's foreign policy, we will seek the coordination of foreign political steps, the intensification of economic cooperation, and the conclusion of additional important special agreements in the sphere of culture, education, science, sports, and so forth. In relations with the Hungarian Republic, we will seek the conclusion of a mutually advantageous interstate treaty by following up on established negotiations.

What Slovakia needs:

4. To work actively in the UN and other international organizations.

What the HZDS will do:

We will push for active Slovak diplomatic efforts in all important UN agencies. We will become involved in approved UN operations and participate in scientific, technical, and economic cooperation within established UN and other international organizations, including UNESCO.

What Slovakia needs:

5. To enforce the intensification of the CSCE process and Slovak diplomacy's committed involvement in this institution.

What the HZDS will do:

We will intensify the Slovak Republic's involvement in the CSCE process and extend the offer to organize on the territory of the Slovak Republic an international meeting (conference), in accordance with the needs and decisions of CSCE bodies.

What Slovakia needs:

6. To seek responsible participation in the work of the Council of Europe. To work toward the further development of democratic institutions and a just solution for ethnic minority rights in Europe, in harmony with Council of Europe norms and legal documents.

What the HZDS will do:

We will intensify the dialogue with Council of Europe representatives on the issue of ethnic minority rights in Europe, with the long-term aim of establishing a uniform Pan-European standard for ethnic minority rights. In accordance with original plans, we will try to organize an unofficial meeting of ministers of culture in the fall of 1994. We will offer to organize events for the Council of Europe at which European states can mutually exchange beneficial experience in the spheres of science, sports, education, and culture (preservation of cultural sights, publication of literature, and so forth).

What Slovakia needs:

7. To work toward the diversification and intensification of comprehensive bilateral cooperation with EU countries, the United States, the Russian Federation, East European countries, Canada, Japan, and OECD countries.

What the HZDS will do:

We will strive to establish a bilateral dialogue with all of these countries, which should result in specific contractual documents.

What Slovakia needs:

8. To devote extraordinary attention to the economic dimension of foreign policy and to Slovak diplomacy's focus in finding solutions to the state's economic and social needs.

What the HZDS will do:

We will direct the Slovak foreign service so that it devotes priority attention to solving the Slovak Republic's economic and social problems and enacts specific and organizational measures in line with this foreign policy orientation. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs will closely coordinate its activities with other ministries, particularly those with an economic orientation.

What Slovakia needs:

9. To assert a qualitatively new solution to relations with expatriates, with the aim of mutual rapprochement and cooperation with expatriates' organizations. One of the priorities will be asserting the right of domicile [domovske pravo] for expatriates.

What the HZDS will do:

We will work out a comprehensive Slovak Republic state policy toward expatriates, with the aim of intensifying cooperation with individuals and expatriate organizations. We will comprehensively resolve the status of expatriate Slovaks, including the extension of the right of domicile or by means of an expatriate card [krajanska karta]. The importance of a new approach toward expatriates will find its expression in the future structure of the state apparatus. We will increase state support for cultural, educational, and religious activities of Slovaks abroad, with the primary aim of strengthening their national identity.

What Slovakia needs:

10. To strive to improve the quality of the Slovak diplomatic service with the aim of unequivocally defending Slovak national and state interests abroad.

What the HZDS will do:

We will adopt systemic and organizational measures to improve the quality of Slovak diplomacy. The assertion and defense of Slovak national and state interests and the

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establishment of a truthful and favorable image of Slovakia abroad will be given absolute priority in this process. We will introduce a system that will ensure the uniform and coordinated activity of the state in the international field. We will work out criteria for the selection, training, and sending abroad of candidates for diplomatic service and the regular evaluation of their performance. We will establish a faculty for training career diplomats.

Results of Last SU SR Preelection Poll

AU2709160994 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 23 Sep 94 p 4

[Unattributed report: "Electoral Preferences of Slovak Republic Citizens Seven Days Before Parliamentary Election"]

[Text] A total of 85.1 percent of eligible voters will participate in the election to the National Council of the Slovak Republic on 30 September and 1 October 1994, 8.6 percent will not participate in them, and 6.3 percent do not yet know whether they will participate. This arises from the last Slovak Statistical Office [SU SR] preelection poll, carried out on 19 and 20 September 1994. The SU SR's representative sample comprised 2,476 respondents. One of the questions of the preelection survey was aimed at ascertaining knowledge of the election programs of the entities running—56.6 percent of participants in this year's parliamentary election claim to know the election programs of several political groupings, 19.1 percent of those polled said they know the program of only one party, movement, or coalition running in the election, and 24.4 percent of voters do not know a single election program.

Estimated Electoral Gains of Political Entities Running in Early Parliamentary Election (in percent)

Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS]-Farmers Party of Slovakia [RSS] coalition	27.4
Common Choice	14.8
Christian Democratic Movement [KDH]	11.6
Hungarian Coalition	10.4
Democratic Union [DU]	8.0
Association of Workers of Slovakia [ZRS]	7.2
Slovak National Party [SNS]	6.7
Communist Party of Slovakia	3.2
Democratic Party [DS]	2.8
New Slovakia	2.1
Party Against Corruption	1.9
Christian Social Union [KSU]	1.8
Movement for a Prosperous Czecho-Slovakia	0.9
Romany Civic Initiative [ROI] in the Slovak Republic	0.5
Social Democracy	0.5
Real Social Democratic Party of Slovaks	0.1
Association for the Republic-Republicans	0.1
Liberals	0.0

Bratislava[1]

	Percent
HZDS-RSS	22.8
KDH	14.8
Common Choice	12.8
DU	12.8
SNS	8.7
DS	5.4
ZRS	4.7
Communist Party of Slovakia	3.4
KSU	3.4
New Slovakia	2.7
Party Against Corruption	2.7
Hungarian Coalition	2.7

[1]Estimates are provided for only those entities running in the election that received more than 1 percent support on the all-Slovak scale.

West Slovakia[1]

	Percent
HZDS-RSS	25.7
Hungarian Coalition	21.3
Common Choice	14.5
KDH	10.2
SNS	6.4
DU	6.1
ZRS	5.4
DS	2.7
Communist Party of Slovakia	2.2
Party Against Corruption	1.5
New Slovakia	1.2
KSU	1.0

[1]Estimates are provided for only those entities running in the election that received more than 1 percent support on the all-Slovak scale.

Central Slovakia[1]

	Percent
HZDS-RSS	29.3
Common Choice	13.5
KDH	10.5
DU	9.2
SNS	8.5
ZRS	8.4

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Hungarian Coalition	5.5
Communist Party of Slovakia	3.4
New Slovakia	3.1
KSU	2.7
Party Against Corruption	1.9
DS	1.8

Estimates are provided for only those entities running in the election that received more than 1 percent support on the all-Slovak scale.

East Slovakia[1]

	Percent
HZDS-RSS	28.4
Common Choice	17.4
KDH	13.7
ZRS	8.6
DU	7.9
Hungarian Coalition	4.9
SNS	4.2
Communist Party of Slovakia	4.0
DS	3.3
Party Against Corruption	2.2
New Slovakia	2.2
KSU	1.5

Estimates are provided for only those entities running in the election that received more than 1 percent support on the all-Slovak scale.

Results of Slovak Radio's Last Preelection Poll

AU2709165894 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 23 Sep 94 p 1

[Article by "ao": "Last Poll; How Would We Vote 10 Days Before the Election?"]

[Excerpt] We have regularly been publishing the results of public opinion polls on preelection preferences. Under the law on parliamentary elections, such polls must not be published within the seven days before the election date. Today we therefore publish the last results of two polls:

The first of these was carried out by Slovak Radio's Methodological Research Department from 17 to 20 September. The representative sample of 1,164 citizens reacted as follows to the first question, which read: "There is less than two weeks left before the early parliamentary election. Have you decided whether to participate in it?"

Will definitely participate	53.8 percent
Will probably participate	24.0 percent
Will probably not participate	7.4 percent
Will definitely not participate	6.0 percent
Have not yet decided whether to vote	8.8 percent

Respondents belonging to the first two groups [that is, the 77.8 percent who will definitely or probably participate in the election] were asked to reply also to the second question: "To which party, movement, or coalition will you give your vote in the election?" Their replies are illustrated by the following table:

	Percent
Movement for a Democratic Slovakia-Farmers Party of Slovakia	21.5
Common Choice	12.6
Christian Democratic Movement	10.4
Hungarian Coalition	8.1
Democratic Union	7.0
Slovak National Party	6.2
Association of Workers of Slovakia	4.9

Parties that, according to this poll, will not reach the required 5 percent of votes to win seats in the National Council follow at some distance: the Christian Social Union with 2.1 percent, the Democratic Party with only 1.9 percent, the Romany Civic Initiative with 1.3 percent, the Communist Party of Slovakia and the Movement for Prosperous Czecho-Slovakia with 1.2 percent each, New Slovakia with 1.1 percent, Social Democracy and Party Against Corruption with 0.3 percent each, and the Real Social Democratic Party of Slovaks with 0.1 percent. Not a single respondent expressed preference for either the Liberals or the Association for the Republic-Republicans. An interesting group is the 19.8 percent that claims it will participate in the election but does not yet know for whom to vote. [passage omitted]

Hungarian Union Threatens 'Civil Disobedience'

AU2709131994 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 16 Sep 94 pp 1, 4

[Article by Katarina Ottova: "Union of Hungarian Teachers Wants Discussion About Ethnic Schools"]

[Excerpts] Bratislava—The problem, or possibility, of an alternative form of teaching some subjects at schools in ethnically mixed areas is not new and has been regularly discussed in the press. The Union of Hungarian Teachers in Slovakia has now addressed to us a statement, in which it rejects the proposed concept of alternative teaching of subjects at schools in ethnically mixed areas and warns that, in the event its forced introduction into the school practice, it will initiate civil disobedience and will appeal to international bodies for help. The bone of contention is the proposal to introduce a new type of elementary and secondary schools, in which key [nosne] subjects would be taught in Slovak, while other subjects would be taught in the mother tongue. [passage omitted]

Zoltan Sido, chairman of the Union of Hungarian Teachers in Slovakia, says that the only difference between this alternative concept and the government-sponsored draft law of 1984, which was to abolish

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Hungarian schools, is that the 1984 bill was a totalitarian diktat, whereas today parents are being offered the possibility to voluntarily give up the right to education in the mother tongue. Sido stresses that the introduction of the alternative form of teaching, as proposed in the concept, does not follow from the law on the official language in the Slovak Republic and violates the Slovak Constitution. "This is how everything started with the children of ethnic minorities in Romania and also in Hungary, the result of which is known. We fear that we will be deprived of our own schools in this way," Zoltan Sido said. [passage omitted]

He drew attention to the fact that, when key subjects are taught in Slovak, one can hardly speak about education in the mother tongue. At schools with Hungarian as the language of instruction, students study a subject called "specialist terminology," which is taught in Slovak. "Our joint aim should be the quality of command of the Slovak language," Zoltan Sido adds, "and not the quantity of subjects taught in Slovak."

We asked Engineer Julius Elias, new director of the Ministry of Education's department for schools in ethnically mixed areas, for his comment on the statement issued by the Union of Hungarian Teachers in Slovakia National Committee. He said that claims by the Union of Hungarian Teachers in Slovakia about the Ministry of Education document on the alternative form of teaching are misleading. "The only thing that exists at the ministry is a working draft of a material entitled 'Proposed Concept of Alternative Form of Teaching Subjects at Schools in Ethnically Mixed Areas,'" Julius Elias stresses. "In August, the ministry submitted this material to the State Pedagogical Institute and the School Inspectors' Center for internal appraisal. Following the completion of this material, we will invite, within the framework of external appraisal, representatives of organizations associating staff from ethnic minorities' schools, including the Union of Hungarian Teachers, for talks. It must be obvious to members of the Union who have studied this, for the time being, only internal material that there can be no talk about a forced introduction of this concept into practice. Even if the idea of an alternative form of schools gained the upper hand, its basic principle is that parents will be able to choose whether their children will study all subjects in the mother tongue or whether they will study some subjects in the mother tongue and some in the Slovak language." [passage omitted]

Dam Official Corrects 'Misleading Information'

AU2709121594 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 6 Sep 94 p 4

[TA SR report: "Commissioner's Unfortunate Statement"]

[Text] Bratislava—The information by Hungarian Government Commissioner Gyorgy Tatar that, at the talks on 2¢ August, the Hungarian side proposed that "the Danube dam at Cunovo be adjusted in order to increase the flow of Danube water to the Hungarian side to 50 cubic meters per second" is imprecise and incorrect. This is stated by Dominik Kocinger, Slovak Government commissioner for the construction and operation of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros system of hydroelectric power projects, in reaction to a report [on Tatar's comments] that Slovak dailies took over from the Hungarian newspaper NEPSZABADSAG.

Since the damming of the Danube in October 1992, the agreed amount of 20 cubic meters per second has been passing through the Cunovo dam to the Hungarian side. Following the installation of two turbines and other adjustments to the dam, it will be possible, on a trial basis, to release 30 cubic meters per second as early as this week and 40 cubic meters per second as of the beginning of October, after the second turbine goes into operation. The trial operation will help to verify calculations and other data necessary for the water legislation permit [vodopravne povolenie]. This schedule was agreed upon by experts of the two sides following the inspection of facilities on the Hungarian side on 26 August, Dominik Kocinger states.

At the Bratislava talks on 24 August, the Hungarian side submitted a completely new proposal, in which it suggested building a new object on the Slovak side above the Cunovo dam. This would widen the seepage channel [priesakovy kanal] so that another 50 to 70 cubic meters of water per second could pass to the Hungarian side. Together, it would thus be possible to release 90 to 100 cubic meters per second to the Hungarian side. The Slovak side will assume a stand on the Hungarian proposal by 9 September. It has been agreed that experts from both countries will meet in Gyor on 16 September to discuss this proposal.

Dominik Kocinger does not consider the Hungarian Government commissioner's statement fortunate because "it could be misinterpreted by the mass media and thus mislead the public. There also exist more effective methods of securing a sufficient amount of water for the network of branches on both sides of the Danube and, at the same, linking this network of branches to the Danube, which would be a significant environmental contribution. Those measures would have to be carried out also on the Hungarian side. The new solution [proposed by the Hungarian side on 24 August], on the other hand, would be realized on Slovak territory alone. This apparently is the Hungarian side's aim," states Dominik Kocinger in the statement he granted to the TA SR yesterday.

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Horn Addresses National Assembly 27 Sep

LD2709220794 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 0805 GMT 27 Sep 94

[Speech by Prime Minister Gyula Horn to the National Assembly in Budapest—live]

[Excerpts] Thank you, Mr. Speaker. Good morning. [passage omitted]

You may ask why it is necessary to take stock and establish tasks 75 days after the prime minister's keynote speech. Well, the reason is that we could only see new facts after getting into government, and they presented a number of new challenges for us. [passage omitted]

The value of the GDP decreased by 20 percent between 1990-93. Unemployment grew explosively from the second half of 1990. More than 1 million jobs have ceased to exist to date. Compared to 1990, consumer prices increased at least one and a half times.

Exceeding every previous precedent, the country's foreign debts have increased by $5.3 billion. Domestic state debt increased more than two-fold in four years, to 3.8 trillion forints. This means that the state debt places an extra burden of 630 billion forints' repayment and interest payment obligation on the 1995 budget. The size of this burden is illustrated by the fact that one-third of next year's budget had to be earmarked for this. [passage omitted]

Compared to 1989, industrial production has almost halved. The bankruptcy law introduced in the first half of 1992 also contributed to the disappearing of two-thirds of certain industries. [passage omitted]

The development of industry is hindered by the fact that national economic expenditures earmarked for research and product development were reduced by over 50 percent compared to 1989.

No law protecting industry and its markets has been passed to date. Multinational companies operating in Hungary and (?potential) Hungarian producers are at a serious disadvantage compared to foreign companies, due to the lack of a state procurement law. [passage omitted]

Due to a policy opposing cooperatives, the large-scale loss of eastern markets, and other reasons, agricultural production has decreased by nearly one-third.

Harvest yields have decreased by 20-40 percent. The number of cattle, pigs, and sheep has almost halved. The number of cattle in the country is smaller than it was after the devastating years of World War II.

Agricultural and food industry exports are hardly half of what they were four years ago. In agriculture, 400,000 jobs were abolished, and losses incurred by the country are in excess of 100 billion forints. [passage omitted]

More than half of the agricultural cooperatives show deficits, mostly through no fault of their own. Compared to 1989, investments in agriculture practically ceased to exist. [passage omitted]

In Hungary, 1.2 million people have been given material compensation so far. With the constant expansion of this circle, there are an additional 800,000 people who are waiting for their claim to be met. The total amount of compensation claims that still burden remaining state assets can be put at 250 billion forints. [passage omitted]

There is lot of criticism and many reports in connection with privatization decisions that are suspected to have involved corruption. Privatization—which aroused great expectations in the beginning—caused disappointment for the majority of Hungarian society: for employees because of their shattered security of existence, for company directors because of their prosperity, for entrepreneurs because of the promised profits, and for investors because their profits failed to materialize. Foreigners took exception to the lack of transparent administration.

In the past four years, nearly half of the state's assets were privatized. [passage omitted]

The heads of the two assets managing privatization organizations [State Assets Agency and State Assets Management Joint Stock Company]—without expertise in this field or personal responsibility—were given a free hand to sell, merge, divide, save, or make companies bankrupt on the basis of narrow political considerations and group interests. [passage omitted]

We cannot accept the current practice of severance pay. Leaders who enjoyed the trust of the previous government were given fixed- term appointments and, according to the law, they can only be dismissed at the cost of a severance pay of several million forints. It is our duty to initiate the amendment of the relevant law because this is an immoral practice that offends the sense of justice of the majority of the people. We will submit a proposal to the parliament on the amendment of the law as early as this year. [passage omitted]

It is unacceptable that people hold positions both in the legislature and at state companies. Therefore, the government coalition will submit to the National Assembly those company and civic posts that are incompatible with being a parliamentary deputy. [passage omitted]

Nonpayment of taxes and other financial contributions is unacceptable. The amounts of taxes and social insurance contributions that people have failed to pay are 100 billion forints and nearly 180 billion forints respectively. All this is missing from the community's resources.

The black economy has become enormous. According to experts' estimates, it represents about 600-800 billion forints yearly with its products and services. [passage omitted]

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The government will ease entrepreneurs' burdens; however, at the same time, it will launch a comprehensive struggle to collect liabilities due to the state. We do not want to impose new taxes but to collect the current ones. [passage omitted]

I would like to state here that I am not in support of anyone reviewing the system of financing church schools. Should there be a need for certain modifications, we will carry them out only after coordination with the churches.

At the same time, it is also important for us to support private schools not run by the church. This is not the way in which we want to change the established proportions of the subsidies granted to the individual churches. [passage omitted]

The right-wing government has brought public service television under its influence, despite the fact that the media's role is not to make policy but to inform, criticize, and praise in accordance with its own conviction, in the spirit of the sovereignty and freedom of the press. Words should be given back their original meaning. Democracy must be democracy and not canonized lawlessness. [passage omitted]

My esteemed fellow deputies, people want to know what they can expect in the coming year or two. [passage omitted]

It is obvious that only by putting right the country's financial and economic situation is it possible to help, fundamentally, the position of people on low incomes, large families, small earners, and the impoverished. With the monies currently available, we can only improve the situation of the needy. [passage omitted]

I would like to win the trust and support of the population for what we want to implement in the short- and medium-term government program, which demands further sacrifices from Hungarian society but which, I believe, will lay the foundation of a future welfare society. [passage omitted]

I would like to achieve this by making you, the citizens of Hungary, familiar with the short- and medium-term measures. Some are already under way. Some are being prepared so that the population will regain its faith, because we will overcome the crisis. We will start economic growth and will improve society's living conditions and sense of well-being.

What does the government do? Following the submission of the 1995 state budget in parliament, we will prepare the draft economic policy plan of the Hungarian national modernization program for the period up to 1998. After coordinating it with representatives of the IMF, the World Bank, and the EU, we will submit this plan to parliament not later than March 1995.

In 1995, we wish to give new impetus to privatization, and we will complete the compensation procedure. The speeding up of the entire process is necessary because state assets lose value month after month as a result of its being delayed. Every month delay costs the country at least 6 billion forints. The greater part of some 1.6 trillion forints' worth of state assets is still awaiting privatization. Despite the previous government's promise, the self- governing bodies of social insurance have still not received any significant operational assets. Our government will also speed up this process.

We will complete privatization by the end of the parliamentary cycle. The process will be public and verifiable, and the interest representation bodies of the workers will also be involved. From now on, the interests of wealth and job creation as well as modernization will be taken into account when privatization decisions are made. [passage omitted]

The decisive majority of state-owned banks will also have to be privatized. [passage omitted]

These banks closed 1993 with a loss of 166 billion forints. They have hardly any capital left that they own. According to our means, we will put these things right in 1995 through organizational divisions, mergers, redeployment, and infusions of capital. [passage omitted]

The government has begun the review and, at the same time, the tightening of the system of internal audits of state organs. Our aim is to end speculation with compensation vouchers and to establish security in the value of assets coupons [vagyonjegy] for the ordinary citizen. [passage omitted]

Shortly, we will offer assets to buy into those holding compensation vouchers. These assets will be large both in nominal and real value. Thus, for example, after the privatization of the electric energy industry, some 60-80 billion forints' worth of shares of the new companies could be bought with compensation vouchers. [passage omitted]

In the framework of a three-year economic program, we will create the conditions for the modernization of the national industry. We will have an industrial development policy. We will examine one by one the enterprises of industrial branches in crisis, including metallurgy and aluminum, and will make the necessary decisions. However, we must calculate with the fact that firms that are not viable will close down. [passage omitted]

We will strengthen the chances of Hungarian goods in Hungarian markets. Already this year, in accordance with our EU associate membership accord, we will introduce measures to protect the Hungarian market with respect to agricultural, food, industrial goods, and automobiles.

It is well-known that during the past four years—or rather in the past years—the Hungarian State Railways [MAV] suffered a loss of nearly 120 billion forints. Putting MAV back on its feet has to begin. [passage omitted]

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The government considers the recovery of the agricultural sector, which affects one quarter of the population, to be a task of national importance. In 1995, agriculture is to be given the largest budget subsidy. Within two years, we will create a new purchasing network of a different type and a reliable agricultural management system. It was one of the first measures of the government to guarantee the price of wheat, and it is going to do the same for pork, beef, maize, and milk, too. As of 1995, the government guarantees that if producers will be unable to sell these products on the free market, the state is going to purchase them at a fixed price. [passage omitted]

To reduce unemployment is a priority task of the government. In the period of economic stabilization, further growth in unemployment is unavoidable. However, during the course of stabilization, we wish to increase considerably the resources for investments and the involvement of working capital and also to facilitate tax exemption of job-creating investments. Sensible privatization based on new principles will be given an important role in preserving jobs. As a result of these measures, the increase in unemployment could be stopped by the second half of this government's tenure.

Until then, we will improve the chances of finding jobs for the unemployed by transforming the social services providing for the unemployed and by expanding the retraining schemes, mandatory community work, and special programs supporting school graduates and long-term unemployed. [passage omitted]

We will transform the social security system providing for the unemployed, and we are to encourage the unemployed to take jobs as soon as possible and in the legal economy.

Ladies and Gentlemen! A situation where the significant majority of Hungarian society only encounters the disadvantages of the market economy is untenable. The case must not be allowed in which the roles of the state and the market deteriorate rather than enhance each other's situation. [passage omitted]

The stringent austerity measures are not only aimed at avoiding the worst possible situation: the unmanageable situation of insolvency. The government is primarily acting out of responsibility for the future of the country. [passage omitted]

The government indicates the necessary economic steps; however, it also marks the boundary beyond which—out of social considerations—we will not go even if economic logic would dictate that. [passage omitted]

One of the first measures of this new government dealt with the situation of homeless people. We are working on a national program with the cooperation of the Ministry of Social Welfare to provide for the homeless. [passage omitted]

It is our intention that homeless people should be housed before winter sets in. The country is able to provide for 50,000 refugees, so it should be able to provide for 100,000 Hungarians in poverty who are also in immediate danger.

We will improve the family allowance for households on low incomes. As of 1995, a child care allowance will be given as a citizen's right, the amount of which was increased by 1,000 forints beginning this September. [passage omitted]

We are to transform and stabilize defense and strengthen the police and the institutions of the judiciary. [passage omitted]

Public money has to be handled frugally and consistently. The government started the slimming cure with itself. With one reasonable exception, it abolished the apparatus of ministers without portfolio. [passage omitted]

It examined the various state funds and spare resources were redirected into the budget. The novelty of the government's policy also manifests itself in that—contrary to the practice of the past 15 years—creating an equilibrium is not carried to the detriment of investments and accumulation. We are attempting something that has very few precedents in economic history. We expand investments and transform the economic structure alongside slow growth and stagnation.

My esteemed fellow deputies! Solutions for the country's problems will only come about if remedying the most vital issues is not left to the government exclusively. For example, we propose—in coordination with a group of bankers—that the banks [words indistinct] should give long-term loans for entrepreneurs. [passage omitted]

Our view is that we can only expect sacrifices and self-restraint from Hungarian society if two important principles are fulfilled: if we disclose a plausible picture about the near future, and if we create a fairer distribution of burdens.

It is heartening that our surrounding environment is gradually improving, and the interest of the developed countries toward our country is gaining new impetus. Hungary became a good partner for the developed western countries. We have recovered from an earlier foreign policy built on ideological elements and from ceaselessly referring to historic deeds or grievances—the style of which, in many respects, was alien to western thinking. Therefore, the most urgent task for the government was to make its intentions clear to the important players in international life. It was also important to disperse concerns with regard to the new coalition suggested by politicians of the previous government during the election campaign. [passage omitted]

I would like to inform the esteemed house and the public that the decisive actors in world and international politics have not only become aware of the Hungarian

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Government's steps toward neighboring countries, but they unanimously welcomed them. The change in Hungary's attitude was appreciated from Washington to Brussels and Tokyo. It was voiced via high-ranking contacts, diplomatic channels, and public statements, and it was emphasized that this change contributes to the stability of the region, serves Europe's interests, and creates better conditions for the integration of Hungary and Hungary's neighbors into Europe.

Esteemed National Assembly! By virtue of the government having clarified its intentions in the next four years in order to bring a turnabout in the economic processes and by virtue of setting an example in self-restraint, I appeal to the organizations of employers and employees to conclude a social- economic agreement as early as this autumn, if possible. Without this, the realization of a tough but progressive economic policy would become extremely difficult. [passage omitted]

We would also make a mistake if solidarity and the obligation of unity would only be restricted to the political sphere or to the legal institutions. I ask the social partners not to take advantage of the government's predicament on the pretext of trying to conclude social pacts. However, even if this does not come about, the government will have to carry out its program for it has pledged responsibility for the country's future.

All of us have to think long and hard and understand that the country cannot be put back on its feet without sensible concessions and mutual self-restraint. We have to eliminate the inheritance of the past decade; otherwise, we will not be able to break out of the devilish spiral of overspending, inflation, and high interest rates. We have to face the fact that expenditures that are not supported by economic performance will ultimately prolong poverty. Our efforts serve as evidence that the government does not abandon its voters. [passage omitted]

Simultaneous commitment to modernization and social interests represents the solid basis of the government coalition's policy. We would like sensible actions at last instead of resignation. [passage omitted]

Ladies and gentlemen! As prime minister, a Hungarian citizen, and as a father, it was not easy to take stock of these hard facts. I know that life is very hard for a lot of us, and it is going to remain hard for a while. Let us all join forces to make this period shorter and easier. I am certain that we will usher in happier and care-free years together.

This is a country full of talent. History proves that it has always fought its way to the top from the nadir. Let us trust each other. It is going to be so this time again! Thank you.

Security Chief Interviewed on Organized Crime

AU2709121794 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 15 Sep 94 pp 1,3

[Interview with General Sandor Simon, general director of the National Security Office, by Attila Schmidt; place and date not given: "Organized Crime Is More Dangerous Than Spying"]

[Text] In addition to conventional crime, terrorism, drug trafficking, and lately the smuggling of nuclear materials represent the main threat all over the world. Secret services are also active in discovering these crimes. General Sandor Simon, general director of the Hungarian National Security Office, gave us an interview about this activity.

[Schmidt] Why did the secret service join in the investigation of conventional crimes?

[Simon] According to our experience, organized crime represents a much bigger threat to Eastern European countries, including Hungary, than the classic espionage.

[Schmidt] What is the special threat in organized crime that has now drawn the attention of counterintelligence?

[Simon] Organized criminals possessing a considerable amount of money are capable of actually paralyzing a country's usual activity, or at least the usual activity of its industrial or trade sector. Corruption becomes a decisive subsistence element, and it can spread widely.

[Schmidt] Since when has the Hungarian secret service been engaged in fighting organized crime and international crime?

[Simon] The period immediately after the change in the regime is decisive from this point of view, because foreign criminals with considerable experience appeared in Hungary at this time. As a result, we got in contact with the German, Austrian, French, Italian, and other intelligence services and we worked out a constant exchange of information.

[Schmidt] Is the illegal trade in nuclear materials something new?

[Simon] It is something new here, but this type of illegal trade has a tradition in many countries of the world. It is not clear that the recent case of attempted trade in nuclear materials was the only one; perhaps previous cases were not discovered.

[Schmidt] Why is the trade in nuclear materials dangerous?

[Simon] It is dangerous because a certain purity level of these materials is already considered weapons-grade material. It is interesting to note that the higher the purity, the lower the radiation level. For example, the radiation of 99 percent pure material is insignificant compared with the radiation of nuclear material enriched to only 82 percent purity. A few grams of this

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material are sufficient to cause tragic environmental pollution by placing it in a hospital building or inside any other public institution, or placing it in a water tank. This material is also suitable for terrorist blackmail. Therefore, all secret services deploy large forces to discover the criminals engaged in smuggling such materials.

Bekesi Optimistic About Economic Program

AU2709121894 Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 15 Sep 94 pp 1,7

[Interview with Finance Minister Laszlo Bekesi by "Gaspar"; place and date not given: "Bekesi in Skirmishes"]

[Text] *The budget deficit cannot be financed from domestic resources anymore; the financial administration is planning to borrow $1 billion from foreign money markets due to the expected overspending in state administration. The social price of the bargaining processes will have to be paid for next year and this may even produce critical moments. Can the Bekesi-program be implemented? We interviewed Finance Minister Laszlo Bekesi on this issue.*

[Bekesi] The program is based on two principles. First of all, lasting growth can only be achieved in a stable economy. On the other hand, the structure-changing effects of modernization which is the most important condition of lasting growth are in delay. Therefore, we have to lay major emphasis on these two factors. Fortunately, these principles and the other elements of the road leading to are goal are part of the coalition government's program. Therefore, looking at the legal side of the matter, the former Bekesi-program is still the government's program. There is no problem here, the coalition partner accepted this program. In fact, it confirmed it.

[Gaspar] However, the program's implementation is not at all without disagreements....

[Bekesi] Naturally, everyone knew that the implementation would be the hardest task. In the first period, we obviously have to concentrate on stabilization and this has two goals: To reduce the annual 10 percent overspending and, in addition to the reduction, to implement changes in the proportions which will increase the resources for investments. The spending of public institutions and, perhaps, at certain points, the population's spending have to be kept in tight control. This was not a secret, I have never said anything different. Perhaps, people, at least some of them, were reluctant to hear what I said. Therefore now, when we should be facing the implementation of this program, a rather big debate is surrounding it. This is natural. Up to now, during the more than two months, we have not had to make compromises that would divert us from the program's fundamental contents.

[Gaspar] Will the situation indeed be more difficult in 1995?

[Bekesi] The key question is what course the processes will take in 1995. The current year is interesting from the point of view that we should be able to prepare the ground for the 1995 position. We should not have to start 1995 with a deteriorated position as was the case in early 1994 due to the bad results in 1993. Obviously, a program like this cannot be implemented without compromises. The main question is whether the partners with whom we eventually have to come to an agreement will be able to understand that their long-term interests have to involve self-limitations on the short term—the government program cannot be successfully implemented in opposition to them.

[Gaspar] The program's implementation or its failure can depend on winning the support of the trade unions and employers....

[Bekesi] If we can achieve a breakthrough in this area then I will have no doubts about being able to implement our ideas—however, I must say that this breakthrough has not yet happened. We have a big parliamentary majority which makes it possible to implement this program. However, if the short-term interests sweep away the longer term goals then we will be in trouble. For the time being, we are still far from this so, at the moment, I can still be optimistic.

Agreement Signed With Novi Sad Radio

LD2709142994 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1338 GMT 27 Sep 94

[Excerpt] Budapest, 27 Sep (TANJUG)—In Budapest today Milan Todorov, director of Novi Sad Radio and Television, and Laszlo Orvary, executive director of Hungarian Radio, signed a declaration on cooperation between the two institutions, thus confirming an agreement concluded in 1990 which has not been implemented over the past two years for well-known reasons.

The agreement envisages an exchange of personnel, technical aid to visiting journalists in Hungary and Yugoslavia, and joint projects. [passage omitted]

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President Explains Nominations to KRRiT

LD2709130794 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1158 GMT 27 Sep 94

[Text] Warsaw, 27 Sep—President Lech Walesa informed the Sejm Presidium on Tuesday of his nomination of Henryk Andracki and Tomasz Kwiatkowski as members of the National Radio and Television Broadcasting Council [KRRiT]. "I am fully aware of the fact that this is a troublesome decision, but, with my knowledge of things, I feel it is an indispensible one. I am convinced that time will show that I was right and that I was not driven by base motives," Walesa said.

Sejm Speaker Jozef Oleksy expressed regret that the president did not wait with his decision until he had spoken with the Sejm Presidium. "The Sejm Presidium is unchanged in its willingness to cooperate with the head of state. We are conscious of the fact that there rests on us as on the Sejm not just the obligation to create the laws, but also to look at how they are implemented, how they function, and what phenomena they give rise to," Oleksy stressed.

Walesa Sees 'Messy' Relations With Government

BR2709143294 Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 24 Sep 94 p 5

[Interview with Polish President Lech Walesa by Peter Michielsen; place and date not given: "In Fifty Years, There Won't Be a Single Town Without My Statue"]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] [Michielsen] You have been in repeated conflict with the government of the former Communist Democratic Left Alliance and the Polish Peasant Party. How would you describe your relations with the present government?

[Walesa] I believe in the principle that the government must have time to show itself. I am not going to act before I know what it plans to do. I have given this government one year. I am now going to point out its failures. I do not want to upset anything, I simply want to ensure that it is on course and guarantee its efficiency. Relations at present are all right, but these relations will probably soon become rather messy.

[Michielsen] Are you pleased with the direction and course of the reforms of the Pawlak government?

[Walesa] We have remained on course, but the pace of change is too slow. Problems are too slow in being solved. There is not enough initiative. I am not pleased about this and neither is Polish society. In the economic area, the key theme is wider privatization. In the political and social area, we are facing the problem of an unbalanced parliament. The right and the liberals are not pulling with us. They should participate in a somewhat broader context.

[Michielsen] So this left-of-center government is, in principle, following the same course as the center governments that preceded it?

[Walesa] Previous governments implemented far-reaching reforms, and this course has not changed. Life is now continuing along its own path. The key issue is that the parliament should not intervene directly and should limit itself to introducing changes in the law. Life is moving ahead faster than the changes, and that is a good thing. The solutions that life dictates are always the best. The best principle is not to upset anything. The government is also of this opinion, but I feel it could help a little more.

[Michielsen] Some people complain of a "velvet restoration" under this government of the left: Old officials are returning to positions of authority, and reforms are being slowed down.

[Walesa] It seems like that at first. But can it be any different? For 50 years, we were training these people. Even priests went to Communist Party schools. The officials were trained within communist structures. But that does not mean that communism is being restored. Absolutely not. We are not like Germany, which is able to take the managers from one half of the country and install them in the former GDR. Also remember that people trained in the former system were best able to oppose that system. They are now getting the jobs, but no other way is possible. Communism consisted of a power system and an economic system. We are now moving toward a market economy with managers from earlier times, but that is not communism.

[Michielsen] Nevertheless, there are many who say that the communists should have been punished after 1989. They feel that the policy of peaceful reconciliation and the conscious ignoring of the misdeeds of communism was wrong.

[Walesa] But it is not like that. We are building a constitutional state. Misdeeds must be proved. Even our judges and public prosecutors come from the old system. What should we have done? Shot them? But even our guns were made under communism. No, that is not the right way. It is easier to build communism out of capitalism than the other way round. We are now a constitutional state, and people are of course not used to it. The people exert pressure. There is time enough to realize that there is no better system than democracy.

[Michielsen] Opinion polls indicate that your own popularity has fallen sharply. Can you give any explanation for this?

[Walesa] Naturally this popularity has fallen. People still have a communist mentality. They expect me to provide everything. They do not understand that power is shared. The people do not understand what we are doing. We have had to close factories. There is unemployment for the first time in 50 years. We are constructing a capitalist system, but from the ground up. In the capitalist system, one in 10 persons owns property. The other nine are envious of them for this. We can, of course, retain our old egalitarian principles, but the question is

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should we do so because we then build a system that is even more communist than before. Then everyone is equal, but also equally dissatisfied.

[Michielsen] Despite this low popularity, you want to be president for a second term. What happens if your popularity remains so low?

[Walesa] There is only one issue: I must demonstrate the validity of the principles I believe in. Have we chosen the right system? Did we have to close the factories? Has one in 10 persons become an owner? If yes, then nobody will change the policy I have chosen. I must convince the people that I am the only one able to make these decisions. And that is difficult. But my popularity will return as I explain this.

[Michielsen] Last year the Poles, out of frustration, threw out the representatives of the former democratic opposition and voted in the former Communist Party and Peasant Party representatives. You can also put that right next year.

[Walesa] No, the present coalition parties obtained just 25-30 percent of the votes. The remaining 70 percent went to the former opposition. It was just that it was so split and fragmented that many parties failed to reach the electoral threshold. It was not a victory for the former Communists but a technical error. [passage omitted]

[Michielsen] Let us turn to Poland's relations abroad. Are you satisfied with Poland's integration into Europe?

[Walesa] In general, no. I understand that there must be rules. The postcommunist countries are changing, but the West also needs time to change. The West is stubborn; it feels good in the present situation. The West is not yet ready enough. Today's Europe is still the product of the postwar confrontation. The Europe of the future is a Europe without confrontations and that will look very different.

[Michielsen] Do you find the West too hesitant?

[Walesa] No, it is a question of becoming aware and of organization. There is no vision; there are no new concepts. Life itself has created the West. I ask myself if politicians can impose anything or if life does that.

Lech Walesa looks pensively at the ceiling for a moment and then answers: "I think the latter."

Likely Presidential Candidates' Support Viewed

WS2809113094 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 28 Sep 94 pp 1, 5

[Article by (oprac. ard): "CBOS: 'Party Primary Election'; Market of Presidents"]

[Text]

Who for President?

	Percent
Aleksander Kwasniewski	19
Waldemar Pawlak	12
Lech Walesa	9
Andrzej Olechowski	9
Tadeusz Zielinski	7
Zbigniew Religa	5
Leszek Moczulski	5
Wlodzimerz Cimoszewicz	4
Krzysztof Skubiszewski	4
Jacek Kuron	3
Jozef Oleksy	3
Hanna Suchocka	3
Leszek Balcerowicz	2
Tadeusz Mazowiecki	2
Adam Strzembosz	2

The main parties' most likely candidates for president are already known, even though they are still unofficial candidates. The Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] has Aleksander Kwasniewski; the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] has Waldemar Pawlak; the Freedom Union has Jacek Kuron. The right wing, however, lacks a politician who would stand a chance of winning considerable support.

Political parties have not fielded their official candidates yet. However, each major grouping has its own market of possible candidates for president. The Public Opinion Research Center [CBOS] has asked Poles to choose the one politician—from either the SLD, the PSL, UW, or the right wing—for whom they would willingly vote.

Easy Choice

As for the SLD politicians, the most popular one is Aleksander Kwasniewski (27 percent). He is ahead of Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz (12 percent) and Jozef Oleksy (10 percent). The rest of the respondents either would not vote for an SLD candidate at all (38 percent) or do not have an opinion (13 percent).

Waldemar Pawlak has beaten all of his competitors among the peasants (38 percent); only 9 percent of respondents would support Jozef Zych; Janusz Piechocinski would not be backed by anyone.

Jacek Kuron defeats all his rivals in UW and secures 24 percent of the support. Hanna Suchocka could count on only 13 percent of the votes, and Leszek Balcerowicz on 11 percent. However, the social confidence in Kuron (71 percent) is not tantamount to the possible results of the presidential election. This most popular Polish politician could count on only 3-percent support in the first round of the election.

Orphan Right Wing

Only the right wing does not have a definite favorite yet. Each of those likely candidates who are highest on the

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ranking list—Wieslaw Chrzanowski and Jan Olszewski—would obtain only 7 percent of the vote. Lech Kaczynski, Adam Strzembosz, and Janusz Korwin-Mikke would get 3 percent each, and Romuald Szeremietiew could not count on even that much. As many as 62 percent would not vote for any candidate of the right wing.

Strong Because United

The CBOS also asked the voters of the various parties about their favorites. The voters of the Confederation for an Independent Poland are the most disciplined (60 percent would support Leszek Moczulski); they are followed by the SLD voters (58 percent would back Kwasniewski). The following people could count on only several percent of the votes of the SLD electorate: Olechowski, Pawlak, Religa, Walesa, and Civic Rights Spokesman Tadeusz Zielinski. SLD sympathizers would vote for neither Kuron nor Moczulski.

Voters of the Union of Labor would also not want Kuron as president. Their favorites are Zielinski (20 percent), Olechowski (14 percent), Kwasniewski (11 percent), Pawlak (9 percent), and Religa (also 9 percent).

Who Is in Favor of Walesa?

UW and right wing voters would prefer candidates other than those from the leading positions of the ranking list. This means that there is still no politician who would collect most of the votes of these two groups of voters.

Surprisingly, the person who could count on the greatest backing from the supporters of UW is...Lech Walesa (19 percent). The incumbent president has gotten ahead of Olechowski (14 percent) and Kuron (8 percent), even though the latter is still UW's most popular politician.

Walesa is also most widely supported among the voters of Solidarity (22 percent) and those of the right wing (21 percent). The supporters of the Nonparty Bloc in Support of Reforms prefer Olechowski (26 percent) to Walesa (19 percent).

Among the sympathizers of the PSL, the person who enjoys the greatest support is, quite obviously, Waldemar Pawlak (31 percent). He is followed by Kwasniewski (17 percent), Olechowski (10 percent), and Walesa (9 percent).

Voters Throng to Polls

According to CBOS research, a presidential election attracts more people than a parliamentary one. If it were held now, as many as 63 percent of Poles would go to the polls to elect the president, and only 54 percent would elect Sejm deputies and senators. Why the difference? Most probably because the presidential elections are governed by simpler rules, researchers explain.

* * *

The poll was carried out between 2 and 5 September on a 1,219-person representative random sample of adult Poles.

Walesa on Government-Bank Exchange Rate Dispute

LD2709230794 Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish 1830 GMT 27 Sep 94

[Text] After today's meeting of the Council of Ministers, President Lech Walesa declared that he had settled the dispute between the government and the Polish National Bank [NBP] over the lowering of interest rates. But several minutes after the president's statement, both NBP Deputy Chairman Witold Kozinski and Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Grzegorz Kolodko reaffirmed their respective previous positions.

[Reporter M. Kupis identified by caption] The president left the government meeting clearly satisfied.

[Begin recording] [Walesa] I had heard about some differences between the bank and the finance minister, but my participation has affected it so that these differences are no longer here. There is full understanding and cooperation, and this is very inspiring, and let's hope that we are really going to pull this Polish cart out of the difficulties.

[Kolodko] And we also agreed, Mr. President, that we were going to put the horse before the cart and not behind it.

[Walesa] Well, if we come up against a wall, we will have to put it the other way round. [end recording]

[Kupis] Deputy Prime Minister Kolodko later explained that, when talking about the horse and the cart, he had in mind the proper coordination of economic decisions. Kolodko still maintains that the slowing down of the rate of devaluation should be followed by a cut in the interest rates.

On the other hand, NBP Deputy Chairman Witold Kozinski maintains the NBP argument that agreeing to a reduction in interest rates now could discourage the public from saving in zlotys.

[Begin Kozinski recording] If people turn away from the zloty, this could mean increased demand for foreign currency, including the dollar. This could lead to a its higher exchange rate. [end recording]

[Kupis] Deputy Chairman Kozinski emphasized that the central bank was fully independent in setting the interest rates.

[Begin Kozinski recording] The actions of the central bank, the central Polish bank are independent of pressures, their strength or the direction these come from. They depend solely on what is happening and what could happen in the Polish economy. [end recording]

[Kupis] According to Deputy Chairman Kozinski, a possible cut in the interest rates would take place only once the NBP is convinced that inflation will not exceed 27 percent. This is the rate of inflation forecast by the Finance Ministry.

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NBP President on Policy, Bank Consolidation

WS2709133094 Warsaw NOWA EUROPA in Polish 26 Sep 94 p 20

[Interview with Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz, president of the National Bank of Poland, with the participation of Zbigniew Maciag, Wojciech Zielinski, Krzysztof Kotowski, Klaudia Sanetra, Przemyslaw Szubanski, and Mariusz Ignatowicz and compiled by M.I; place and date not given: "The French Model Is Most Suitable"]

[Text] [NOWA EUROPA] Work on next year's budget has begun. Is it already known what part of the deficit shall be financed by the central bank?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] The sum will be smaller than this year's budget, and the minister of finance agrees with that. The preliminary figure is 20 trillion zlotys [Z]. At such a level of financing the budget, the rate of inflation should be 19 percent. I believe that keeping it at a level of 17 percent, as projected by the Ministry of Finance, would require certain adjustments—for instance, avoiding raising some fixed prices.

[NOWA EUROPA] Is such a strong standpoint of the National Bank of Poland [NBP] a signal for the Ministry of Finance that the central bank will not soften on issues related to the basic indicators of next year's budget?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] We want to avoid a situation in which the rate of inflation would turn out to be completely different from the basic budget provisions. The rate of inflation for this year was estimated at 23 percent, and the first draft even assumed it would be as low as 21 percent. We thought that, under conditions of very strict discipline, considering that the wage tax was upheld, such a rate would be realistic. Therefore, it is better to establish it in the very beginning. We feel that, considering the existing budget and the level of financing from the NBP, the inflation rate next year will be 19 percent. The state's financial policy must be based on reality, not on optimistic assumptions.

[NOWA EUROPA] The Ministry of Finance is exerting considerable pressure on the central bank to increase profit payouts. Have you reached any consensus over the past few weeks on this issue?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] You cannot say that the ministry is exerting pressure on us. We have to pay approximately 87 percent of our profits. There are no differences of opinion on that. This year we will pay over Z1 trillion more than planned.

[NOWA EUROPA] Let us move on to the condition of the banking sector. The last report on the financial condition of banks was for the first quarter of the year, and it was not very optimistic. Cooperative and private banks were in a particularly difficult situation. Are there any later developments?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] The only means of salvation for banks suffering serious difficulties is fusion. As for details, we are at present in the process of preparing relevant materials, which will be presented in the near future.

[NOWA EUROPA] Public opinion polls indicate that trust toward private banks has declined considerably. Does this not pose a threat to the entire banking sector?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] I see this as a huge hazard, and that is why we attempted to take over banks on the verge of bankruptcy. Let us hope that the situation will change once the bill on bank deposit insurance is passed. Because the draft of this bill states that only three banks—Polska Kasa Opieki-Bank Panstwowy, Polska Kasa Opieki S.A., and Bank Gospodarki Zywnosciowej—are to have temporary guarantees from the State Treasury, the condition of private banks should improve.

[NOWA EUROPA] At a meeting with Grzegorz Kolodko, deputy prime minister and minister of finance, bankers said that a guarantee fund would be yet another burden for them. Does the NBP therefore plan to decrease obligatory bank reserves?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] It seems there exists the possibility of connecting the introduction of the bill on the Banking Gaurantee Fund with NBP policy on obligatory reserves in the sense that a part of them, as in the case of the National Bank Clearing House [KIR], could be allocated as payments due to membership in the Fund. I put forth such a declaration before Speaker of the Sejm Jozef Oleksy when the Sejm banking team analyzed the draft bill. The NBP remembers about this declaration, contrary to some imminent representatives of the Polish banking sector.

[NOWA EUROPA] Does the NBP find the draft bill on the Banking Guarantee Fund to be presented before the Sejm satisfactory? Many issues that you previously pointed out were not taken into account.

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] The draft has been changed several times. Its latest version has fewer divergences than the previous ones. I think the most serious drawback of the present draft is the provision that the banking guarantee fund will not be able to purchase the shares of endangered banks. We stand on the position that the fund should have the possibility—for a limited time only—to take over shares of a collapsing bank, which would have to be disposed of eventually. Time limits could be introduced for up to one year, or two at the most. Another controversial issue is the unlimited possibility of increasing bank charges by the Council of Ministers when a serious banking crisis arises. I believe that, as it is in other countries, the state should be the ultimate guarantor of the banking system's stability. I hope that bankers themselves, who, after all, are represented in the parliament, will persuade the commission to investigate the matter of how pertinent these solutions are.

[NOWA EUROPA] Much has been said lately about the consolidation of Polish banks. Opinions are also being

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voiced that this process could be accelerated by administrative measures. Would such a consolidation be favorable?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] I think it should take place independently. Making decisions is not advisable in processes of this sort, and, if they are made at all, it should be only in extreme circumstances. The fusion of banks will, beyond doubt, be very difficult because they vary considerably in the types of services they provide, in their clientele and their balance income. The basic precondition for consolidation is for the banks to be comparatively congruent.

[NOWA EUROPA] There are opinions that the government is not interested in the privatization of banks, as changes within supervisory councils seem to show...

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] It is difficult for me to evaluate the government's intentions on only this basis. I have the impression that both the banking community and the minister of finance have been interested in the privatization of banks so far. Bank Przemyslowo-Handlowy [BHP] shall be privatized this fall, so we cannot really speak of any specific delay, especially because preparing a bank for privatization requires a considerable amount of time. It will be possible to conduct the first evaluations only once the BPH is privatized.

[NOWA EUROPA] Reports on the possibility of putting Polski Bank Inwestycyjny [PBI] up for sale lead one to believe that the NBP has speeded up getting rid of its banks. Is this connected in any way with the recent discussion on separating supervision from the central bank so that it cannot join supervisory functions with ownership?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] Establishing the PBI—that is to say, getting rid of foreign currency exchange divisions so as to remove retail [oddetalicznic] from the NBP. Such an operation should be carried out systematically and in the right order. We thus assumed that the PBI would be privatized within two years. An analysis of the market of potential purchasers was begun in the spring. I do not exclude the possibility that the bank will be subdivided and that several investors will be involved in the selling process. It should also be considered which banks most need the PBI's network of divisions.

[NOWA EUROPA] Which banks have the greatest chances?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] We are talking about privatization, so I can say that banks outside the stock exchange will practically not be taken into consideration. Any division must be carried out in a way that would not harm competitiveness in the banking sector.

[NOWA EUROPA] Do you mean strictly private banks or those that have been privatized?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] I mean banks listed on the stock exchange.

[NOWA EUROPA] In the beginning of August, Animex Bank Joint-Stock Company was suspended. What are the chances of selling it, and which banks are interested in taking it over?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] It is difficult to say because some discussions are still in the working stage. The NBP's main goal is always—and this case is no exception—to prevent the banks' bankruptcy, but not at any cost.

[NOWA EUROPA] Regarding the issue of Animex Bank or, more precisely, closing down its brokerage office, there appeared a controversy: Who is in charge of resources from investors in the bank's brokerage office? How does the NBP define the means on investment accounts in the Animex Bank brokerage office and brokerage offices in other banks?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] Brokerage offices are inscribed into the NBP's balance, and the NBP must proceed in such a way so as not to decrease the bankruptcy property [masa upadlosciowa]. If an adequate contracting party is not found, these bills must be included in the bankruptcy property. Perhaps the relevant legal regulations need to be more precise to facilitate the extraction of brokerage office means from banks. My duty, however, is to prevent a decrease of the bankruptcy property.

[NOWA EUROPA] So chances for recovering money from the investment accounts are slim?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] They are merely the same as those of bank depositors. They could be recovered only when the bank was taken over by another bank. If the bank goes bankrupt, investment accounts of natural persons will be guaranteed by the NBP on the same principles that apply to deposits of other natural persons. I do not see any reason to treat stock exchange investors differently from remaining bank clients.

[NOWA EUROA] When could this takeover occur?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] It is very difficult to say. Sometimes the process can take a long time, especially when the contracting parties change. From the central bank's point of view, once the possibility of postponing the bank's bankruptcy appears, we do everything we can. A declaration of bankruptcy would mean that the NBP has to pay out the deposits we guarantee.

[NOWA EUROPA] Has any decision concerning Interbank been reached? The Germans and the Dutch did not hide their interest in this bank...

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] We have not yet made a decision. We will choose the best offer.

[NOWA EUROPA] Another controversial issue regards the banking law and the NBP law. Press reports indicate that preliminary drafts state that the independence of the central bank will be curbed.

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] I have obligated myself to present the banking law by the end of the year, and the NBP law,

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because of the necessity of discussing important structural issues, is to be presented in the spring of 1995. The banking law was laid down in 1993. It should soon be modified because one and a half years have already passed, and there are issues that must be dealt with.

The Council of Monetary Politics, which would have only advisory and supervisory functions, does not exist in this form anywhere in the world. I believe the French model would best suit Polish conditions. The council should be made up of people representing a wide political spectrum. Apart from representatives of the central bank, it would include highly qualified professionals, designated by the government and the parliament. The council should have decisionmaking powers, and its members could not be involved in any government or parliamentary activities. They could not be dismissed before the end of their terms. At the same time, the annual practice of laying down financial policy assumptions by the Sejm should be abandoned.

[NOWA EUROPA] Is it possible to introduce such a council structure under the present political conditions?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] This will certainly be very difficult. It will be a test for parliament members—of their reliability and openness toward solutions that have already been implemented in European countries.

[NOWA EUROPA] Do you recommend the French model because it is possible to implement it in Poland or because you think it is the best?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] It is difficult to say whether this particular model is the best because it has not been introduced until recently. It does seem, however, that it most closesly addresses Polish reality and the Polish central bank system. How this system operates depends on the people and the political climate.

[NOWA EUROPA] What if a project that would bind decisions made within the central bank with politics is passed?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] Primarily, such a project would contravene the status of Poland as a country associated with the European Union [EU] and a resolution passed by the Sejm on 28 May 1992, putting us under an obligation to conform our banking law to that of the EU.

[NOWA EUROPA] The foreign exchange law meeting EU requirements may come into effect on 1 January 1995. Is there a possibility that legislative problems may occur if there is no new banking law or NBP law?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] These matters are not that closely related; they are homogenous. There may only appear minor obscurities, which will not be all that difficult to eliminate. There is no need to draft the law anew; it could simply be modified should the need arise.

[NOWA EUROPA] Denomination is due to begin soon, yet the exchange of some high bills is still being carried out. How is the NBP prepared for the operation?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] On 1 January, we are introducing a new system of cash settlements, and the bill exchange is one of its elements. However, this process will take two years, and you have to bear in mind that old bills will exist on the same rights as the new ones. We are well prepared for the denomination. The present exchange of bills is like a general rehearsal before the next operation, when only one type of bill will be in use.

[NOWA EUROPA] Do you fear that denomination will boost inflation?

[Gronkiewicz-Waltz] Opinions on this issue vary. Some claim that denomination induces inflation; others say it curbs inflation. This process was quite different in countries other than Poland. Therefore, it is difficult to make an unequivocal statement.

National Strategic Defense Policy Presented

94EP0096A Warsaw PRZEGLAD WOJSK LADOWYCH in Polish No 7, Jul 94 pp 5-11

[Article by Division General Marian Robelek, chief of Armed Forces Strategic Planning; reprint of the article by Robelek published in the book *Bezpieczenstwo Polski w zmieniajacej sie Europie* (Poland's Security in a Changing Europe), Adam Marszalek Press, Warsaw-Torun, 1994: "On the Polish Republic's Defense Strategy"]

[Text] The geopolitical and geostrategic changes in Central and East Europe have resulted in a new political-military alignment in this region. They caused Poland to be in a different military situation. Previous doctrinal premises, based on the existence of the [Warsaw Pact] coalition, proved to be irrelevant, as did the organizational structures of troops, which had been geared to accomplishing diametrically opposite objectives within the framework of the groupings of Warsaw Pact troops.

* * *

This situation has necessitated the reappraisal of many previous premises of national security policy, including premises of military strategy.

[Now that we are] a sovereign country, we have begun working on a new security strategy allowing for actual tasks and realities and suiting our position. Hence also, in developing new concepts of this strategy we should get rid of deeply rooted stereotypes concerning chiefly:

—The nature of future conflicts (or war).

—Political-military dependence.

—The nuclear and air umbrella.

—Offensive strategy.

In this situation the first step taken was to prepare two documents that were signed by the President of the Republic of Poland and adopted by the National Defense Committee on 2 November 1992. They are:

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—"Premises of Polish Security Policy," which defines the underlying principles of our national policy on domestic and foreign security.

—"The Security Policy and Defense Strategy of the Republic of Poland," as a document defining these principles precisely and presenting the intentions and directions of actions being taken to strengthen Poland's sovereignty and security, actions which also affect our country's standing in Europe.

The premises of Poland's defense strategy presented in the above documents underlie the active pursuit of security policies by the concerned state institutions. These premises have also become the point of departure for the reflections presented here, especially as regards military strategy construed as the state's ability to act in the military domain, as viewed on the scale of overall spatiotemporal objectives and the means and resources serving to accomplish them. This concept also extends to the basic problems of the preparation and use of the state's armed forces as a whole.

The Context of Poland's Defense Strategy

In any country defense strategy is formulated in the process of confrontation between political objectives and the possibilities for achieving them. It should allow for, among other things, the implications of the country's geostrategic location, the evolving directions of the national security policy, the anticipated military threats, the consequences of superiority of the military potentials of eventual enemies and the possibilities for neutralizing it, the probable nature of future warfare, and the experiences to be learned from contemporary military conflicts and crisis situations.

The paramount strategic objective of our national defense is to preserve our national sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity (cf.: "Premises of Polish Security Policy" and "The Security Policy and Defense Strategy of the Republic of Poland").

The pursuit of this objective is the task of all the component elements of the national defense system, according to their functions. Thus each of these elements will follow a specific strategy of action that is consonant with the national security policy. Allowing for the overall trends of our strategic concepts, the existence of a particular enemy and a specific scenario of warfare is not presupposed. For example, the strategic concepts of NATO assume, as the basis for their solutions, readiness for dialogue and detente combined with a high degree of defense preparedness of the member countries. The guiding idea is the formula: From confrontation through dialogue to cooperation leading to integration. The adopted approaches of security policy toward potential threats should be based on rational forecasts of the possibility of their occurrence.

Hence also this policy should be geared toward mastering and resolving crisis situations through negotiations, mediation, and also other methods practiced by international organizations. Resorting to force should be viewed as the last resort.

In the event force has to be resorted to, the strategy of action may be as follows:

—In the event of a war of more than local scope, the longest possible resistance with the object of halting invasion, by inflicting maximum losses on the aggressor, demonstrating a determined defense, and taking steps to gain time, which would make it possible for other countries and international organizations to react.

—In the event of a low-intensity conflict, the conduct of independent defensive actions with the object of localizing, halting, and defeating the enemy as soon as possible.

In both variants an important role will be played by proper coordination of the activities of territorial defense troops and organizations with the combat activities of operational troops, as well as by the resistance of the nation as a whole. Also crucial will be the execution of various measures in domains vital to the functioning of the state and the nation in wartime. They include: Protection of the population and state structures, logistical support for the armed forces, and meeting the varied needs of the population.

In the context of the military strategy of national defense it is assumed that, in the event of absence of alliances its premises should be based on independent defense actions. It is believed, however, that such independence is of a temporary nature, because it is a political objective of the Polish Republic to join the structures of West Europe, including its security systems.

Allowing for possible military threats, Poland's defense strategy should presuppose preparing the state (armed forces) to both oppose large-scale aggression and successfully resolve conflicts of limited intensity. In the present situation, especially the economic situation, it would be more convenient to adapt this strategy to resolving small-scale conflicts alone. But this does not assure the possibility of achieving Poland's political objectives in the event of a sudden increase in the risk that a larger war may break out. Hence also it appears warranted for the adopted solutions to take into account the possibility of large-scale threats.

Allowing for the superiority of the military potential of possible enemies, the need to establish and operate a system of universal and prepared defense should be taken into account.

Universal, because it would utilize considerable human and material resources and comprise both armed and

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unarmed resistance. Prepared, because implementing preplanned defense measures would be a general principle.

In these conditions, side by side with mobile operational troops there must also exist territorial defense forces that are strongly implanted locally and capable of putting up resistance in the form of irregular (partisan) activities combined with universal resistance by the society.

A thus-prepared defense creates the conditions for effectively opposing all attempts at blackmail in peacetime, possible aggression, and eventual occupation of lost territory.

Nature of Armed Conflicts

The currently adopted premises and forecasts estimate that a global conflict or a conflict on the European scale is hardly likely. However, the possibility of the outbreak of armed conflicts between individual countries or groups of countries is not precluded. These conflicts may assume varied forms, from border skirmishes to regular combat.

They may be the so-called low-intensity conflicts which will not always take on the form of armed clashes. The forces taking part in them may not represent their national governments or an unambiguously defined political force. It is thought that they will be military units involved in an armed conflict in a border zone (violating our territory in a deliberate or unintended manner), illegal armed organizations, or troops refusing to acknowledge legal authority. Threats of this kind may be viewed as most likely in the near future so far as Poland is concerned.

An eventual armed conflict may be initiated as follows:

—Poland's involvement in war following a period of gradual exacerbation of the domestic situation in the neighboring countries, especially owing to a rise in tensions in the border regions, incidents, and armed provocations.

—Transition to actual warfare owing to a sudden change in the international situation preceded by a selective deployment of armed forces, attempts to bring about the economic collapse of the state, and actions weakening the defense system.

—Sudden commencement of war on using, in its initial period, forces with a high degree of combat readiness directly from sites of regular deployment, exercise areas, and training ranges (hardly likely).

It is assumed that the second and third variants will be based on the aggressor's endeavor to commence combat upon exploiting elements of surprise on an operational or even strategic scale, without prior concentration of forces in the vicinity of borders. The aggression may begin with an air operation—with a strike on installations decisive to the viability of the country and its armed forces, such as political-administrative and industrial centers, transportation hubs, power facilities, communications centers, and military installations such as airfields, the firepower and signals facilities of the air defense system, guidance and command posts, and troop groupings.

In the course of offensive operations the possibility of using air-land groupings and reconnaissance and strike systems is to be taken into account. This operating mode entails the threat of a simultaneous strike at not only installations located in the tactical and operational zone of defense but also those located in the interior. This also provides the attacker with the conditions to exploit his success in several distinct directions. As a consequence, numerous foci of combat may arise over an extensive area and the defense system may become paralyzed. This will facilitate the rapid intrusion of armored and mechanized enemy groups into the interior and complicate the defender's maneuvering of reserves along the especially threatened directions.

In the event of low-intensity conflicts, combat activities may be characterized by a smaller scale and by the need to commit, in principle, only part of the troops. Aviation, artillery, etc., will be used to a small extent. In this case a major role may be played by territorial defense forces and the forces subordinated to the ministry of internal affairs.

The principal defense objectives of a strategic nature may thus include:

—Protection of main resources and forces of the defense system against missile and air strikes.

—Preparation of an effective land defense of border regions and installations of operational-strategic importance in the operational zone and in the interior.

—Early preparation of forces and resources for border defense to repel strikes by enemy armored and mechanized groups attempting to penetrate into the interior of our country.

—Establishment of a territorial defense system assuring the functioning of key economic and administrative installations and reducing to a minimum civilian casualties.

The Concept of Military Defense

Underlying the concept of military defense of the Republic are two basic strategic objectives:

—The creation of a defensive force that would discourage potential aggressors from attempting to use armed force, exerting pressure, or launching aggression.

—Assuring the possibility of an effective use of the armed forces, appropriate to the scale and nature [of

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the aggression] and, in the event of the enemy's intrusion into the interior of Poland, his expulsion across the border.

These objectives can be achieved by:

1. Utilizing combat potential in two forms of land defense, stationary and mobile, waged on air, land, and sea, upon exploiting the entire firepower potential, the protective features of terrain, and a prepared defense infrastructures.

2. Maintaining part of the armed forces in a state of readiness for immediate assumption of combat against the aggressor and utilizing rapid response forces, especially in the air and on ground.

3. Preparing the national defense infrastructure and streamlining mobilization measures affecting the defense capability of the state and its armed forces.

4. Waging combat as based chiefly on the use of materiel (weaponry) prepared in peacetime and stockpiled on national territory.

5. Effectively destroying the forces and resources of the enemy, preventing the defeat of friendly forces and maintaining their readiness for counterstrikes, and also by reducing casualties to a minimum.

The principal executor of defensive actions is the operational troops. An important role is also played by territorial defense forces and various paramilitary organizations.

The principal branch of the armed forces is the Army. Its purpose is to repel ground and air strikes by the aggressor in cooperation with the other armed services in any region of the country. It is organized into tactical groups and units (subunits) deployed in the organizational structures of military districts.

The Air Force and Air Defense Troops are the branch of armed services which reaches the highest degree of combat preparedness in peacetime. Its principal purpose is to repel air attacks by the enemy from any operational direction, to destroy his forces on land and sea, and to create the conditions for a mobilizing and operational deployment and conduct of operations by the Army and the Navy.

The Navy is designed to defend the maritime boundary of the state, to ensure freedom of navigation, and to protect economic interests in the exclusive economic offshore zone of the Republic of Poland, as well as to defend the seacoast. Independently or jointly with the Air Force and Air Defense Troops it combats enemy groups on sea and together with the seacoast defense troops it participates in hindering landings of seaborne troops and their joining the troops active along the seacoast.

In peacetime the armed forces are maintained in a state of readiness ensuring their operational deployment. Their conversion from peacetime to wartime structure and tables of personnel is accomplished through mobilization measures on utilizing a command system that is an integral part of the system for guiding national defense.

Depending on the nature and scale of aggression the Armed Forces of the Polish Republic may, by means of energetic and varied combat activities, on employing strategic (totality of forces) or operational (part of forces) defense, engage in, according to the situation, screening, defensive, defensive-delaying, defensive-offensive, and partisan operations.

In a low-intensity conflict, rapid response forces (or a part thereof), designated troops, especially at the tactical level, designated sections of the command system, operational centers of Air Force and Air Defense Troops as well as the Navy, and deployed all-arms units (subunits) and services can be utilized. In this case it is assumed that screening, blocking, antidiversionary, or antiterrorist operations will be waged in the areas menaced by a spillover of conflict from a neighboring country, especially at the border, in the directly adjoining border zone, or over a broader border zone.

If the area under aggression is a particular operational region, the operational troops of one or two military districts may participate in combat operations. In such a situation the operation will commence with a defensive battle waged by the forces of the first echelon of a defense grouping. After the enemy is halted by screening forces or first-echelon troops, the second-echelon forces of operational groups usually carry out a counterattack with the object of breaking enemy troop groupings.

Then combat operations will consist in brief engagements in the form of sudden surprise strikes culminating in departure from the battlefield in order to execute a maneuver preparing favorable conditions for the next engagement (defensive combat or counterattack).

In the event of armed aggression against a strategic area the armed forces put up organized resistance with the object of inflicting maximum casualties on the aggressor and making the aggression unprofitable. This is accomplished owing to active defense at successive lines of defense until the aggressor is halted at the strategic (final) line protecting the areas decisive to the survival of the state and the armed forces. To this end, the Armed Forces of the Polish Republic enter into the strategic defense situation, as part of which they organize and wage ground defense and defense of the seacoast against seaborne landings, combat air landings by the enemy, and protect key military and economic installations. (Footnote: The strategic defense operation means the totality of the steps taken on the national scale and of the military ground, sea, and air operations intended to repel the strikes of the aggressor, inflict maximum losses on him, and prevent loss of national territory. It comprises the land, air, and sea defense operations as organized and waged under the direct guidance of the Supreme

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Command, upon committing all the elements of the national defense system.) In addition, they organize and wage partisan warfare in the areas conquered by the enemy.

Ground defense operation in the menaced strategic regions (or directions) is waged by the operational units of the Army in their regions (zones) of operational responsibility, in cooperation with units of the other armed services. Defense is organized on the basis of expanded systems for the defense of fortified lines, regions, fortified positions, barriers, and regions of devastation.

Air defense operation is waged by the Air Force and Air Defense Troops and the antiaircraft defense units of the Army and the Navy with comprehensive support from reconnaissance forces and facilities and from radioelectronic warfare units, thus creating a nationwide integrated system for the air defense of the state and the armed forces.

Sea defense operation is conducted by the Navy with its forces and resources, on waging warfare at sea within the Polish economic offshore zone, concentrating the defense efforts in the coastal zone and supporting the ground troops defending the seacoast.

Combating landings by the enemy and diversionary activities is a task for designated operational troops and units of territorial troops in their particular regions, as well as of aviation and naval strike forces. The aim is to prevent these landings and to break up and destroy the enemy troops in the landing areas and during their transportation by sea (or by air).

These operational objectives are carried out by defense groupings of land, air, and air defense troops and the Navy, as well as by territorial defense forces, deployed as a strategic-operational grouping.

Given the current operational conditions the principal form of combat will be an active and deeply echeloned defense (of areas, regions, lines, and positions). It consists in an appropriate deployment of troops in the direction from which the threat originates and thereupon execution of decisive maneuvers and regrouping of forces in the directions of enemy strikes.

It is believed that defense operations may take place in the following stages:

—Starting with the commencement of an aerial assault and a radioelectronic strike by the enemy, and subsequently after contact with his ground strike forces is established. The defense will consist in repelling missile and aircraft (air) strikes, combat by the screening group in the screening zone, and suppressing air landings and special and diversionary groups. During that period designated troops and forces will engage in screening and delaying activities with the object of making possible an efficient mobilizational and operational deployment of the armed forces as a whole. Of special importance during this stage of the operation is air defense and antiparatroop defense, along with the formation and activities of mobile units and screening and antiparatroop groups.

—Combating the enemy ahead of the forward line of the main (first) zone of defense and fighting to protect the defense regions of first-echelon tactical groups.

—Combating the enemy in the interior (in the operational zone). In that stage the armed forces will wage defensive combat along with the possibility of aggressive operations (counterstrikes) and, when the situation is favorable, switch to counterattacking. In the event a counterstrike is not made, the final stage of the battle will be defense waged by the entirety of the forces at the strategic boundary, in the nature of a typical stationary (positional) defense.

* * *

As outlined above, the concept of the military defense of the country indicates that the composition, armaments, equipment, and deployment of troops throughout the country must assure readiness to use part of the armed forces in a low-intensity conflict and make possible exploiting the entire combat potential in wartime. Some of the forces, such as rapid response units, must be maintained in the highest degree of readiness with the object of using them promptly in any area. They will be transported by air (by aircraft and helicopters).

As presented in this article, selected problems of the defense strategy of the Polish Republic point to the tasks faced by our armed forces, especially as regards military strategy. The traditional solutions are no [longer to be] viewed as static and invariable. The changes taking place in politics, economics, military science, and the defense awareness of the society, both in this country and elsewhere, require a continuing verification and optimization of the adopted premises.

As a subject of broadly conceived interdisciplinary research, the problems of the military strategy of the state increasingly often transcend the scope of military research centers. In our concepts we should allow for all kinds of trends toward detente and conciliation based on defense, which in Polish conditions assure achieving the strategic objectives of national and security policy.

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PUNR States Support for Iliescu U.S. Visit

AU2809103794 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 0500 GMT 28 Sep 94

[Text] The Standing Bureau of the National Romanian Unity Party [PUNR] regards as groundless the accusations by certain political and press media in Romania that the party has made the visit of Romania's president to the United States difficult.

A communique issued by the PUNR Standing Bureau also mentions that the party, which—regardless of the circumstantial elements—is consequently pursuing its policy of promoting the national interests, on the latest occasion has genuinely supported and will continue to support the president's mission by facilitating certain important contacts with U.S. political officials, which was also stressed during a telephone conversation that the PUNR leadership held last night with Romanian President Ion Iliescu.

On the other hand, the communique says, the PUNR will not hesitate, under any circumstances, to claim its democratic right to have its own political opinions.

UDMR's Frunda on Ethnic Hungarian Autonomy

AU2809103694 Bucharest EXPRES MAGAZIN in Romanian 13-20 Sep 94 pp 8, 9

[Interview with Gyorgy Frunda, senator of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania, member of Romania's permanent delegation to the Council of Europe, Council of Europe High Commission for Lithuania, by Ileana Lucaciu; place and date not given: "The Struggle Against the Dictatorship of the Government"]

[Excerpts] [Lucaciu] During the recent visit of Romanian Foreign Affairs Minister Teodor Melescanu to Budapest, Mr. Gyula Horn, the prime minister of Hungary, declared—referring to the stage of the negotiations in view of the Romanian-Hungarian basic treaty—that "both parties display the necessary political will." Our diplomat asserted that there will be no problems regarding the state frontiers, but "it will be more difficult to turn into practice the requirements regarding the rights of ethnic minorities." I would like you to comment on that assertion.

[Frunda] On the geographic-political plane, I believe that the normalization of the Romanian-Hungarian relations and the conclusion of the Romanian-Hungarian treaty has a vital importance. That treaty has to be prepared exceptionally well. During the recent meeting in Budapest, the two [foreign affairs] ministers reached agreement over 80 percent of the issues. However, the rest, which was not settled, refers precisely to the rights and the guaranteeing of the rights of Romania's ethnic minorities. Above all, I am very satisfied over the fact that they have reached an agreement regarding the inviolability of the borders. Once that problem is settled, the Romanian side's suspicions will be defused regarding the revengeful Hungarian spirit, so loudly invoked by the nationalist-communist parties in our parliament. That agreement also opens the possibility to settle the issue of the rights of Romania's ethnic Hungarians. [passage omitted]

In contrast to current reality in Slovakia, in my opinion the Romanian government is at a disadvantage. Over the past eight years the Romanian government has been continuously promising to solve the problems of the ethnic minorities living in Romania. Now they have set up a Council for Ethnic Minorities, which told the CSCE High Commissary for Ethnic Minorities and the experts and the chairman of the Council of Europe that those problems can be solved and that there is political will to solve them. However, what they are actually doing is merely trying to delay their settlement. What is even more, in certain fields, for example in the Draft Education Bill recently passed by the Chamber of Deputies, they are even taking steps backward, in the sense that they are curbing the rights of the ethnic Hungarians instead of furthering them. Under such circumstances the government of Romania has isolated itself. With the exception of Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, where there is a tragic situation, in entire Central and Eastern Europe the problems of ethnic minorities have been almost fully solved. Including in Hungary. In our country there is not sufficient political courage or political will to settle those problems.

[Lucaciu] Why would the Romanian Government not wish to solve them?

[Frunda] It is a comforting thought for the government to know that they can always resort to the weapon of ethnic diversion whenever a crisis arises. Besides, the government has set up a coalition with that nationalist-communist party, a term which applies to the majority of the members of the PUNR [National Romanian Unity Party]. [passage omitted]

[Lucaciu] In front of us lies the document addressed by the UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania] to the Hungarian government, which was also published by the press in our country. Please could you explain some of the demands included in it, which cause bewilderment and suspicion. I am referring especially to point three, which raises the question of autonomy. That point is followed by another one, with a further demand requesting a special juridical status for the ethnic Hungarians. What do you mean by autonomy and a special juridical status for the ethnic Hungarians living in Romania? I would like to remind you that not even the PNTCD [National Peasant Christian-Democratic Party], which is also a member of the convention to which the UDMR belongs [Democratic Convention of Romania] consents to such formulations.

[Frunda] I will begin to explain this by reiterating the example I have already given you, by comparison with the situation in South Tirol. South Tirol exists within the boundaries of a free and independent state, namely Italy.

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That is the sense in which we conceive autonomy as well. We consider it normal that in regions where a substantial proportion of the population consists of ethnic Hungarians, they should have an autonomy that is not exclusively a territorial one. That minority, according to its size, should have the right to representation, to be consulted in the issues that concern it, and to be bestowed with decisionmaking authority for those regions. These claims are not new and they do not imply that the sovereignty of the Romanian state should beimpeded in any form. Therefore it is absolutely groundless to say that they are a threat, as our enemy political parties try to suggest, exploiting the issue in a demagogic way and claiming that we want to set up a state within a state. We wish to remain within the state of which we are citizens, but we are requesting such autonomy as to be able to decide over the problems that concern us. That right is stipulated by several European conventions. [passage omitted]

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Izetbegovic Postpones Embargo Exemption Decision

LD2809012694 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2339 GMT 27 Sep 94

[Text] New York, Sept. 27 (TANJUG)—Bosnian Muslim leader Alija Izetbegovic said Tuesday he would consent to defer arms embargo exemption implementation only [words indistinct] decision was made now. He said implementation or consequences would be postponed for six months.

Speaking in the United Nations General Assembly debate, Izetbegovc said he accepted to defer the arms embargo exemption for the Bosnian Muslims only if all UN resolutions were strictly adhered to and steps taken towards efficient control of the border between Yugoslavia and, as he put it, parts of Bosnia under Serb control.

He also demanded a resolution be passed urgently on extending the so-called safe areas in Bosnia, that current resolutions in connection with this issue be observed as well as that the security council take urgent steps to, as he said, check strangulation of Sarajevo.

On condition these terms were met and the UN troops continued with their mission, the Muslim government in Sarajevo would be prepared to accept the new, modified formula in connection with the arms embargo, he said.

U.S. Secretary of State Christopher said Monday the Muslim Sarajevo government has asked officially the U.S. no longer insist on exemption of the Bosnian Muslims from the arms embargo.

The U.S. has previously announced that, if the Bosnian Serbs failed to accept the 'Contact Group' plan on the map territorially dividing the three nations in Bosnia by October 15, it would institute proceedings in the United Nations Security Council for exemption of the Bosnian Muslims from the arms embargo.

The Security Council imposed in September 1991 an arms embargo for the entire territory of the former Yugoslavia.

Rose Hails Decision

AU2709173294 Paris AFP in English 1700 GMT 27 Sep 94

[Text] Sarajevo, Sept 27 (AFP)—UN Bosnia commander Lt-General Sir Michael Rose on Tuesday hailed a Bosnian Government climbdown over lifting the arms embargo, saying the authorities had heeded his warnings that they could lose the eastern enclaves and provoke a UN departure from Bosnia.

In an interview with AFP, Rose said neither the Moslem-dominated Bosnian Army nor the Bosnian Serbs were yet ready for a return to full-scale war, and said the Bosnian Government had signalled it was ready to give peace a chance—for another six months at least.

His comments came the day after the Moslem-led government indicated in New York that it was no longer insisting that the lifting of the UN embargo on weapons sales to ex-Yugoslavia be effective immediately.

"I think that decision to postpone further moves toward lifting the arms embargo is tremendous news for the people of this country and for the peace process," Rose said.

"Having an artificially imposed time line on a peace process undoubtedly creates difficulties because peace is drawn out and never proceeds smoothly, but if you are patient and persistent in the end you get there."

The apparent about-face by the Bosnian Government had not surprised him because the "strategic imperatives are there. Neither side can accept a premature return to war."

Rose said he had held lengthy talks with the Bosnian military and political hierarchy "pointing out to them as a military man what the military effects were likely to be.

"They certainly listened to what I had to say," he said, adding that he had made the same points to the administration of U.S. President Bill Clinton, who had set for the Serbs a mid-October deadline to accept an international peace plan for Bosnia or see him move to lift the weapons ban—either through the United Nations or unilaterally.

Rose said he did not believe there had been an about-turn in Bosnian policy but rather that the Sarajevo government was taking into account the coming winter months and the possibility of seeing peacekeepers leave the country if the embargo is lifted.

"What they were saying is not that we are abandoning lifting the arms embargo," he said. "What we are saying is that with winter coming up, with the immediate effect it would have on us with the withdrawal of UNPROFOR (UN Protection Force) the withdrawal of the aid programme etc, we need to reconsider that and we will give the peace process another six months to demonstrate that it's working before we look at a war scenario."

The Bosnian Army was in no position to take on the Serbs if the country was plunged back into full-scale war, he said.

"I have always said, and this is why I was not surprised by their decision, that consequences would be dire and incalculable.

"First of all they are not in a position to defend the enclaves. I have had many discussions with military commanders in those enclaves and they are as aware as I am that if UNPROFOR withdrew... then those enclaves would be overrun.

"Sarajevo is an enclave, I'm not saying Sarajevo would be overrun but certainly the Bosnian Serb army controls all the high ground around Sarajevo and therefore the utilities.

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"And life in Sarajevo would return to the hell it was two years ago."

Delic Views Embargo, UNPROFOR, Posavina

AU2709193894 Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 25 Sep 94 pp 4-5

[Interview with General Rasim Delic, commander of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, by Zdravka Soldic; place and date not given: "The Observers Along the Drina River Will See Nothing!"]

[Text] Since the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation was established, the people said to be the most efficient, at least by the media, are Generals Roso and Delic. It was said that the negotiations between the military commands of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] were far more successful than the political leaderships. However, it is evident from the recent statements of the commanders of the two military forces that there are some fundamental differences regarding the organization of the future joint army anticipated by the federation Constitution.

We talked to Gen. Rasim Delic some 10 days after the Zagreb agreement, and the first question was, naturally, what military news the agreement contained.

[Delic] I did not attend the talks in Zagreb, but I can answer your question. Nothing new was arranged; certain principles, which have already been adopted by the federation Constitution, were reactivated. Representatives of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the HVO should be sitting down to talk in a few days, as, despite the established principles, there are certain problems that need to be overcome in order to start working on putting together the federation army. The problems relate to the situation on the ground. In the joint federation army, the views of problems should be the same, which is not the case at the moment—while the Army is fighting, the HVO is taking a break from combat activities. There are some other reasons that have to be resolved in principle.

[Soldic] What are they? What do the HVO and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army propose?

[Delic] There are differences of principle in the views of the future army of the federation, and these differences have to be overcome. I would not like to discuss this now, because it could cause additional difficulties in overcoming the existing problems. At any rate, it is in the interest of all the peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina to resolve the problem as soon as possible, and to bring the federation army to life as soon as possible.

[Soldic] How does the federation Constitution anticipate regarding the forming of the federation army? What principles and models will it be based on?

[Delic] The federation Constitution has not elaborated this aspect, because a constitution cannot do that. This is elaborated in laws on defense and other laws that specify the principles of the defense of a certain country—in this case, the federation as part of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Constitution talks about a unitary, joint command of the federation army. There can certainly only be one army in one country. This is the main principle to be presented; otherwise it is difficult to discuss a joint and unitary army. Although some people are trying to find different interpretations of the term, I am talking about the principle. An army can only be commanded from one place and by one person. There cannot be two commanders and two commands.

[Soldic] So the joint Roso-Muslimovic headquarters is a transitory stage that will last until the joint federation army is established?

[Delic] Precisely. The Split agreement anticipated the establishment of joint headquarters whose task was to coordinate certain activities in the transition period. They were primarily supposed to resolve the problems that existed after the agreement was signed, to not allow the conflicts to be repeated, and to separate the forces on the ground. The joint headquarters carried out the task very well. However, the joint headquarters was formed on the basis of the order Gen. Petkovic and I signed; it is subordinate to us, rather than the state bodies. A legal basis should be created for the federation bodies to manage—and therefore be the supreme command of the federal army. The Roso-Muslimovic joint headquarters does not have the influence needed to command in any way.

[Soldic] This is a known fact, but it is also known that the joint headquarters was supposed to have drawn up the plan for the federation army by now. How far have they got, and on what principles and models was the organization of the future federation army based?

[Delic] The draft model of the future federation army has been drawn up and delivered to the Ministry of Defense, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, and some other institutions to be reviewed. Although the draft came from the joint headquarters, it cannot be said that the work put into it was joint work.

[Soldic] Your visits to Turkey and Washington were connected with the demand for the lifting of the arms embargo imposed on the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Before the visit, you expressed your pessimism about the possible lifting of the embargo. What can you say now, having visited the Pentagon?

[Delic] You are aware of the fact that Russia, Britain, and France stated clearly that they were against the lifting of the arms embargo imposed on the legal forces defending the statehood of Bosnia-Herzegovina. You also know that they have the right to impose a veto in the Security Council and, since I am a practical person, I believe that the lifting of the arms embargo is not a realistic possibility. There are many obstacles and labyrinths, and it is difficult to say that the embargo will be

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lifted and that justice will prevail, that all the armed formations at the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina that are defending the country will receive weapons. In Washington, I tried to point out to the people who have some influence on the decision that everyone was receiving weapons except the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. If the embargo was imposed on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, why is it that everyone except the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army can get weapons?

[Soldic] What is your opinion of the Contact Group decision that civilian observers be deployed along the border between Bosnia-Herzegovina and the so-called FRY? Can civilian observers look through the shipments from Serbia and send them back?

[Delic] This practice with observers—of any kind—should be abandoned. The UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] in Bosnia-Herzegovina represents observers who only register how many shells landed and how many civilians were killed, and they have no authority to do anything. If the same kind of observers are deployed along the border between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro, they will be of no use—if they only register how many trucks and how many people cross the border toward Bosnia- Herzegovina. I always support what is efficient; a successful control that would facilitate the implementation of the peace agreement on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina as soon as possible. I believe that the right thing to go along with this would be Serbia recognizing the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina—this is what the Contact Group should have demanded. It should also be stated that deploying civilian observers to impose sanctions on Karadzic's "disobedient" Serbs is not in accordance with the main propositions the Contact Group posed as an ultimatum when it proposed the peace agreement. It was stated then that whoever would say "yes" would get subsidies and benefits, and whoever would say "no" would suffer sanctions. It seems that something has gotten mixed up here. Bosnia-Herzegovina has accepted the plan, but it received no subsidies. Instead of the lifting of the arms embargo imposed on the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina, we are witnessing the suspension of the sanctions imposed on Serbia and Montenegro. I do not understand how the principles supported by the proposed peace agreement could have been so easily abandoned. Have the proposers considered their credibility?

[Soldic] There has been a lot of talk lately about UNPROFOR withdrawing if the embargo is lifted. If you are faced with this alternative, what will you opt for?

[Delic] These two processes are not connected. First, no one has the right to talk about UNPROFOR leaving on their own behalf. France and Britain have indicated this, but UNPROFOR came here under the UN mandate, and it can leave if the UN demands it. However, there are obligations that the international community took on by voting over 50 Secutity Council resolutions, and it cannot renounce them. It should be said that we are not afraid of UNPROFOR leaving, with the international community taking over the tasks we can not carry out. This is primarily the protection of the "protected areas" as declared by the Security Council. According to the decision of the international community, weapons have been taken away in some of these "protected areas," because there is a civilian population there. In considering this problem, a way has to be found to protect the "protected areas" and to deliver humanitarian aid. Moreover, it should be stated that there are countries that have provided soldiers for UNPROFOR and that do not support the proposal that UNPROFOR should leave Bosnia-Herzegovina. I was asked the same question in the United States several days ago. I asked them what they would do if they were in our shoes. Naturally, they had no answer. According to the Contact Group plan, we are their allies in putting the pressure on the Serb aggressor to accept the peace plan. Now we are faced with dilemmas and pressures, rather than the Serb side, so that there can finally be a peaceful solution.

[Soldic] It seems to me that your forecast "There will be as much Bosnia as we can defend" is the most realistic one. Evidently you did not only speak about this. The Bosnia-Herzegovina Army has taken the initiative on the frontline, and in the past month it has liberated several hundred square kilometers of territory.

[Delic] All the wars so far have shown that the force lies with the military, that whoever has the military power can also conduct political negotiations. This is why I insisted on improving the combat readiness of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, so that the positions of the political negotiators of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina could be stronger. This is the context in which I said this. We have to make sure that peace reigns on the territory of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina and that a democratic system is built that can offer all the peoples safety, an environment in which they can live and work. This is perhaps not as it should be at the moment, but if there is peace, work and intelligence will become prominent....

[Soldic] Gen. Dudakovic's action in taking over Velika Kladusa has been evaluated by military experts as excellent. However, the problem in that area has not been resolved. A great part of the forces loyal to Fikret Abdic went over to the Serbs along with Abdic, and now they are shelling Velika Kladusa. The refugees cannot return to their homes. What do you see as the solution to this problem?

[Delic] It is difficult to find a solution for people who are under military pressure, who are not allowed to return to their homes. Many of these people would like to return to their homes, but they cannot do so. We tried to make this possible for them through UNPROFOR; we organized a mixed police force of UNPROFOR personnel and the forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs so that the people who returned would feel safer. However, Fikret Abdic's only trump card is to detain the people. The political bodies of Bosnia-Herzegovina will continue

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to seek a solution that will enable the people to return in an organized manner. We need the people—what do we do with the territory if there are no people?

[Soldic] There has been talk of Serb actions cutting the Knin-Banja Luka railroad on the Cazin territory, the part held by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army.

[Delic] The Serb forces in the UNPA's [UN Protected Areas] in Croatia attacked the area of Buzim and Bosanska Krupa. Our forces warded off these attacks and inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy in the counter-attack. We also captured a lot of equipment. The same was done on the Bihac part of the frontline. This part of the railroad is in the hands of the Army, and I see no possibility of the situation changing. The most tragic thing for us is that, apart from the attacks from the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, there are also attacks from the UNPA's in Croatia, where UNPROFOR should have all heavy weapons under control. We also have problems with not being able to fight back, because this is the territory of the Republic of Croatia.

[Soldic] Can you conclude a military agreement with the Republic of Croatia that would relate exclusively to this situation?

[Delic] Unfortunately, the hands of the Croatian Army are tied where the liberation of its territory is concerned. You remember how the international community threatened Croatia when it wanted to resolve the issue of Maslenica militarily and took some other action? The problem lies in the 1991 agreement, which is when the UNPA's were formed.

[Soldic] Bihac has been shelled for days, and the United Nations is not doing anything. Is Bihac facing the same fate as Gorazde?

[Delic] We have asked of the United Nations and the international community to protect the "protected areas." Unfortunately, the "protected areas" are the least protected. As far as Bihac is concerned, this is a large free territory, and our forces there are stronger now. The international community must not allow the Knin Serbs to attack Bosnia-Herzegovina from the territory of the Republic of Croatia. I do not expect a fate similar to Gorazde—on the contrary—but I expect the international community to protect the "protected areas," which it has declared that it will protect.

[Soldic] When Rose threatened the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army forces with NATO air strikes, what were his threats based on?

[Delic] I think he is trying to be "neutral" in all possible ways. The situation on the ground should be viewed realistically. The Bosnia-Herzegovina Army has not violated any of the regulations of the Security Council resolutions relating to the protected areas or exclusion zones around Sarajevo.

[Soldic] If the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army violates the exclusion zone, which is the 20-km radius around Sarajevo, does Rose have the right to order NATO air strikes?

[Delic] He does. However, we have been pointing out for a month now that the Serb-Montenegrin aggressor has been using heavy weapons in the Sarajevo exclusion zone, which was supposed to have been under UNPROFOR control. They have been using artillery, tanks, rocket launchers.... Two principles have been violated in the exclusion zone: The heavy weapons are not under UNPROFOR control and combat activities are being carried out. Therefore, we have the moral right to respond without Rose demanding strikes on our forces.

[Soldic] Our interview has just been interrupted by Gen. Drekovic's phone call. Could you tell us what the new information is regarding the Konjic frontline? What did Gen. Drekovic say?

[Delic] As you know, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army units have liberated the facilities from which Konjic was being shelled and the roads toward Mostar. Over a hundred square kilometers have been liberated, several villages. Many weapons have been captured. Gen. Drekovic has just told me that, in accordance with the agreement, the HVO has left the line facing the Serbs, and that they are heading for Herzegovina.

[Soldic] There has been fighting at the Posavina corridor. Have the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the HVO forces undertaken an offensive?

[Delic] There has been no heavy fighting in the Posavina corridor for a month, since the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army forces liberated Donja Brka. This is the most important area, on which the outcome of the war depends in a way. As far as we are concerned, the Posavina corridor is not the site for some decisive combat activities. The small corrections on the ground are not that important for the final result. When it comes to the Serb-Montenegrin aggressor, they surely aspire toward conquering, that is, widening the corridor, because what they have now is 4 km wide and it does not mean anything to them. However, considering the number of tanks that have been destroyed lately, it is not likely that they will decide to launch a new offensive. I cannot but commend the members of the 108th Brcko Brigade of the HVO, who have been fighting along with the members of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army forces.

Banja Luka, Knin Serbs Reach Transit Agreement

AU2709194894 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 23 Sep 94 p 7

[Report by D. Kecman: "Disagreements About Transit of Goods Resolved"]

[Excerpts] Banja Luka, 22 Sep—A meeting of the governments of the Srpska republic [RS] and the republic of

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Serbian Krajina [RSK], headed by Dusan Kozic and Borislav Mikelic respectively, is underway in Banja Luka. During the break at noon, they addressed journalists saying that all disagreements about the transit of RSK goods from its regions of Eastern Slavonia and Western Srem and from the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] through the RS have been resolved.

The host, RS Prime Minister Dusan Kozic, said that all potential disagreements that might have been caused by the RS government's temporary decree on import duties on goods from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia at the Raca border crossing have been removed. [passage omitted]

RSK prime minister Borislav Mikelic said that today's work of the RS and the RSK governments and relevant ministers was held in a tolerant and constructive atmosphere. He also stressed that he was fully aware that the RS was in an extremely difficult situation and that the current RS government is experiencing great problems caused by the blockade, and that this should be solved jointly.

"At today's session, we also discussed different views, but did manage to agree that a joint ministry of the RS and the RSK that would work constantly should be set up in Banja Luka," Mikelic said, adding that the Banja Luka region has become extremely economically well-developed in the 1990's with an income of $380 million a year. He also said that it was necessary to preserve all economic resources and that the economies of the former Bosnian Krajina, Posavina, and Semberia should be linked with the complementary economy of the RSK. As stated, these economies have accepted a unified monetary system and linked their development to the economy that is also complementary to theirs, that of the FRY.

"We are aware that it is necessary to have the sanctions on the RS lifted as soon as possible and establish a payments system, whose suspension led to all the problems," Mikelic stressed, saying that he agreed in principle—something he also said at today's session—with the decisions of the RS that it was necessary to establish order in import-export activities, especially regarding the import of goods from the FRY through the RS.

"However, regarding oil and goods from the RS, that is RS imports and exports to the FRY, we have agreed to 'remove' from these decisions the goods from Baranja and Srem, such as flour, wheat, and oil that are arriving in the RSK from parts of our country, and that they cannot be subjected to any duties."

UN Teams Restore Utilities to Sarajevo

AU2809084994 Paris AFP in English 0729 GMT 28 Sep 94

[Excerpt] Sarajevo, Sept 28 (AFP)—Sarajevo awoke to the rumble of trams Wednesday [28 September] as power line repairs restored power to the city and heralded the end of a Serb-orchestrated utilities blackout.

In bright early morning sunshine packed trams rattled down Vojvode Putnike [now renamed Zmaja od Bosne]—better known under its Sniper's Alley soubriquet—the main thoroughfare which bisects the Bosnian capital east-west.

The sight of the trams marked the return of a semblance of normality to this besieged city of 380,000 residents after almost two weeks deprived of water, electricity and gas.

UN teams carried out repairs to pylons north of the city at Vogosca on Tuesday to complete the local power network after weekend repairs to damaged lines east of Sarajevo.

Those repairs enabled power to flow to the Bacevo water pumping station, which provides Sarajevo with 80 percent of its water, although technical problems meant not all pumps were working.

However, UN officials said they were hopeful that water would be restored to the entire city soon. [passage omitted]

Government To Form Federal Police Unit

AU2809084394 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 27 Sep 94

[Excerpt] The session of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government in its capacity as the Federal Government is under way in Sarajevo this evening. The government plans to meet in the capacity of the republican government later in the session. The government has adopted the decision on the functioning and composition of the Federal Police unit along the road from Doljane to Doboj and Tesanj. Mehmedalija Sisic has the details:

[Begin Sisic recording] Two topics were to be discussed at the government session: the proposal of the decision to form the Federal Police unit, which has been adopted, and the proposal of the decision on forming a customs house in Doljani.

After some amendments to the proposal, the decision on the Federal Police unit was adopted unanimously. This decision, which will be implemented five days after adoption, precisely establishes the unit's function, composition, method, and area of activity. This unit will consist of five departments and will have a commander who will have a deputy from another nation who will be changed every month. The decision has it that only this police unit will be able to stop vehicles and patrol the above-mentioned road. The policemen will carry the insignia Federal Police on their uniforms and cars, and along with federal official documents, they will be able to keep their old identity cards. These policemen will have no other insignia.

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The debate on the Doljani Customs House proposal is still under way. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Serb Artillery Attack on Zvornik Territory

AU2809114094 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 28 Sep 94

[Text] The free Zvornik territory was subjected to [Serbian] enemy artillery fire this morning. The targets of the attacks were the areas of Kovacevici, Lipinica, and Kobilica. Enes Hasanovic reports from the Information Service of the 206th Chivalrous Brigade of Zvornik that, according to available information, apart from material damage, there were no other consequences.

Serbs Attack Gorazde, Srebrenica Protected Zones

AU2709204594

[Editorial Report] Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian at 1800 GMT on 27 September within its regular 35-minute newscast carries several reports on the fighting in the republic.

Studio Announcer Velid Dzindo says that "the aggressor carried out attacks on Gracanica from Mt. Ozren on the second anniversary of the regional operations group. As Izudin Durakovic reports, chetnik artillery attacked our defense lines on the Doboj and Lukavac battlefields and the districts of Lukavica, Lukavac-Rijeka, Brijesnica, and Klokosnica. Lukavac suffered particularly grave damage."

Dzindo further says that "the bestial chetnik attacks on the Srebrenica protected zone have also continued. The chetniks are concentrating their manpower and military hardware on the roads that lead into this heroic town. During today's activity of the aggressor's long-range artillery, three people were wounded in Bijescani, while the enemy pounded other suburban districts with mortars. The aggressor has acted more intensively with antiaircraft and infantry weapons on the outskirts of the Srebrenica Commune."

Enes Musovic reports from Gorazde on "the chetniks continuing their aggression on armless Gorazde people" by using "antiaircraft guns to hit Gunje from Lovsica in the Ilovaca Region, as well as (Bodovaca) from Mirkovica. The chetniks hit Cosici with five 82-mm mortar bombs launched from Vrazovice."

Mirza Sadikovic reports from Bihac on "the joint aggressor's constant attacks on the free regions of the Bihac District. In the Buzim Region, Karadzic's chetniks attempted infantry and artillery assaults again, particularly at the regions of Corkovici and (Herzegovina)."

Studio Announcer Dzindo then reads a report by the 1st Corps Information Service saying that "today, the aggressor acted from the direction of Spaic farm with two mortar bombs at the Centrotrans building. Two grenades from a rifle-mounted launcher hit Vis from Treskin Dol. The enemy also opened fire from Spicasta Stijena on the Sedrenik District. On the Visoko battlefield, the chetniks used all kinds of infantry weapons to pound Vlajcici. The enemy acted with infantry weapons from Kokoska, Metaljka, and Vela on Ravna Gajina and Zege, as well as from Pijesci and Stijena on Borak and Vrljajica. Particularly intensive was the fire opened on the Borak Region with a death sower machine gun from Panduriste."

Serb Shells Kill 6, Injure 9 in Zavidovici

AU2809100094

[Editorial Report] Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian at 0900 GMT on 28 September carries within its regular 15-minute newscast the following account of the fighting in the republic:

According to an unidentified correspondent reporting from the Press Center of the Bosna Operations Group, "after 27 May 1993, yesterday was certainly the most tragic day for the residents of the free Zavidovici territory. The criminals' fury took six lives with another nine people seriously wounded. This happened during two attacks, when the (?child-killers) fired several powerful howitzer shells at the town and the surrounding area from the direction of Ozren. It was in fact young children who suffered the most. Three of them were killed and three seriously wounded. Our forces had to return fire at the aggressor's military targets and thus stop these Serbian bandits from killing more innocent people."

A correspond from the Information Service of the 1st Glorious Olovo Hill Brigade reports that the "aggressor on the Olovo front stepped up antiaircraft and small arms fire against the defense lines overnight," but that there "were no casualties."

An unidentified correspondent from the Information Service of the (?104th Gradacac) Motorized Brigade reports that "the Gradacac front was yesterday characterized by the aggressor's long-distance artillery fire, as has, after all, been the case over recent days." He then says that "fresh helicopter flights and columns of vehicles [words indistinct] indicate that the chetniks are not (?happy with the attained) situation. The defense lines have not changed."

UN Protests Muslim Violation of Exclusion Zone

AU2809101394 Paris AFP in English 0946 GMT 28 Sep 94

[Text] Sarajevo, Sept 28 (AFP)—Bosnian Army troops fired two 82-mm mortars on Serb trenches in southwestern Sarajevo in violation of the heavy weapons exclusion zone in force around the capital, a UN spokesman said Wednesday [28 September].

Tuesday's incident sparked an immediate protest from the UN Protection Force to the Moslem-dominated Bosnian Army, said the UN's Lt-Colonel Bernard Labarsouque.

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The mortar rounds were fired from the Bosnian Government-controlled Sokolovici district south of the capital's airport, into Serb positions in the Sumarska area of Ilidza, he said. No casualties had been reported.

Earlier this week senior UN spokesman Lt-Colonel Tim Spicer blamed the Bosnian Army for a 120-mm mortar shell which exploded near the runway at Sarajevo airport last Friday.

Labarsouque said Sarajevo ceasefire violations remained high at around 1,400 but were mainly concentrated in the government-controlled Butmir and Serb-held Ilidza areas.

Butmir is the gateway to a Bosnian supplies tunnel under the airport runway, currently the only route for food, fuel and weapons into the besieged city from over Mount Igman.

Labarsouque said Serb restrictions on movement meant UN troops on Mount Igman would have to "cut back the number of patrols" in the demilitarised areas on the strategic heights, which dominate the southwestern approaches to the city.

French UN troops there were running short of fuel and the Serb restrictions meant they could not be resupplied, he said, adding there was a danger of clashes between Serb and Bosnian forces infiltrating the zone.

Separately, Labarsouque said UNPROFOR in Sarajevo had only had fuel for some 15 days normal activity, as the Serbs were still blocking a fuel convoy with some 250 tonnes of fuel in Kiseljak, 35 kilometres (20 miles) west of Sarajevo.

The city's airport remained closed by a Serb threat against aircraft with no UN military or aid flights scheduled Wednesday. UN aid officials say the humanitarian airlift could be suspended until Monday because of the security situation.

Muslim Army Bihac Corps Commander Replaced

LD2809081794 Sarajevo Radio Republike Srpske Program for Abroad in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 27 Sep 94

[Text] Brigadier General Atif Dudakovic has been replaced. According to Serb military sources, Izet Plamic, former commander of the 505th Buzim Brigade, is the new commander of the Bihac-based Muslim [Bosnia-Herzegovina army corps] Fifth Corps. Dudakovic was replaced because commanders of local [Muslim] brigades were dissatisfied [words indistinct] after considerable losses suffered during Muslim attacks on positions held by the Srpska republic army. According to the same source, the new commander has decided to disband the 503d Cazin Brigade of the Muslim army because of huge losses it suffered over the past month.

Muslim Corps Commander Says Peace 'Not Close'

AU2309205194 Ljubljana OSLOBODJENJE (European Edition) in Serbo-Croatian 15 Sep 94 p 21

[Interview with Brigadier General Mehmed Alagic, commander of the B-H Army 7th Corps, by Faruk Midzic; place and date not given: "The Aggression Is Still Going On; We Cannot Take Things Easy"]

[Text] *Brigadier General Mehmed Alagic, commander of the 7th Corps of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, has pointed out several times recently that "in certain areas controlled by our corps, and not only ours, there is a feeling that people who are not members of the army have begun to relax."*

[Alagic] It seems as though there is a peace-time atmosphere. Taking it easy is, of course, unacceptable. People should realize that the aggression against our country is still going on, on certain fronts there is heavy fighting, our enemies have been launching offensives or are preparing to do so, and, as we have been witnessing over the past few days, the aggressor is continuing ethnic cleansing in Bosanska Krajina [western Bosnia], Bijeljina, Janja, and other temporarily occupied areas. They are mercilessly expelling Bosniaks from these areas. As things stand now, we are all facing new tribulations and it is fairly obvious that peace is still not very close.

They Say One Thing...

[Midzic] In what ways are the "relaxedness" and "peace-time atmosphere" manifested, at least in the areas "covered" by the 7th Corps?

[Alagic] The soldiers can see and feel these things; they are not difficult to notice. People who have not even felt what it is like to fight have been directly or indirectly taking the initiative, appearing in various associations of intellectuals and clubs.... They are starting to create politics based on peace-time reasoning. In this kind of thinking and these kinds of moves the voice of the fighters is not heard and is avoided. Moreover, it is damaging that our justified demands for more complete logistical support for our units are being dealt with very slowly, and sometimes not at all. This is not pleasant, but I must say openly that obligations have been accepted only notionally in many parts of the area controlled by the 7th Corps. Time goes by, and there are many things that are, unfortunately, not being implemented, either according to the regulations or the agreements that we reached at one stage.

[Midzic] What influence can this have on the morale of the troops?

[Alagic] If it is not prevented, it could have a very negative effect on the disposition and morale of the troops. It is therefore high time that those who keep talking about Bosnia and their patriotism and swearing by the army, and then doing quite the opposite in

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practice, were openly told that we have "seen through them," and that this cannot continue. Otherwise, the overall situation in the units under the control of the 7th Corps is stable. Morale is showing an upward trend, which is partly due to the recent excellent successes achieved by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, especially the 5th Corps.

[Midzic] We hear that there are increasingly frequent demands that, instead of being mobilized, people be issued compulsory work orders, the reason being that the economy should be revitalized.

[Alagic] This has become increasingly prominent in our area too, and there have been pressures that these demands be met as soon as possible. We accepted such proposals only when we decided that they were necessary, as the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army supports the revitalization of the economy and production, but we must also bear defense in mind, so replacements have to be found for those who are transferred from the army into production. To judge from the experience that we have had so far, these demands are quite difficult to coordinate. There arise certain problems. It is not easy for the officers simply because the principle of exterritorial reinforcements is not being implemented yet. It is our opinion, therefore, that the highest state bodies should make an assessment plan in which they would determine the labor force needs in the economy, related fields, and, naturally, the army. For instance, there are human reserves in our centers in Zenica and Tuzla, and what should be done is simply to provide reinforcements through the Ministry of Defense, and demobilize into the economy a realistic and acceptable number of workers and experts without which the economy cannot function. On the territories controlled by the 7th Corps we have about three or four companies whose production is widely important, and we will do everything we can to consider thoroughly the requests that we have received and to reach a solution, but, I repeat, it is extremely important that at the state level and in the ministry what we reasonably demand and expect is also done.

[Midzic] We were abroad recently and visited several Bosniak clubs, where we learned that many individuals have acquired great wealth by allegedly collecting aid for Bosnia-Herzegovina and the army. What relations has the 7th Corps established with our people abroad, especially the Krajina people?

[Alagic] We know that many individuals have become rich from the suffering of the Bosniak people, and that most of the aid that they collected abroad for Bosnia-Herzegovina and the army has never reached us. But justice is justice and no one will escape it. Sooner or later, accounts will be squared, and it will be found out who specifically, by name, filled their pockets at the expense of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is no news of the Krajina people abroad; the traitor Fikret Abdic plundered the most, and used the money to stab Bosnia-Herzegovina and his own Muslim people in the back. According to the information that we have, many Bosniaks in Germany and other countries around the world no longer buy the stories of these various con-artists and thieves. Lately they only want to establish direct contacts with the representatives of the army, and they organize campaigns only after arranging everything with them. The logistics people of the 7th Corps cooperating with Bosniak clubs have had increasingly good results. We are establishing correct and honest relations with these clubs, and we regularly inform them that we have received what they have sent—even the smallest item—to the soldiers and members of their families. We have sent a list of these 7th Corps logistics people to the clubs and associations, diplomatic mission representatives, and representative offices of the religious institutions in Europe and the rest of the world. It is therefore known whom we have authorized to represent the 7th Corps and which people we trust to contact Bosniaks abroad. Each month we analyze what the logistics people have done. We cancel the cooperation with those who do not carry out what has been arranged, although this has happened very seldom, and take away the identification papers necessary for the job. We have therefore minimized the possibility of abuse. With the valuable help of Bosniaks abroad, our logistics people have contributed greatly to the strengthening of the 7th Corps, but that does not mean that we have no weaknesses. We are aware that we have not yet exploited all the possibilities of relying on our fellow countrymen who live abroad.

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Tudjman Addresses UN General Assembly

LD2709204794 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 27 Sep 94

[Speech by President Franjo Tudjman at the UN General Assembly in New York on 27 September—read by announcer Ivan Kojundzic]

[Text] Ladies and gentlemen, representatives of the Security Council, thank you very much for this opportunity to once again present Croatia's views regarding UNPROFOR's [UN Protection Forces] mandate for the territory of Croatia and the overall peace process in the region.

Let me begin by expressing my sincere gratitude to the Contact Group members—France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States—for having organized this meeting. I would particularly like to thank the permanent representative of the United Kingdom, Sir David Hannay, for chairing this meeting.

This is the third time in the course of 12 months that I am meeting with the members of the council. Since our meeting last September, some important changes have taken place, with significant impact on peace efforts in the region of the former Yugoslavia. I would like to emphasize two of them.

The Federation of Croats and Bosniaks has been established in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, ending the fighting and political disputes between the two victims of the Serb aggression in Bosnia-Herzegovina—Bosnian Croats and Muslims. Croatia strongly supports the Federation as one of the strongest pillars of regional stability. We are encouraged by the international community's support for the Federation, and the Confederation, both of which have Croatia's full support.

I would like to emphasize that the Washington agreement, and the ensuing establishment of the Federation, have over the past several months paved the way for the Contact Group to start working towards the peaceful resolution of the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina. By actually improving the strategic—and to a certain extent even the military—situation and balance on the ground, the Washington agreement and the Federation arrangements have served as a firm stepping stone for a more decisive action on the part of the international community as a whole.

The setting up of the Contact Group, which filled the earlier worrying political vacuum, is equally important. The Contact Group has provided determined international leadership of the utmost importance for solving one of the most dangerous regional crises. It has laid down the precise course of action in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Croatia strongly supports the proposed plan for a lasting political solution and territorial division.

While welcoming and supporting the Contact Group's work concerning the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia cannot but be concerned at not being in the same focus of Contact Group activities. It is our firm belief that the Contact Group should deal with both problems at the same time. The same principles and mechanisms should be applied to both problems. Specifically, I am referring to the principle of the inviolability of international borders, and the preservation of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the United Nations member states. The failure to implement the universal principle of the right of displaced persons and refugees to voluntarily and freely return to their homes cannot be condoned under any circumstances. Similarly, principles of international humanitarian law must be sustained and supported through the efficient work of the International War Crimes Tribunal at The Hague.

Certain things in the region have changed for the better, but some have changed for the worse. The Serbian policy of aggression, aimed at the ultimate goal of creating a Greater Serbia through territorial expansion, will remain the biggest threat to peace and stability in the region.

It may be too early to claim that the Yugoslav leadership has been successfully forced to start contributing to the peace process. Belgrade has made some clear commitments, but the situation on the ground still does not completely correspond to those commitments. Croatia's representative in Belgrade has recently brought to your attention serious violations of the blockade regime. We hope that that will not be overlooked.

While the debate on the viability and success of the blockade of the Bosnian Serbs continues, there is ample evidence that President Milosevic is still firmly supporting the illegal and self-proclaimed Serb occupation authorities in Croatia; authorities which have publicly and clearly stated and effectively carried out plans of judicial, monetary, military, educational, customs, and other integration of the occupied parts of Croatia into the legal and administrative system of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY].

I believe that this is not news to you, the simplest reason being the latest report of the UN secretary-general which states the following in paragraph 4: Local Serb authorities in Knin issued a number of statements that appeared to close the door on political reconciliation. They announced their intention to pursue full integration with other Serb areas.

If Belgrade is genuinely committed to peace, the FRY should immediately recognize Croatia within its international borders, end the occupation of its territories, and recognize other republics in the territory of the former Yugoslavia that have become UN member states.

The question of ensuring minority and human rights to the Croatian citizens belonging to the Serb ethnic group is important to Croatia, and we are giving our full attention to it. You are already aware of Croatia's

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constitutional provisions for minority groups which, many experts believe, grant our minorities the highest degree of freedom in the world. We have also agreed to the monitoring of the implementation of those provisions by international institutions. Our commitment to their full implementation is real.

You are also aware of our firm commitment and plans to establish autonomous areas for the Serb ethnic community in Croatia. We understand that the reintegration of occupied Croatian territories and the issue of insurgent local Serbs in Croatia should be solved by peaceful means, if possible, and that the use of other means should be the last resort. But, Belgrade must be clearly told by the international community that the question of the Serb minority in Croatia cannot be solved through military aggression and annexation of Croatian territory, but through existing international mechanisms designed for effective protection of minority rights.

One of these mechanisms is reciprocity. We cannot forget that there is also a substantial Croatian minority in Serbia and Montenegro. But, this mechanism requires mutual recognition, which Croatia is prepared to accept in the benefit of minorities in both states and in the benefit of the final political settlement in the region.

In three days UNPROFOR's mandate will expire. While reserving its unalienable right to decide of its own accord whether UNPROFOR's mandate on its territory will be extended for an additional period, Croatia is fully aware of the importance and sensitivity of the ongoing peace process. It is very difficult for us, however, to continue to accept the constant lack of progress in the implementation of the relevant Security Council resolutions.

So far Croatia has demonstrated the highest level of patience, often accepting the damaging status quo for the sake of the overall peace process. Some essential elements of the Vance plan, as outlined and emphasized in the latest report of the UN secretary general and laid down in Security Council resolutions, have been completely ignored by the international community—in particular those regarding the disarmament of the Serb occupation authorities; the speedy restoration of Croatian authorities in the so-called pink zones; the establishment of effective control of border crossings on the Croatian border, in line with Resolution 769; and initiating the return of all displaced persons and refugees to their homes.

In spite of the painful lack of progress towards a peaceful reintegration of the occupied territories into Croatia's legal, political, and economic system, the Croatian Government will not to rush into decisions which could inflame new passions in the region. However, we cannot simply stand by and accept the prolongation of UNPROFOR's mandate without some clear provisions.

In this regard it is my duty to inform you and to emphasize that both the government of the Republic of Croatia and I, are obliged to act in accordance with the view expressed by the Chamber of Counties of the Croatian Parliament on September 22, 1994, and the resolution adopted by the Chamber of Representatives on September 23, 1994. The texts of these parliamentary decisions are available to you.

We consider that, specifically, the following issues have to be dealt with:

1. If the UNPROFOR mandate is to be extended, Croatia cannot accept this extended period it exceeds 100 days. This will give the Contact Group enough time to work out a detailed peace plan for Croatia based on the integrity of the Croatian state and starting with the immediate reintegration of the so-called pink zones and disarmament of Serbian paramilitary units in the UN Protected Areas. The rights of minorities pursuant to Croatia's Constitution, our Constitutional Law on Human Rights and Freedoms and the Rights of Ethnic Communities and Minorities, as well as the specific provisions and proposals set forth in my peace initiative of 1 November 1993, are essential elements of such a plan. These three documents that make up the core of our position are clearly in full accordance with the United Nations Charter and other international documents and, in some provisions, are superior to them;

2. Pursuant to the Security Council Resolution No. 847/1993 and No. 871/1993 (operative article 8) the restoration of electricity, water and communications in all regions of the Republic of Croatia, and particularly, and most importantly, the reopening of the highway and railway between Zagreb and Split, and between Zagreb and Zupanja, and of the Adriatic oil pipeline, has to be implemented within the extended period of the UNPROFOR mandate mentioned under point 1 above;

3. International monitors must be posted on the border between the Republic of Croatia and the FRY, and on the border between Bosnia and Herzegovina and occupied Croatian territories, following the same design envisaged for the border between the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the FRY;

4. New pilot programs for the gradual return of displaced persons and refugees must be put into effect immediately. These programs should include a clearly set time framework for their implementation;

5. Croatia will accept a resolution regarding the prolongation of the UNPROFOR mandate that shall in no uncertain terms warn the FRY to cease all forms of aggressive interference with internal matters of the Republic of Croatia, and call on Belgrade to recognize Croatian borders, as the first essential step in the process of normalizing the situation.

6. The same resolution should remain on the path set by articles 4 and 5 of Resolution No. 871/1993, which clearly links the sanctions regime against Belgrade to the successful reintegration of occupied territories into the Croatian legal and administrative system.

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7. Most important, Croatia considers it necessary to cease the UNPROFOR mandate in parts of the United Nations Protected Area Sector West which is under the control of the Croatian authorities. The situation on the ground in this Sector will make this possible and the forces presently deployed there are certainly needed elsewhere.

Excellencies, I sincerely hope that this meeting will produce fruitful results, and I thank you for your attention.

Once again, thank you Ambassador Hannay and ladies and gentlemen.

Tudjman on Talks With Security Council Members

LD2709173894 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 27 Sep 94

[Text] This is Tihomir Vinkovic reporting from New York for Croatian radio. A few minutes ago President Tudjman ended his meeting at the UN Security Council with member countries. After the talks the president said:

[Begin Tudjman recording] It is with satisfaction that I can stress that a few members, ranging from U.S. representative Albright to the Russian representative and the Czech representative, as well as other representatives [words indistinct] all stressed Croatia's right to demand the return of the occupied areas to Croatia's legal and constitutional system, pointing out that it is important to do this by extending the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] mandate in a peaceful way. [as heard]

I believe that the suggestions I put forward as well as our debate will contribute to a resolution by the UN Security Council which will be satisfactory from the point of view of Croatian interests. I particularly stressed that one should take account of the dissatisfaction of nearly 400,000 refugees and displaced people in Croatia, the atmosphere among the Croatian public, and particularly our parliament's resolution, which is of such a nature as to suggest that our demands must be considered in a most serious way. Otherwise, if the crucial problems described in our demands were not to be met, Croatia would indeed have to reconsider its decisions. [end recording]

Tudjman, Hurd Discuss UNPROFOR Mandate

LD2709214694 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 27 Sep 94

[Excerpt] Tihomir Vinkovic reporting for Croatian radio evening news. After the meeting in the Security Council, President Tudjman held talks with British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd. We discussed the issue of the Croatian occupied areas and the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina, President Tudjman said after the talks, and added:

[Begin Tudjman recording] Mr. (?Hurd) confirmed that his government, the Government of the United Kingdom and Great Britain, adheres to the principle of Croatia's integrity. He is in favor of extending UNPROFOR's [UN Protection Forces] mandate in order to solve the issue by peaceful means. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Istrians Applying for Italian Citizenship

LD2709140594 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1320 GMT 27 Sep 94

[Text] Belgrade, Sept. 27 (TANJUG)—The Belgrade daily EKSPRES POLITIKA said Tuesday that about 10,000 families from the Croatian peninsula of Istria had applied for Italian citizenship.

The Zagreb correspondent of the Belgrade daily said this meant that every seventh of the 220,000 citizens of the largest Croatian peninsula had applied for Italian citizenship.

The paper quoted Dino Debeljuh, official of the opposition Democratic Union of Istria, as saying that 'the upsetting number of applications for Italian citizenship proves that the Croatian Government policy has completely failed in Istria.'

An analyst from Zagreb said that dual citizenship 'seems not to be reserved exclusively for ministers any longer' and that 'it would be nice to see what, according to international law, is the status of Croatian Defence Minister Gojko Susak, who is a Canadian citizen.'

The daily said that about 40,000 citizens from Istria who were not ethnic Italians had applied for dual Croat-Italian citizenship.

It also said that Catholic priests in Istria had been issuing new certificates of baptism to those changing their names to ones their families used to have while Istria and Dalmatia, the Croatian part of the Adriatic coast, belonged to Italy.

The Italian Government offered Italian citizenship to all citizens of Istria and Dalmatia who had lived in the region during World War II, and the Senate in Rome extended the validity of the act until August 1995.

Serbs Claim Croatia Covering Up Genocide

LD2709210094 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1835 GMT 27 Sep 94

["Pool" item]

[Text] Belgrade, Sep 27 (TANJUG)—The Serb Krajina and Croatia Serb Associations on Tuesday said Croatians at United Nations cover up responsibility for genocide against the Serbs in Western Slavonija.

In a statement made public in Belgrade on Tuesday they said about 70,000 Serbs from 10 Western Slavonija's

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municipalities left Croatia. Some of them were expelled, others fled before the Croatian authorities' terror.

The statement said the Croatian Democratic Union had organized a protest meeting in Daruvar against international administration in U.N. 'pink zones.'

Following the meeting, the Croatian Government had requested that the Daruvar and Grubisino Polje municipalities, both about 100 km east of Zagreb, be formally placed under Croatian administration, the statement said.

The statement said that with this request, Croatia had attempted to cover up the crime committed against at least 2,500 Serbs who had been murdered in Marino Selo and Pakracka Poljana, in Western Slavonija.

The statement said the Croatian Government had attempted to conceal that it has been dumping chemical and radioactive waste in Western Slavonija since the Serbs fled the area.

Serbs from Western Slavonija should be compensated for their destroyed and plundered homes which had been systematically burned down or blown up, said the statement.

Yugoslav and Serb Krajina Governments' reports say about 14,000 Serbs had been killed, more than 300,000 expelled and about 8,000 forced to move out from their apartments in Croatia since Croatia seceded from Yugoslavia in 1991.

A recent report by the U.N. rapporteur on human rights Tadeusz Mazowiecki said about 8,000 Serb houses had been destroyed in Croatia in 1992-1993.

Serbs in Croatia set up their own state, the republic of Serb Krajina in 1991, after Croatia seceded from the former Yugoslavia and removed Serb national rights from its constitution. Serb Krajina was proclaimed the United Nations Protected Area in the spring of 1992.

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Albanian President Discusses Expanding Relations

AU2709172694 Skopje MIC in English 27 Sep 94

[Text] The Albanian Minister of Defense Safet Zhulali paid an official visit to Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia] yesterday, and met with his Macedonian counterpart Vlado Popovski, Prime Minister Branko Crvenkovski, and President Kiro Gligorov.

After the talks, Zhulali stated that they focused on the broadening of cooperation between the two countries, foremost in the sphere of defense. Both countries, Albania and Macedonia believe that in the future they will be encompassed in the initiative "Partnership for Peace," and, as Zhulali said, he was hoping for a full membership in NATO, for modern, contemporary defense structures, adapted to the countries NATO members.

Zhulali stressed that the lifting of the sanctions against FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] should be conditioned with the settling of the problems in Kosovo. He pointed out that without settling that problem, the crisis in the former Yugoslavia could not be solved. Albania, according to him, will build its policy in the region according to the way this problem is solved.

Political Alliance Leaders Set Out Policy Aims

AU2709121494 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 24 Sep 94 pp 1, 4

[Report by "V.R.": "Sure in Victory"]

[Text] The Alliance for Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] held an electoral convention in Skopje yesterday to make a definite agreement on the division of parliamentary seats. The final agreement among the three coalition partners—The Social Democratic Alliance [SDSM], the Liberal Party [LP], and the Socialist Party of Macedonia [SPM]—was reached in a packed hall after individual speeches by the party presidents, as well as by their common candidate for state president, Kiro Gligorov.

The formal announcement on the common candidate of the Alliance for Macedonia was first made by SPM President Kiro Popovski, who emphasized that the three parties had chosen Kiro Gligorov as their common candidate. He also pointed out that one of the main goals of the Alliance was to affirm the Republic of Macedonia as a political and social subject in the Balkans and Europe, as well as to introduce changes with a clear and sure vision for the present and the future. The SPM leader particularly stressed the importance of the Alliance, which, together with its common candidate for president of the republic, is taking a sure road to a peaceful and independent state, a market economy, democracy, and the international affirmation of Macedonia. The formal submission of the list signed by the three parties that make up the Alliance for Macedonia was presented by the LP President Stojan Andov. He talked about the common candidate for president of the state, saying that Kiro Gligorov is a known politician, recognized and respected both inside and outside Macedonia, capable of leading our state with the least risk and the most hopes for the citizens. Andov stated that the signing of the common list represents a firm belief that the citizens of Macedonia have been offered a candidate who will serve them successfully in these most difficult and dangerous times.

SDSM President Branko Crvenkovski started his speech by expressing his belief that the Alliance for Macedonia will definitely win the forthcoming elections. His firm belief, as he stated, is based on the fact that in the past these parties have proved that they know exactly what the strategic, state, and national interests were, as well as the daily policies. He said that there are two kinds of love for one's people. In his opinion, one is to boast about oneself, to scream out slogans and sing heroic songs, while the other is to do something, to construct and create something for one's people. The SDSM president said that the Alliance for Macedonia had chosen the second way.

The speech by presidential candidate and current FYROM President Kiro Gligorov was received by the audience with the greatest attention and loud applause. After expressing his gratitude for the show of confidence, Gligorov stated that it was his honor to be the Alliance for Macedonia's candidate at the presidential elections. He said that the second elections are of a decisive importance for Macedonia's peace, democracy, and economic progress and that they are the key to safeguarding the state and constructing a modern society with a European face. Recalling that the convention represents the official declaration of the Alliance's candidates for the parliamentary elections, Gligorov emphasized that the basic goal of the Alliance is to end the elections with a parliament that will be an expression of the human, professional, and moral potentials of our nation. As is the case with all democratic countries, the presidential candidate said, these elections should produce a serious opposition, in the interest of the best political solutions and decisions, as well as in the interest of democratic competition among programs and ideas.

After emphasizing that the advantage of the Alliance for Macedonia lies in its consistency, Gligorov said that as presidential candidate he will consistently rely on the confirmed policy for an independent and European Macedonia, for a market economy and economic progress, for a permanent rise in the standard of living, and for the benefit of our people. Kiro Gligorov pointed out that he will support the construction of a civic society and the intensification of a state where the law will be respected, for mutual respect, tolerance, understanding, and co-existence between the Macedonian people and all the nationalities, for good neighborly relations and for peace in the Balkans. "Instead of slogans and empty promises, instead of the language of

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conflict, we are offering a democratic election campaign, accomplished deeds, and a clear vision for the future and for the appropriate evaluation of every person's work in Macedonia," Gligorov emphasized. He also said that the force of the Alliance for Macedonia lies in its arguments and policies. He expressed his deep belief that Macedonia can become an example of a prosperous country, and in his opinion, it is something that we owe to the young generation.

At yesterday's Alliance for Macedonia convention the names of the parliamentary candidates were not announced, and the explanation was that it was a tactical move before the election race. The identity of all the candidates will be announced on Monday, and from what we could see and find out in informal discussions, almost half of the candidates had not hitherto been members of parliament affiliated to the SDSM, the LP, or the SPM.

Description of Electoral Districts

94P21226A Skopje VECER in Macedonian 14 Sep 94 pp 16-17

[Unattributed article: "Electoral Districts and Voters: How Many Districts for How Many Representatives"]

[Text] According to the Law on Electoral Districts in the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia], there are 120 electoral districts. The principle is one representative per district. Although there has been an attempt to maintain the proportionality of having 10,000 voters per representative, there are discrepancies for various reasons which have meant, for example, that in Resen an electoral district has 5,837 voters, while in Kocani there are 18,267.

We are listing below the electoral districts along with the numbers of voters according to the opstinas [townships] in the republic. The number of voters is drawn from data from the first parliamentary election four years ago.

—Berovo

The entire opstina is contained in one electoral district, namely the 1st District. At the last election, there were 14,597 voters.

—Bitola

There are nine electoral districts with the following numbers of voters:

2d District—10,531
3d District—8,489
4th District—8,169
5th District—9,909
6th District—8,764
7th District—17,354
8th District—7,047
9th District—6,663
10th District—6,173

—Makedonski Brod

One electoral district covers the entire opstina, the 11th. At the last election, there were 7,775 voters.

—Valandovo

One electoral district, the 12th, serves the entire opstina. At the last election, there were 8,210 voters.

—Vinica

The 13th District covers the entire opstina. At the last election, there were 13,201 voters.

—Gevgelija

There are two electoral districts: The 14th has 14,421 voters, and the 15th has 11,315 voters.

—Gostivar

There are six electoral districts with the following numbers of voters:

16th District—15,354
17th District—13,467
18th District—8,051
19th District—11,707
20th District—14,637
21st District—10,323

—Debar

A single electoral district, the 22d, covers the entire opstina. At the last election, there were 25,082 voters.

—Delcevo

There are two electoral districts: the 23d has 9,333 voters, and the 24th has 7,251 voters.

—Demir Hisar

The 25th District covers the entire opstina. At the last election, there were 9,132 voters.

—Kavadarci

There are three electoral districts: the 26th has 12,657 voters, the 27th has 10,051 voters, and the 28th has 7,032 voters.

—Kicevo

There are three electoral districts: the 29th has 16,123 voters, the 30th has 8,138 voters, and the 31st has 12,934 voters.

—Kocani

There are three electoral districts: the 32d has 18,267 voters, the 33d has 8,624 voters, and the 34th has 7,789 voters.

—Kratovo

The 35th District covers the entire opstina. At the last election, there were 7,758 voters.

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—Kriva Palanka

There are two electoral districts: the 36th has 10,997 voters, and the 37th has 6,273 voters.

—Krusevo

The 38th District covers the entire opstina. At the last election, there were 9,537 voters.

—Kumanovo

There are eight electoral districts with the following numbers of voters:

39th District—11,942
40th District—11,232
41st District—11,397
42d District—11,043
43d District—9,082
44th District—12,612
45th District—9,933
46th District—12,288

—Negotino

The 47th District covers the entire opstina. At the last election, there were 15,750 voters.

—Ohrid

There are four electoral districts with the following numbers of voters:

48th District—14,467
49th District—14,892
50th District—10,205
51st District—10,842

—Prilep

There are seven electoral districts with the following numbers of voters:

52d District— 13,387
53d District— 13,023
54th District—10,559
55th District—7,388
56th District—9,387
57th District—8,024
58th District—8,245

—Probistip

The 59th District covers the entire opstina. At the last election, there were 11,179 voters.

—Radovis

There are two electoral districts: the 60th has 10,271 voters, and the 61st has 10,867 voters.

—Resen

There are two electoral districts: the 62d has 9,707 voters, and the 63d has 5,837 voters.

—Sveti Nikole

The 64th District covers the entire opstina. At the last election, there were 15,130 voters.

—Struga

There are three electoral districts: the 65th has 14,711 voters, the 66th has 15,670 voters, and the 67th has 10,455 voters.

—Strumica

There are five electoral districts with the following numbers of voters:

68th District—13,370
69th District—12,156
70th District—11,101
71st District—11,663
72d District—13,701

—Tetovo

There are nine electoral districts with the following numbers of voters:

73d District— 14,439
74th District—11,482
75th District—10,627
76th District—8,260
77th District—9,227
78th District—15,573
79th District—13,716
80th District—17,203
81st District—16,408

—Titov Veles

There are four electoral districts with the following numbers of voters:

82d District—12,907
83d District—9,597
84th District—12,959
85th District—10,444

—Stip

There are three electoral districts: the 86th has 13,561 voters, the 87th has 11,525 voters, and the 88th has 10,946 voters.

—Gazi Baba

There are six electoral districts with the following numbers of voters:

89th District—14,179
90th District—14,214
91st District—11,257
92d District—12,296
93d District—12,577
94th District—10,450

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—Karpos

There are eight electoral districts with the following numbers of voters:

95th District—11,404
96th District—9,489
97th District—11,706
98th District—10,634
99th District—9,937
100th District—10,608
101st District—11,537
102d District—12,043

—Kisela Voda

There are eight electoral districts with the following numbers of voters:

103d District— 11,445
104th District—10,700
105th District—14,268
106th District—12,009
107th District—13,110
108th District—10,575
109th District—12,669
110th District—14,192

—Centar

There are five electoral districts with the following numbers of voters:

111th District—13,245
112d District— 14,094
113th District—12,116
114th District—13,789
115th District—13,139

—Cair

There are five electoral districts with the following numbers of voters:

116th District—13,575
117th District—12,488
118th District—15,177
119th District—11,922
120th District—12,293

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Drnovsek Views EU, Conflict With Italy

AU2709194394 Munich FOCUS in German 26 Sep 94 p 335

[Interview with Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek by Marta Halpert; place and date not given: "Right-Wingers Are Fanning the Conflict"]

[Text] [Halpert] What do you want to do if Italy once again vetoes Slovenia's association with the European Union [EU] on 5 October?

[Drnovsek] We hope that this will not happen. This would strongly increase tensions with Italy. In addition, Italy would have to justify this and would have to reveal its true intentions. Rome claims that we are not observing European laws. We expressly stress that we will harmonize our laws as soon as we—like Austria and others—start negotiations with the EU and are fully integrated into the community.

[Halpert] Whom do you expect to support you in the EU?

[Drnovsek] I have received positive signals from all EU states, but, of course, Germany currently holds the presidency and is, therefore, very important. Italy just uses the European Union to put pressure on Slovenia. We know that the issues are domestic policy problems.

[Halpert] What do you mean?

[Drnovsek] Berlusconi is a prisoner of his coalition partner Fini and the latter's party. Then there are also other right-wing extremist circles that are interested in fanning this conflict. Everything has been settled by treaties between Italy and Slovenia. And if the Europeans permit such pressure on Slovenia, this can become very dangerous. This can give rise to similar problems between the Germans, Czechs, Poles, and others.

[Halpert] And what happens if Rome remains stubborn?

[Drnovsek] We have considered renouncing the association treaty completely and striving for full membership immediately. Italy can annoy us for a long time and put in its veto at every stage. Actually, we do not need that, because we have had a trade agreement with the EU since 1993. We live with that very well. We want the association for political reasons.

[Halpert] When could you be ready for the EU?

[Drnovsek] I believe that we could be ready in four to five years. We have a very successful economic development. Our results are not only the best in all former reform states, today we are certainly comparable and competitive with some EU members, such as Portugal, Greece, and Ireland—in some areas we are even better.

New Defense Minister 'Purges' MORiS Brigade

AU2809085894 Ljubljana DELO in Slovene 17 Sep 94 p 2

[Report by Vinko Vasle: "Purges in the MORiS Brigade"]

[Text] Ljubljana, 16 Sep—After Janez Jansa's deposition, Jelko Kacin, his successor as defense minister, began with substantial cadre changes and reshuffles. At the middle of this week, this also happened to the 1st Special MORiS Brigade, as 13 of its members received reassignment orders, mainly to lower-level posts.

Already on Tuesday evening, five Vomo [Security Service of the Defense Ministry] members from Ljubljana arrived in Kocevska Reka [the seat of the MORiS Brigade], all five of them specially selected and armed with Israeli-made Uzi submachine guns, each one having an additional 200 rounds. The morning after, Vojko Pavlin (who replaced the dismissed Anton Krkovic as the head of the MORiS Brigade) began, in the presence of the above-mentioned and some other security service members from Kocevska Reka, the process of transferring duties and presenting new cadre decisions. Pavlin first summoned Boris Mikus, the second most important officer in MORiS and told him that, for official reasons, he is to be transferred elsewhere and that he should bear it like a soldier. Attending the procedure was also a brother of Gorazd Vidrih, secretary at the Defense Ministry, who explained to Mikus that being a security official, he is authorized to document this handover. He listed the documents that Mikus submitted on a special form. When the latter asked whether that was the usual procedure, Vidrih said that it was not, but that he had been told to do so. Vidrih came to Vomo from the crime-squad service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and is among the police cadres who infiltrated all structures of the Slovene Army. MORiS Commander Vojko Pavlin later told Mikus that these transfers are necessary as there are some undercover forces in the brigade that are acting against politicians. He also added that this was not the main reason for the transfers, but that he did not want to talk about other reasons.

It was decided that Boris Mikus, the second most important person in the MORiS Brigade, who headed the organization of maneuver units for Ljubljana in the autumn of 1991, is to be transferred to the post of deputy head of the Vrhnika School Center.

Albin Mikulic, assistant commander of MORiS Brigade in charge of motivation, was transferred to Ribnica to the 27th Regional Staff as the officer for rear operations. During the process of the handover, security serviceman Vidrih even examined Mikulic's personal belongings, letters, and photographs. Every document was entered separately and sealed in a special envelope; keys were also sealed up. Following the handover, Mikulic had to leave his office. During the handover, all Mikulic's documents on the People's Protection Tactical Corps were confiscated. Some time before, veterans of this tactical corps formed a committee and authorized Mikulic to file these documents, which represent the history of the Slovene Army from May to October 1991 and therefore, since they thoroughly assess the role of every individual in the first organized resistance against the Yugoslav People's Army, they may also be

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unpleasant for some people. Mikulic did protest, but to no avail, and then wrote a special letter in which he particularly warned Pavlin by writing the following: "Yesterday, together with several associates, I was suddenly transferred to other duties by a decree of the defense minister of the Republic of Slovenia. Being your former assistant for motivation and information, I am particularly deeply stricken by the way I was replaced, which seems inappropriate and insulting. Let me add that my associates who were also replaced had the same feeling."

The way in which the handover of duties and the handling of replacement decisions were organized was received by the affected members of the MORiS Brigade with indignation, and they say that they were treated like criminals. In protest, they have lowered the flags of Slovenia and of the MORiS Brigade to half-staff. They say that the transfers were incorrect, also because people in the regions to which they were sent did not know anything about them.

On 15 September, the procedure resumed and was concluded. That morning, MORiS Commander Vojko Pavlin left for Skrilj where he read a written speech to the soldiers, stressing among other things that all cadre changes are linked to the requirements of the service. On that occasion, a minor incident took place as Lado Troha, who was then demoted and transferred to Sentvid as the deputy commander of a battalion, told the professional soldiers after Pavlin's speech that what Pavlin had told them was a farce. This upset the soldiers, so Pavlin ordered them to attention and told Mikus' successor, Cveto Zorko, (one of those people who, after Kacin's arrival, wrote a letter pledging loyalty to the minister and signing it "intellectuals of the MORiS Brigade") to lead the soldiers away.

The dissolution of MORiS is only a continuation of cadre purges in the Defense Ministry, that is, in the Slovene Army. The Vomo reorganization, with the inevitable cadre dismissals and replacements, has been going on for some time already. Thus, Dusan Mikuz will be replaced as head of the counterintelligence service (before that he was acting Voma director) by Brane Lukac who was employed in the State Security Service a year ago and then in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. One more fact: In a short time, seven out of eight regional commanders were replaced.

[Box, p 2]

Apart from Boris Mukus, Albin Mikulic, and Lado Troha, the following people were demoted, transferred, or replaced in Kocevska Reka this week: Andrej Jarnij (transferred to the post of head of a tank troop in Cerklje), Andrej Beljan (transferred to the post of detachment head in the 510th Training Center), Mirko Poje (transferred to the post of head a department in the 510th Training Center), Vili Ilc (transferred to Vrhnika to the post of commander of the Training Center Department), Robert Suhadolnik (with the rank of second lieutenant, he was transferred to Postojna to be a military policeman), Maksimiljan Cvajdig (transferred to Maribor to be a gunner), Matej Praznik (transferred to Ptuj to be a gunner), France Orazm (transferred to Pivka as a soldier), Bostjan Otonicar (transferred to Pivka to the post of warehouseman), and Semec, who was transferred to Domzale.

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Federal

'Violent' Radicals Disrupt Assembly Session

AU2709214094 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 27 Sep 94

[Interview with Radoman Bozovic, chairman of the FRY Chamber of the Republic, by unidentified correspondents in Belgrade on 27 September—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Bozovic] The situation in the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] Chamber of Citizens is burdened by the violent behavior of a group of deputies, primarily Deputy Seselj [head of the Serbian Radical Party]. This is the essence of their policy and presents nothing new. However, what is new is that, due to an inability to compete with those with different opinions in the assembly in a political and democratic way, he is resorting to methods that are characteristic of hooligans and vandals.

He exploited the talks of the heads of clubs of deputies about the observation of the rules of procedure and the continuation of the session to try and settle things with me physically. I have no intention of sorting out my relations with Mr. Seselj or anyone else physically; however, I informed the heads of clubs of deputies and the incumbent state offices—here I am referring to the government and the incumbent ministries—that until the conditions that would banish hooliganism and violence of this type from the assembly are created, I, as the chairman of this chamber, will not call the continuation of the session.

Of course, on this occasion, full responsibility for the creation of conditions in which the parliament would work and argue with political arguments and not with violence and primitivism lies with the incumbent state offices whose responsibility it is to secure the normal work of this house. For this reason, I shall call on the responsibility of the incumbent state services to safeguard the work of the federal assembly in compliance with the Constitution and the rules of procedure. If this proves impossible, with the responsibility of the incumbent state offices, I shall proclaim that the chamber is not fit to perform its role determined by law and the Constitution under normal conditions.

Of course, deputies can think that my assessment is not justified and they can demand a new chairman. I shall be honored to not moderate over those to whom hooliganism and violence are the means of parliamentary struggle.

I demanded that the government and the incumbent ministry safeguard the conditions for work of this assembly and remove all those who behave violently from the assembly by law and [words indistinct] in combating hooliganism.

[Correspondent] Will the session continue its work tomorrow?

[Bozovic] Only if I am told that the conditions that I have put forward as the chairman of the chamber are fulfilled.

[Correspondent] Whom will you inform about the fact that the assembly cannot work normally—the head of state?

[Bozovic] I informed prime minister and the incumbent ministries that it is their duty to secure the conditions for work in the assembly and not to tolerate the physical violence that was in this case employed by Seselj and a group of his deputies?

[Correspondent] Mr. Bozovic, what will you do if (?these conditions are not met)?

[Bozovic] As the chairman of this chamber, I shall not call another session until these conditions are met. Deputies can decide to continue working in an atmosphere of violence and primitivism, however, without me as their chairman.

[Correspondent] Does this mean that the assembly will be dissolved?

[Bozovic] I did not say that. The decision on this is not passed by the chairman of the chamber. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] Why did the incumbent services not intervene in the assembly today?

[Bozovic] I view this as a question of responsibility and inefficiency on behalf of the state and the incumbent state offices. I will demand an investigation of the responsibility of the incumbent offices from the federal government. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] There is a little problem, because nobody can arrest Peoples' Deputies Mr. Seselj and (?Mr. Gudelj) unless the council rules so?

[Bozovic] Well, I am not a lawyer and this is not my occupation. I am the chairman of the FRY Assembly and I will not tolerate physical violence in this house. I cannot perform my duties determined by law and the Constitution under these conditions.

Leaders Discuss Conflict

LD2709162994 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1401 GMT 27 Sep 94

[Text] Belgrade, 27 Sep (TANJUG)—A meeting between Radoman Bozovic, president of the Federal Assembly's Chamber of Citizens, and the heads of deputies' clubs, which was held for an agreement to be reached on the continuation of a session that was adjourned this morning, ended in an impasse because of a duel between Bozovic and the radicals. The president of the Chamber and the heads of the deputies' clubs are expected to meet again today. Having left the meeting this morning, Vojislav Seselj, head of the SRS [Serbian Radical Party] club of deputies, said that an argument arose because

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Bozovic had a different view from the heads of deputies' clubs who thought that the president of the Chamber should have allowed SRS Deputy Maja Gojkovic to conclude her address.

The session was adjourned because Gojkovic did not wish to leave the rostrum even after several warnings from Bozovic. Retelling events from the meeting that was held in Bozovic's office, Seselj said that he swore at Bozovic who, according to Seselj, still defended his position that he was right in interrupting Gojkovic.

Bozovic's fiery reaction and an exchange of offenses that followed made Seselj, as he put it, spit at Bozovic twice. A very unpleasant conversation that turned into shouting could be heard in the assembly hall, which was full of reporters who were waiting for the results of the meeting.

The meeting was adjourned with an agreement that the heads of deputies' clubs should gather again and agree on the continuation of the session, Seselj said, adding that he would not take part in this new meeting.

Seselj Views Session

AU2709202694 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 27 Sep 94

[Interview with Vojislav Seselj, head of the Serbian Radical Party, by unidentified correspondent in Belgrade on 27 September—recorded]

[Text] [Correspondent] What did you actually do at the meeting of the heads of clubs of deputies [with Radoman Bozovic, chairman of the FRY Assembly of Citizens]?

[Seselj] I had a discussion. Then he [Bozovic] turned hysterical and started to insult me. It was clarified earlier whether Maja Gojkovic could continue to speak or not. All the chiefs of the clubs of deputies favored Maja being allowed to say what she had to say because she had in no way violated the rules of procedure.

Bozovic then became hysterical and started calling us primitives. I swore at him then. He continued. Do you know (?what I do in similar situations?)

[Correspondent] (?No, explain.)

[Seselj] Well, I spat at him and went out.

Serbia

President Milosevic Receives Owen, Stoltenberg

LD2709163894 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1555 GMT 27 Sep 94

[Text] Belgrade, 27 Sep (TANJUG)—Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic has received David Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg, co-chairmen of the conference on former Yugoslavia, who arrived in Belgrade yesterday evening.

In lengthy and open talks they exchanged views on the most important aspects and the current phase of the peace process, Milosevic's office has announced.

"Peace and continuation of the negotiations process on the basis of the peace plan on offer are the only firm basis and safe way to achieve a political solution. In this respect, the report notes in particular the importance of explanations that were given during a recent meeting between President Milosevic and the Contact Group.

"It was stressed during the talks that the process of lifting the sanctions, which has already begun, needs to be completed as soon as possible, in order to enable the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to contribute as fully as possible to the stabilization of the situation and the normalization of relations in the region, which is in the interest of peace and stability throughout the European continent. These expectations are present not only among the Yugoslav public, but also in many countries which are committed to developing cooperation with our country," the statement says.

Bo Pellnas, head of the humanitarian mission of the international conference on the former Yugoslavia, also attended today's talks.

Owen Views Talks

LD2709172794 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1551 GMT 27 Sep 94

[Text] Belgrade, 27 Sep (TANJUG)—UN Security Council Resolution No. 943, which envisages the lifting of the first package of sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY], will be implemented in the immediate future, David Owen, co-chairman of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, said today after almost three and a half hours of talks with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic.

Owen's colleague Thorvald Stoltenberg and Bo Pellnas, coordinator of the UN humanitarian mission in Yugoslavia, also attended the talks. Lord Owen, however, did not specify when the resolution will begin to be implemented but stressed that "there are no problems" in the procedure that precedes the implementation. The procedure incorporates the Pellnas report on the work and insights of the humanitarian mission.

Lord Owen did not say when the report would be completed and sent to UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali. He indicated, however, that this will happen very soon and noted that firm conclusions had to be made first.

After their meeting with Pellnas this morning, Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg announced their departure for the border and talks with members of the humanitarian mission. Although Owen failed to confirm this, it is believed that the report could be finalized and sent to New York after the visit to the border.

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According to Lord Owen, today's meeting with Milosevic was "very useful." The talks encompassed all the aspects of the Yugoslav crisis, especially the problem of ending the war in former Bosnia-Herzegovina, relations between Belgrade and Zagreb, and the situation in the republic of Serb Krajina. Of course, one of the inevitable subjects were the sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Expressing his belief that the Pellnas report would be positive, Lord Owen especially stressed the very high level of cooperation between the humanitarian mission and the police and customs.

Lord Owen pointed to the importance of Yugoslavia's latest moves in the peace process, especially its acceptance of the contact group's plan. He said he and Thorvald Stoltenberg would continue talks within the framework of the process of resolving the Yugoslav crisis and, in this regard, particularly emphasized the importance of normalizing relations between Belgrade and Zagreb.

Asked about possibilities for corrections to the contact group's plan, Lord Owen said he knew nothing about this, but that the existing plan was still "on the table" and that he was not informed about anyone demanding its alteration.

Comments on Sanctions

AU2709200294 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 27 Sep 94

[Statements by David Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg, co-chairmen of the Conference on Former Yugoslavia, after the talks with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic in Belgrade on 27 September; in English with superimposed translation—recorded]

[Text] [Unidentified correspondent] Lord Owen, how do you assess the talks with President Milosevic?

[Owen] We have held very good talks indeed. We discussed all aspects of the situation in the region. We discussed the possibilities for ending the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. We discussed the relations between Zagreb and Belgrade and the relations between the republic of Serbian Krajina and Croatia. Therefore, we discussed all topical issues in the region. This was a very good meeting.

[Unidentified correspondent] Did you discuss the total lifting of sanctions?

[Owen] There really was not much need to discuss this. We dwelt on this issue very briefly because there are actually no problems connected to it. Everything is evolving in the right direction.

[Unidentified correspondent] Mr. Stoltenberg, you have stated that peace in the former Yugoslavia could be achieved by the end of the year. Could you expound on that?

[Stoltenberg] Reporters have asked me whether this was possible and I replied that it was if sufficient political will for it existed. I stick to what I have said.

[Owen] It is very important to realize that Belgrade, that is, the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] Government, Serbia, and Montenegro, made a very important step and accepted the international community peace proposal for Bosnia-Herzegovina. They would also like to exercise their influence to resolve the remaining controversial issues in the region.

Woman Jailed for Espionage for German BND

AU2709155594 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 21 Sep 94 p 13

[Report by Zorka Miladinovic: "A Cocktail of Rights and Absurdities"]

[Excerpt] Nis—The defense attorneys of Andjelka Stefanov (42) from Nis, who was sentenced to three and a half years in prison for espionage, have announced that they will lodge a complaint with the court of appeals. The one-day trial at the Nis County Court, in which the sentence was immediately pronounced, has already contributed to a demystification of espionage. It need not be a highly sophisticated activity performed by special secret agents; collection of data from the press, delivered through a translator, can also be considered espionage. This almost bizarre case of espionage for a foreign intelligence service proved that the "good old" State Security Service is still very close by.

Any doubts that the observers of the trial had about the collection of data from the press as being a type of espionage were dispelled by Judge Stojadin Jovanovic, who stressed that it was not significant whether the data were secret or not, but that they had been systematically collected with a certain intention. Jovanovic established that Andjelka Stefanov, who is pretentiously being called the Nis Mata Hari, had contacts with the German Federal Intelligence Service [BND], for which she collected the information. When explaining the consequences that this spying activity caused, Jovanovic sounded like a politician: "During a blockade every piece of information is useful for foreign intelligence services. In the difficult situation with which Yugoslavia was confronted, this was a possibility to discredit Yugoslavia in the world. This kind of information can also be used to increase pressure on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia."

The Bill of Indictment

The judge also pointed out that Andjelka Stefanov had contacts with the BND, for which she collected data about the military, political, and economic situation in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, earning from 500 to 3,000 German marks. The court established that Mrs. Stefanov did this by reading all existing dailies and other press, and by filling in forms translated for her by her

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husband Slavko Stefanov, who was a long-time guest worker in Germany. The court claims that Stefanov either took this information directly or sent it in writing to the BND in Duesseldorf.

"The accused confessed during the investigation," reads the indictment, which was signed by Nikola Kostic, Nis Deputy District Attorney. "Her husband introduced her to a Mr. Egon Klein in September 1992. She learned that he was a member of the BND in Munich and that he was also her husband's boss. Since she agreed to cooperate with Klein, he came to visit her in her apartment in Duesseldorf on several occasions, but she could not talk to him since she does not speak German and so her husband talked to him instead! The accused wrote down the information about military artillery ranges, military units and their headquarters, atomic shelters, that tank units were situated in the 'Stevan Sindjelic' and 'Bubanjski heroji' barracks, and that a missile unit is situated in Pantelej. She explained that she took her reports to Germany in her handbag, but that Egon Klein once gave her a handbag with several compartments and with a false bottom, which she showed to her sister. Klein told her husband that it would take his wife a relatively long time to specialize as a spy. He also told him that if she was arrested, he would organize her release because he had his connections," the indictment reads.

Modern and Proven Methods

Mrs. Stefanov's lawyers tried to prove the absurdity of the accusation about her spying activity. They tried to explain that the BND would not employ someone who has completed only six school grades. Her lawyer, Nikola Cvetkovic, formerly the head of the State Security Service at the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Nis, lectured the court on the intelligence services: "The BND is one of the leading intelligence organizations in the modern world, which is creating a new world order. As the second most powerful intelligence service in the world after the CIA, the BND uses modern and proven methods and state-of-the-art equipment."

This former intelligence officer, in his role as an attorney, asked what criteria Mrs. Stefanov used in being a BND spy, since she had not even succeeded in completing her elementary education and thus had worked as a cleaning woman in Germany and added that she had not signed the declaration on cooperation, which is an obligation with pedantic German intelligence officers. He claims that German intelligence officers use the most reliable means and the latest scientific know-how for the protection of their agents. A recruited agent is supplied with a secret print, trained to send reports through the so-called "micropoint," through coded radio messages, and in recent times even through coded satellite connections.

The Words of the Defense and the Accused...

The defense claimed that the collection of data from the mass media cannot be considered as espionage, and that Mr. Stefanov's activity had not damaged the country. It was stated that information on the military, political, and economic situation in the country, on the activities of political parties and their leaders Vojislav Seselj, Zeljko Raznatovic-Arkan, and Vuk Draskovic, the implementation of the embargo, the position of the Catholic Church, on food supplies, and the purchasing price for milk did not affect the security of the state and was of no political significance. "Far more important information can be heard from assembly deputies on television, since assembly sessions are broadcast; some of the things broadcast have even been declared state secrets and nobody has been accused of espionage," was one of the arguments of the defense. [passage omitted]

Montenegro

SDA Official Denies Charges of Illegality

LD2709185594 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1602 GMT 27 Sep 94

[Text] Bijelo Polje, 27 Sep (TANJUG)—The secretary of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA] for Montenegro, Rasim Sahman, was heard today in continuation of the trial of a group of this party's leaders and members charged with plotting the violent creation of the state of Sandzak from parts of Yugoslav territory.

Defendant Sahman has been charged with organizing and forming security departments as illegal and parallel bodies of authority and appointing department heads for the municipalities of Bijelo Polje, Berane, and Rozaj, in the capacity of head of the security department.

The prosecution also charged Sahman with forming crisis headquarters and military groups, and procuring large quantities of arms and ammunition for the needs of these units.

According to the bill of indictment, he received aid in arms from the top leadership of the SDA for Bosnia-Herzegovina, took part in a Visegrad meeting of commanders devoted to the setting up of a corridor between Bosnia and Sandzak and actively participated in selecting and sending persons of Muslim nationality for military training in the Turkish army.

With a lawyer's help, Sahman tried to deny all the accusations from the indictment in a speech that went on for almost six hours.

"I did not form any security department and I did nor arm anyone. It is not true that I received any instructions either from the Muslim National Council or the SDA leadership, and consequently I did not carry them out," Sahman stressed.

Continuing his defense, he said that he had only passed through Visegrad and visited Sarajevo only four times—once to attend an SDA congress and three times on private business.

"I did not go to Turkey, which I visited twice, on orders from the Muslim National Council. The first time I went

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to see the conditions under which our students from Sarajevo University, taken by the Turkish Government, were studying, because two of my own children were among them. The second time I went on a private visit to my daughter and son-in-law," Sahman said.

He did not deny his political activity in the SDA, whose main aim was, according to him, to secure, through dialogue and political means, Muslim national equality and rights, which he claims were put in jeopardy after the disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

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